



British Politics Group **NEWSLETTER+**

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Publication note: The British Politics Group Newsletter is published quarterly by the British Politics Group (BPG). Inquiries about the content of the Newsletter should be communicated to the Editor – address on the front cover. Dues are: One year - \$20 or £14; two years - \$35 or £25; three years - \$50 or £35; graduate student dues at ½ of these rates. **Lifetime membership:** \$500 or £350. Dues and inquiries about membership in the British Politics Group should be directed to the Executive Secretary – address on the front cover. In addition to the Newsletter, the BPG provides an annual annotated bibliography of books on British politics. The BPG offers the Samuel H. Beer Prize for the best dissertation at a North American university on a British politics subject, the Donald E. Stokes Dissertation Fellowship for dissertation research in the UK by a North American working on a British politics topic, and the James B. Christoph Prize for the Best Paper on British Politics by a graduate student at a professional conference. See further details in Activities section below. Inquiries about the Beer Prize, the Stokes Fellowship, and the Christoph Prize should be made to the Executive Secretary. Periodically, a membership directory is compiled and sent to members.

BPG Electronic Communications – A) Discussion List – Joel Wolfe has created a discussion list for the BPG. The instructions for its use were revised in August 1998 as follows: Send an email to listserv@listserv.uc.edu with this message: subscribe BPG-L, followed by your first name, middle initial and last name. Inquiries about the list serve?

Contact Joel at Joel.Wolfe@uc.edu **B) Web Site** – Joel has also constructed a home page for the BPG: <http://www.uc.edu/bpg>. We thank the University of Cincinnati for providing these internet services.

ACTIVITIES

The James B. Christoph Prize for the Best Paper on British Politics by a Graduate Student – 2003 (revised terms)

The fourth annual James B. Christoph Award for the Best Paper on British Politics presented by a graduate student will be awarded by the British Politics Group. The paper (or poster) must be presented at a conference during the calendar year 2003. All papers on British politics, whether solely on Britain or comparative, are eligible. The author/presenter must have been a registered graduate student (pre-awarding of Ph.D.) at any institution of higher education in North America at the time of

presentation. The prize is \$200, and the decision will be made by a three-person committee of established scholars who are BPG members. Four copies of the paper should be submitted to the Executive Secretary of the British Politics Group at the address below by April 1, 2004 for consideration. The winner will be recognized at the 2004 Business Meeting of the BPG in Chicago. The prize is named in honor of the late James B. Christoph, a leading scholar and former President of the BPG.

Submissions to:

Donley T. Studlar, Executive Secretary
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P.O. Box 6317
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Beer Prize Nominations – The Samuel H. Beer Prize was created to honor Samuel Hutchison Beer, a distinguished American scholar of British politics, and to encourage the study of British politics in North American universities. We invite nominations for the 2002 Prize of £200 (\$300) for the best dissertation on British politics completed during the calendar years of 2001, 2002 or 2003. Either a supervising professor or a department's director of graduate studies may nominate a dissertation. No person may nominate more than one dissertation. At least one loose copy of the nominated dissertation, along with a brief letter of nomination, should be postmarked by March 1, 2004 to:

Donley T. Studlar, Executive Secretary
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Tel. 304-293-3811; Fax 304-293-8644
Email: dstudlar@wvu.edu

The principal criterion for awarding the Prize is the dissertation's contribution to the understanding of British politics, regardless of whether the study is exclusively British or comparative research. It is expected that either the nominee or the nominator is a BPG member. All nominees must have received their Ph.D. from a department in the United States or Canada, regardless of whether they are North American citizens. The winner will be announced at the BPG's annual business meeting at the 2004 American Political Science Association annual convention. An unsuccessful candidate in one year must be re-nominated for consideration in a subsequent year.

Stokes Dissertation Fellowship Nominations –

The Donald E. Stokes Dissertation Fellowship was created to honor Donald T. Stokes, a founding member of the British Politics Group, a member of its first Executive Committee, and co-author of the seminal book, *Political Change in Britain*. Its purpose is to enable a North American graduate student doing research on British politics for his or her dissertation to conduct research in the United Kingdom. The award in the amount of \$500 or £300 (choice of recipient) is to be used for Ph.D. dissertation research on British politics, broadly defined, including historical and comparative work, as well as approaches more specifically focused on British politics.

Application must be postmarked no later than March 15, 2004. Applications should include a prospectus of no more than five double-spaced typewritten pages that outline the project and makes clear how the fellowship will aid the research, plus a C.V. of no more than three pages. A letter from the chair of the dissertation committee concerning the project is also required.

The research should be conducted in the United Kingdom sometime during June 2004 through 2005. The successful applicant is required to submit a brief report on the research funded by the fellowship by September 30, 2002, including the purposes for which expenses were incurred. An international committee of British politics scholars will judge applications. Applicants will be notified as soon as possible of the committee's decision.

Inquiries and all materials should be directed to:

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ANNOUNCEMENTS

31ST Annual Western Conference on British Studies, 8-9 October 2004, San Antonio, Texas, Gunter Hotel – This conference welcomes papers and sessions on all aspects of British Studies, including the teaching of British Studies. Paper proposal should provide a brief (200 words) abstract and a brief (1-2 pp.) c.v. For complete sessions, identify the contact person for that event (including address, email, and fax number), and the participants. Volunteers to serve as session chairs or commentators

should send a brief c.v. and indicate the topics for which one would be interested to serve. All proposals or offers to serve should be submitted by 16 April 2004 to: Dr. Paul Deslandes, Department of History, Texas Tech University, P.O. Box 41013, Lubbock, Texas 79409. Tel.: (806) 742-1004, ext. 226. Fax: (805) 742-1060. Email – paul.deslandes@ttu.edu

BPG panels at NEPSA—an invitation (Terry Royed forwarded the following invitation to BPG members.)

The BPG has been invited to organize some panels for the meeting of the Northeast Political Science Association, November 11-13, 2004, in Boston.

This offers an attractive venue and an alternative since it has become more difficult to get on the BPG program at APSA, due to our reduced allocation. I would invite all BPG members to consider this option for their work/travel.

Professor Dan Green of the University of Delaware, who is well experienced with NEPSA, has kindly offered to undertake the role of BPG Program Organizer for this meeting. Please send your offers of participation to him, as follows:

Daniel Green
Dept. of Political Science
University of Delaware
347 Smith Hall
Newark DE 19716
Fax: 302-831-4452
email: dgreen@UDel.Edu

Canadian Studies -The seventh Indiana Canadian Studies Roundtable will be held at Franklin College on Friday, 30 April, 2004. This year's edition of the Roundtable will focus on cultural diversity and the maintenance of cultural identity. Speakers will include Dr. Janet Billson (Director, Group Dimensions International), Dr. Donald Cuccioletta (State University of New York - Plattsburgh), Dr. Jarrett Rudy (McGill University, Montreal), and Dr. Rosalie Vermette (IUPUI). Presentations will cover issues such as the role of women as keepers of the culture in immigrant communities; the ethnic history of Montréal; and cultural retention among Franco-Americans of Canadian descent.

As always, the event will be free and open to the public. It will also feature a luncheon as well as information sessions on resources provided by the Bureau commercial du Québec in Chicago and the Consulate General of Canada in Detroit. In addition, Dr. James Baker of Western Kentucky University will talk about his student internship programme in the House of Commons.

For more information or to register for the event, please contact Dr. Ralph Guentzel, Director of Canadian Studies (rguentzel@franklincollege.edu).

From the BPG-L

Position available - New York Consortium for European Studies Visiting Professor – The Consortium (New York University, Columbia University, New School University) seeks an established European Studies scholar currently teaching in Europe with a minimum of five years teaching experience and specializing in one of more of the following fields: European constitutionalism, justice, and law; comparative politics of Western Europe; international relations of Western Europe; European public policy; modern European history; social movements; religion in Europe, to be the Consortium Visiting Professor during the Fall 2004 semester (September 1-December 31). Specialists in the European Union are particularly sought. The successful applicant will teach two graduate-level courses, one at NYU and one at Columbia, participate in Consortium conferences and workshops, meet with students, and contribute to other activities of the Consortium. The stipend is \$25,000.

There is no application form. Those interested should send a letter, detailed CV and the names, addresses and contact details of references by March 19, 2004 to:

Professor Martin Schain, Director, Center for European Studies, New York University, 58 West 10 Street, New York, NY 10011. Tel: 212-998-3838; Fax: 212-995-4188.

Further information – contact Zoe Ragouzeos, Program Administrator, NYU Center ofr European Studies at: 212-998-3838 or zrl@nyu.edu

GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION/ LEONARD SHAPIRO ANNUAL LECTURE at the PSA Annual Conference, Lincoln University, Lincoln UK

“Institutions Matter,” Professor Adam Przeworski - Wednesday 7 April, 1:30 to 2:15pm
Followed by a drinks reception at 2:15pm, Atrium, Main Academic Building, Lincoln University, Lincoln, UK www.blackwellpublishing.com/journals/gov-opp

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Classics for the British Politics course - Someone on the list asked about this topic. In November, Alan Ward offered these suggestions:

“Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790). This is hard to excerpt because it’s written as a long essay, not as chapters. I recall using pp. 251-352 of an 1869 Little, Brown edition of *The Works of Edmund Burke* because it gave the best zerox copies, but that’s awfully long. A better way is a collection of political philosophy and use the Burke from that. Thirty to 50 pages should be enough to give the flavor of Burke’s argument about an organic constitution, his defense of the English revolution as a renewal of the English constitution, and his attack on the paper rights used by the French.

“Walter Bagehot, *The English Constitution* (1967), Ch. 1, ‘The Cabinet, Cha. 2, ‘The Monarchy,’ and Ch. 5,’ ‘The House of Commons.’ Sometimes I’ve use the Crossman introduction, too, from the Cornell paperback, 1966 of the Collins 1963 edition.

“A.V. Dicey, *The Law of the Constitution* (1885), Ch. 1, ‘The True Nature of Constitutional Law.’ This is where Dicey lays out the difference between constitutional law and constitutional conventions. Dicey’s concept of the convention helps explain what Bagehot is getting at.”

Henry Steck made these comments on the same topic:

“I would suggest L.S. Amery’s *Thoughts on the Constitution*—as well as something from McKenzie, British Political Parties. Does Sam Beer count as a ‘classic of British writing’? If the Frenchman de Tocqueville counts for American political thought, I count Beer as a classic. In my own education, aside from these and those I listed by Alan, I also had a pretty heavy dose of Ivor Jennings, although I don’t know if his work counts as a classic.”

Frank Myers added to the interchange:

“I thank Alan for reviving this topic. I had begun to think I was the only person left who assigns Bagehot. In addition to the chapters Alan cites, I would mention Chapter 6, which deals explicitly with adaptation of British institutions to the primacy of commerce and

science. As for other classics, in addition to those noted by Henry, would it be appropriate to mention Laski's *Grammar of Politics*? There was a time when it was thought to be a strong candidate for classic status—especially the sections dealing with the Britain proper. Am I the only person who has worked his way through A. Lowell Lawrence's two-volume treatise? When it was assigned to me, I was told it was a classic. On the other hand, I would agree that Graham Wallace's *Human Nature and Politics* is a definite classic.

"This whole topic raises the question: Among the books available today, which ones will be regarded as classics fifty or a hundred years from now?"

Is it revolting? Or maybe it isn't? - BPG-ers interested in this topic might be interested in www.revolts.co.uk, which is a new site linked to an ESRC project on backbench dissent that I'm running with Philip Norton.

We'll be posting briefing papers on backbench revolts and votes (we've put two up on top-up fees over the last two days), as well as publishing more detailed papers from time to time.

It's not going to win website of the year—it's all a bit basic at the moment and it certainly doesn't have any flashy bits—but it sort of does what it says on the tin. If you're interested in that sort of thing, you might find it interesting. If you don't, you won't.

We'd be interested in any comments and feedback that you might have on it. (From Philip Cowley, Nottingham)

Philip Norton on Government defeats in the Commons –

There are three types of government defeat in the House of Commons:

[1] Those on votes of confidence. These are motions that explicitly declare confidence in the government or motions to which the government declares confidence attaches. If defeated, the convention is that the government resigns or requests a dissolution of Parliament. The last government to be defeated on a vote of confidence was the Callaghan government on 28 March 1979.

[2] Defeats on major issues of government policy. The government may decide to resign/request a dissolution or seek a vote of confidence from the House. The more recent historical practice has been to seek a vote of confidence from the House (the last occasion was the Major government in 1993).

[3] Defeats on issues that are not deemed to be major. In these cases (the majority of government defeats in the 20th century), the government need only decide whether to accept the defeat or seek its de facto reversal at a later stage. No wider constitutional questions arise. [Bear in mind, incidentally, that between 1972 and 1979 inclusively, there were 65 government defeats in the House of Commons.]

To a large extent, it is a matter for government to determine in which category a defeat falls. This is qualified somewhat in that the Opposition can always table a motion of no confidence (for which time is normally found quickly) and pressure may result in a government, in effect, 'up-grading' a defeat.

[This is a rather brief summary of my piece ('Government Defeats in the House of Commons: Myth and Reality') in *Public Law*, Winter 1978.]

A defeat on a Second Reading vote does not automatically fall into the second category. The Thatcher Government lost a Second Reading vote in April 1986 - when 72 Conservatives voted with the Opposition to defeat

the Shops Bill - but the defeat was confined to the third category. It was overshadowed by the fact that the same evening US planes bombed Libya.

Unrelated to the constitutional question, it is also worth remembering that next week's vote on the Higher Education Bill is on Second Reading. If defeated, the Bill obviously goes no further. If the Government does muster a majority, then there are further opportunities for critics to seek to amend the Bill. [*Philip Norton, Professor The Lord Norton of Louth, Professor of Government, Hull University*]

Re the Hutton Report –(The listserv had probably the longest exchange of views on this topic since the listserv was established. We were asked to print some of this exchange in the BPGN. That proved to be more than we could handle, but see the item below and the Book Review section.)

From Robin Melville (Feb 9)-There is commentary in the upcoming London Review of Books on the Hutton Report that those who have been debating it—and the virtues or otherwise of the media—may find interesting: http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n04/gear01_.html

ARTICLES

‘Election to Nothing’: The Northern Ireland Assembly Election 26 November 2003

*William A. Hazleton
University of Adelaide*

As one might expect, given its troubled existence, the Northern Ireland Assembly election, held on 26 November 2003, was a communal contest over the future of the Good Friday Agreement. The assembly has been suspended since October 2002, its fourth suspension in as many years, when unionist parties withdrew support from the power-sharing executive with Sinn Fein because of IRA activities and rising frustration over paramilitary decommissioning. Ceasefires declared by the IRA and loyalist paramilitary units remain in place, drastically reducing the level of violence; but punishment attacks, allegations of high-profile covert operations, and organized criminal activity north and south of the border serve as visible reminders that ‘normal’ politics have yet to take root in Northern Ireland.

Five years on, parts of the Good Friday Agreement, like cross-border cooperation between Belfast and Dublin, have proved less contentious than originally feared, and its underlying principles of mutual consent, minority inclusion and communal equality have increasingly gained wider acceptance. The assembly too, when in session, proved fairly adaptable at working around logistical quandaries, like the Democratic Unionist Party’s (DUP) physical absence from the executive, and functioned, for the most part, in a civil and constructive manner. But persistent calls for closure on different obligations, like decommissioning, attest to the fact that the framers of the agreement resorted to ‘creative ambiguity’ for the sake of expediency. That unionists and nationalists now insist on far greater clarity and specificity in solving these matters shows the intervening period has done little to diminish the fear and suspicion with which unionists and nationalists view one another. At a minimum, unionists want tangible proof that the war is really over, while nationalists remain unconvinced that unionists really intend to share power. Condemning Sinn Fein as ‘anti-democratic’ for harboring an armed wing, unionists have succumbed to holding representative institutions hostage through their non-participation. Sinn Fein, seeking to advance its own agenda, has

made decommissioning contingent on attaining satisfactory outcomes to highly sensitive questions relating to policing, criminal justice, and British troop reductions. Recrimination and blame, accompanied by threats and boycotts, have plagued the agreement since its inception, creating one crisis after another that have threatened to collapse the assembly if the Northern Ireland secretary of state had not ordered its suspension.

When the fundamental conflict is one of nationality and territoriality, the search for a reasonable middle ground usually proves frustrating, if not totally illusive. Yet, in the wake of the last suspension, Tony Blair was determined to re-start the process through a series of proposals and incentives that would, if accepted, serve as ‘acts of completion.’ These measures were subsequently spelled out in a Joint Anglo-Irish Declaration with the hope of restoring the political institutions and proceeding with the assembly election originally scheduled for May 2003. Despite the personal intervention of the two prime ministers, and even President Bush’s cameo appearance at Hillsborough Castle, this comprehensive Anglo-Irish package failed to entice Sinn Fein or reassure most unionists. More discussions followed over the next months, including the first face-to-face negotiations between the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and Sinn Fein, with Irish and British officials, along with then U.S. special envoy Richard Haass, patiently prodding in the background.

By mid-October, UUP leader David Trimble and Sinn Fein’s Gerry Adams had apparently secured a private understanding. On 21 October a sequence of events, carefully choreographed by the Northern Ireland Office, began unfolding when Downing Street announced the November date for the assembly election. Adams followed with a speech that while stopping short of saying the ‘war was over,’ articulated Sinn Fein’s opposition to the use or threat of physical force. The IRA publicly endorsed Adams’ speech within minutes. Then Canadian General de Chastelain, head of the International Independent Commission on Decommissioning, issued a terse statement that he had earlier witnessed a quantity of IRA weapons being put ‘beyond use,’ confirmed by a second IRA statement. But under terms agreed with the IRA, the general disclosed few specifics. The baton then passed to Trimble. He welcomed Adams’ remarks as positive, but maintained lack of transparency in the general’s report did not provide sufficient confidence to complete

the sequence by announcing his party would return to the executive. Within hours a deal that required the Ulster Unionists and Sinn Fein, as well as the IRA, to stretch further than they could comfortably go failed to rescue the assembly, an outcome that few political observers in Belfast found unexpected or particularly alarming.

Already criticized for 'denying democracy' by issuing two previous postponements, Blair kept the assembly election date as announced. Resenting that the prime minister had left him out on a limb, with a faction of his own party already attempting to push him off his perch, an exasperated David Trimble dismissed the 'election to nothing' as pointless. Trimble was not the only one with reservations; Ireland's Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, in a moment of candor, predicted the election would result in 'a mess.'

However, Blair's announcement delighted two parties, Sinn Fein and Ian Paisley's DUP, representing the harder edges of Green and Orange. Over the years, these parties had assiduously avoided the taint of compromise or surrender, and each now hoped to win a decisive majority on its home turf by having the least to concede in negotiating the return of devolution. Success for Sinn Fein and the DUP could only come at the expense of the parties that had hammered out the bulk of the Good Friday accord, namely, the nationalist Socialist Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Trimble's UUP, plus the smaller non-sectarian Northern Ireland Alliance Party (NIAP) and Northern Ireland Women's Coalition (NIWC). With unionists and nationalists deeply divided over decommissioning, and increasingly skeptical as to the assembly's future, the electorate instinctively retreated into their tribal camps, making the election another intra-ethnic contest between the DUP and UUP on the unionist side and Sinn Fein and SDLP battling for the nationalist vote.

Two hundred and twenty-six candidates contested the election, representing a total of 17 parties and including 23 independents of various sorts. As in 1998, the 108 Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) were elected from Northern Ireland's 18 Westminster constituencies by proportional representation, using a single transferable vote. Each constituency elects six MLAs. Eighty-nine, or slightly more than one-third, of the candidates were members of the last assembly; a high proportion served as local district councilors; 13 were

Westminster MPs; one, Rev. Ian Paisley, was also an MEP, and one, Lord Kilclooney, a former MP and, like Paisley, a member of the old Stormont parliament, was a life peer. There was ample precedent for using well-known public figures to draw voters in competitive constituencies. Sixty-six district councilors had been elected MLAs in 1998, comprising slightly more than 60% of the chamber. The first assembly also included 16 MLAs who served concurrently as MPs, though not all at the same time, along with two MEPs and two life peers, Lord Kilclooney and the speaker, Lord Adlerdice. The only difference in 2003 was one of the Westminster MPs, Andrew Hunter (Independent Conservative – Basingstoke), who contested Lagan Valley for the DUP, was from outside Northern Ireland; he was also the only MP not elected.

Admittedly, the circumstances under which this election was held were not the best, but Robin Wilson of the Belfast-based Democratic Dialogue still faults the media for concentrating on the impasse between unionists and Sinn Fein and for fanning speculation as to who might do what, not in the assembly, but in the next round of negotiations. Obviously, with the assembly suspended, it was not initially clear, nor did the media provide much assistance in clarifying, what was in store should the election outcome make a power-sharing executive impossible. This mixture of confusion and concern shored up support for the four main parties and turned the contest into two separate elections for communal leadership, one on each side of the sectarian divide.

Questions of past performance and substantive policy issues received scant mention during the campaign. Accustomed to having neither governmental responsibility nor political accountability under direct rule from London, the opportunity to set policy priorities and allocate public spending has had limited appeal in Northern Ireland. Moreover, since the consociational model used for the power-sharing executive is a non-voluntary coalition of the main parties, there really is no political opposition. Not surprisingly, this arrangement has allowed shortcomings in performance to be conveniently laid squarely at the feet of central government.

Party manifestos cited the need for improvements in the health service, education, transportation infrastructure, economic opportunity, and the environment; but on the hustings these problems, if

addressed at all, were usually crouched in terms of rights and entitlements. Smaller parties, like Alliance and NIWC, stood out as notable exceptions by developing positions on policy questions, as did the rare independent like socialist Eamonn McCann in Derry or Dr. Kieran Deeney who campaigned exclusively on retaining acute care facilities at his local hospital. The main parties preferred to steer clear of substantive issues, even highly contentious ones like policing, and target what they saw as fundamental flaws in the peace process; that is, well-rehearsed arguments of who had been promised what, who had benefited and at whose expense, who had violated their responsibilities, etc. Unlike program development and expense allocation, process-related concerns ideally suited sectarian parties intent on venting their constitutional aspirations of remaining part of the UK or joining a united Ireland.

As for saving the Good Friday Agreement with ‘acts of completion,’ the pro-agreement faction of unionism aligned with Trimble discreetly distanced itself from the accord for fear of contamination, preferring to market themselves under the heading ‘Simply British.’ Paisley’s message, though less disguised, called for ‘renegotiating’ the agreement in some unspecified way, but the impression among critics, as well as diehard supporters, was nothing short of rejection. Sinn Fein and SDLP presented themselves as the agreement’s defenders, determined to resist unionist tampering or attempts at renegotiation. Each attacked the re-imposition of direct rule and insisted on the restoration of the power-sharing executive; in short, decommissioning need not prevent the peace process from forging ahead on a variety of fronts. One that Sinn Fein and SDLP ardently espoused was the aggressive expansion of cross-border contacts, and their preoccupied with when and how Irish unification would inevitably materialize made their commitment to the assembly appeared fleeting at best. Thus, with little in the way of substance being discussed, the campaign followed Ulster’s all too familiar pattern of tribal politics where opposing constitutional objectives fuel mutual suspicion and animosity.

The outcome of the election was never seriously in doubt, just the final margins of victory for DUP and Sinn Fein. If the purpose was to break the political deadlock, the election may have been pointless, if not counterproductive given the outcome, as most

now predict a continuation of direct rule. For Northern Ireland’s unique brand of bi-communal politics, the election witnessed a major re-alignment of political forces within unionism and dramatic confirmation that Sinn Fein had consolidated its pre-eminence within nationalism. (See fig.1) As the net beneficiary of growing Protestant disenchantment with the agreement, DUP topped the poll with a 7.5% increase in first preference votes and a gain of 10 seats, bringing the historic dominance of the UUP to an end. An aging Ian Paisley may personify ‘no surrender’ unionism, but his party has been careful to avoid being labeled ‘wreckers’ by assuming its place in the executive while reassuring its faithful it has no physical contact with Sinn Fein. Bombastic attacks condemning the agreement on highly principled grounds have overshadowed DUP’s subtle shift toward acceptance of a power-sharing arrangement with nationalists. Much like its antithesis, Sinn Fein, DUP’s fundamentalism has yielded to what is politically expedient, presenting a more moderate and pragmatic approach that appeals to a wider segment of the unionist electorate.

Figure 1: Distribution of 1st Preference Votes and Northern Ireland Assembly Seats in 2003 and 1998¹

	DUP	UUP	NIAP	OTHERS*	SDLP	SF
Seats Won (2003)	30	27	6	3	18	24
Vote Share (2003)	27.71%	22.67%	3.68%	5.6%	16.98%	23.52%
Seats Won (1998)	20	28	6	13	24	18
Vote Share (1998)	18.14%	21.25%	6.5%	11.52%	21.97%	17.63%

* Includes United Kingdom Unionist Party (UKUP), Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC), Progress Unionist Party (PUP), Independent Unionists, and other Independents.

Failing to extract concessions on decommissioning, and plagued by internecine warfare, even greater losses were initially expected for the Ulster Unionists. As it was, the party’s share of first preference votes actually rose slightly, and it lost only one seat; but this offered little consolation for a

party that has always occupied Ulster's center stage. Increased support for the DUP, and to a lesser extent the UUP, came at the sacrifice of smaller unionist and loyalist parties, along with a half dozen independent unionist candidates. The stark line drawn over decommissioning and Sinn Fein in the executive made this a battle of the titans, with the DUP and UUP accounting for 95% of unionist first preference votes, a significant increase over their combined total of 78% in the 1998 election. The UUP suffered a further blow in mid-December when MP Jeffrey Donaldson (Lagan Valley), the recipient of the highest percentage of first preference votes (34%) of any candidate, along with two other UUP MLAs, defected to the DUP. Recouping its lost status will be difficult unless the UUP can stem the deepening divisions within its ranks, and with the possibility of still more defections, Trimble's leadership faces serious challenge.

Unlike the Ulster Unionists, Sinn Fein visibly benefited from being at the center of the implementation debate, and its failure to be more forthcoming on decommissioning proved anything but a liability. Its first preference vote rose a healthy 5.9%, accompanied by a gain of six seats, making it Northern Ireland's second largest party and expanding its lead over SDLP with 58% of nationalist first preference votes. Sinn Fein also widened its geographic base outside West Belfast, Derry, and the border areas, winning seats in 12 of 18 constituencies, up from nine in 1998, including former Belfast mayor Alex Maskey's final count victory in predominantly middle class and religiously mixed South Belfast.

SDLP, the party that had sacrificed to bring Sinn Fein into the political process, suffered a major setback at hands of its nationalist rival. A 5% decline in first preference votes dropped SDLP from first place in 1998 to a poor fourth and occasioned the loss of six assembly seats. The year-long suspension and decommissioning controversy effectively sidelined the party, and as politically astute Sinn Fein operatives undercut their positions, SDLP's defensive reaction created the appearance, whether warranted or not, of a weak imitation; i.e., 'Sinn Fein lite.' To revamp their image, SDLP invested heavily in political broadcasts, advertising, market research, and media, spending nearly ten times as much as Sinn Fein, Ireland's wealthiest party, although the latter probably has local expenses not yet reported in the register of campaign

expenditures. Another problem plaguing SDLP was generational; not only did the party have less appeal to younger nationalist voters, but many SDLP stalwarts, like John Hume (Foyle) and fellow MPs, Seamus Mallon (Newry & Armagh) and Eddie McGrady (South Down), had either resigned as MLAs or not sought re-election because of their pending retirement from politics. For several well-known veterans who did contest the election, the results were bitterly disappointing, with only 55% of SDLP incumbents retaining their seats in comparison with 80% for Sinn Fein and in excess of 90% for both the DUP and UUP.

Intense intra-communal competition also squeezed support from smaller non-sectarian parties. Alliance witnessed a dramatic 43% drop in its first preference total, but proved miraculously resilient by holding on to its six assembly seats through the help of transfer votes in the final counts. The Northern Ireland Women's Coalition lost both its seats in the assembly, with co-founder Monica McWilliams falling prey to Sinn Fein in South Belfast. The further erosion of what already constituted a very narrow and fragile center ground in Ulster politics has caused some to question whether voters actually understood what they were voting for because the result reinforced the political impasse. While suspension may have sparked some initial confusion, the preferences of the 63% of the electorate that did vote indicated that most voters were either suspicious of compromise and/or opposed to concessions on the key issues dividing unionism and nationalism. If for no other reason, substantial majorities voted along sectarian lines for what they saw as the least worst alternative, the status quo, realizing the likely outcome was further political gridlock.

The composition of what is at present a virtual assembly reflects considerable continuity as well as some unique elements of North Irish politics. Sixty-five of the 108 MLAs, or 60%, are incumbents. Seventy-one MLAs, or 66%, concurrently serve as district councilors; in fact, 75% of DUP MLAs are district councilors, followed by 72% for SDLP. Twelve Northern Ireland MPs are MLAs, including all five (or six counting Jeffrey Donaldson) DUP MPs and all four Sinn Fein MPs. Moreover, four DUP MPs are also district councilors and the fifth, Ian Paisley, is soon to retire as MEP. Unlike its rivals, the UUP has attempted to restrict MPs from

contesting assembly seats, with the exception of the party leader, David Trimble (Upper Bann). However, in a fruitless attempt to placate two of Trimble's more vocal critics, the party allowed the nominations of David Burnside (Antrim South) and Jeffrey Donaldson to go forward in 2003.

The political breakdown among the 108 MLAs is as follows: 59 unionists, 42 nationalists, 6 Alliance, and 1 independent, Dr. Deeney, who topped the West Tyrone poll in protest of hospital cutbacks. Thirty-four of the 59 unionists are considered 'anti-agreement'; that is, united in their opposition to Sinn Fein's participation in the executive in the absence of decommissioning and the IRA standing down. They include the 30 DUP MLAs, plus the three UUP MLAs defectors, and Robert McCartney, a unionist maverick and the sole representative of the UK Unionist Party. The remaining 74 MLAs are loosely described as 'pro-agreement'; however, other than a perceived willingness to work within the overall context of the Good Friday Agreement, this faction lacks any unity of purpose or shared sense of direction. A notable example is that half of the remaining 24 Ulster Unionist MLAs are increasingly skeptical of enticing the IRA to decommission and support sanctions against Sinn Fein. Not surprisingly, SDLP is much more broadly supportive given its role in devising the conceptual and structural basis for the agreement; whereas Sinn Fein's backing has always been conditional and confined to its strict interpretation of the agreement.

Lifting suspension would trigger the creation of a power-sharing executive. The first minister and deputy first minister, each representing a different cultural tradition, are elected on a cross-community basis requiring at least 40% of the unionist and nationalist vote. The other ten ministers comprising the executive are appointed by the main parties using the rather complicated D'Hondt formula to determine their allocation. The election results would, under more normal conditions, likely produce a DUP first minister and a Sinn Fein deputy first minister, with four ministries awarded to DUP with 33 MLAs, and two each to the UUP, SDLP, and Sinn Fein. While nationalists have expressed reservations over the majority of ministries possibly going to unionists, unlike the five-five split D'Hondt produced in the last assembly, the critical stumbling block is achieving cross-community consensus on the first and deputy first ministers. The DUP at

present will not go into government with Sinn Fein, and there is no likelihood of SDLP stepping forward as an acceptable nationalist alternative or of Sinn Fein being excluded from the assembly. Thus, the assembly remains suspended in a virtual mode, costing £1.93 million a month, with MLAs receiving 70% of their yearly salary (£31,817) to handle constituency matters, expenditures that many in Northern Ireland have openly questioned in the local media.

A four-year review, stipulated in the Good Friday Agreement, was belatedly convened at the beginning of February 2004. The original intent was to assess the operation of the agreement, reviewing largely nuts-and-bolts issues, not to resolve outstanding disagreements like decommissioning. Fearing the election might stall the peace process, the British and Irish Governments emphasized the review's potential for restoring devolved government. But within a matter of weeks, new allegations of IRA paramilitary activity made decommissioning the singular focus and put meaningful cross-party talks in serious doubt. Meanwhile, the attention of the major sectarian parties has already shifted to June's European parliamentary elections, in which two MEPs, Hume and Paisley, both serving since 1979, are stepping down. Hoping to enhance its all-island status, Sinn Fein is running a total of five candidates on both sides of the border, and it will also contest 200 seats in local elections, twice the number it contested in 1999, scheduled for the same day in the Irish Republic. Judging by the assembly election, communal tensions and the peace process 'in crisis' will, if anything, advantage of DUP and Sinn Fein in the European elections, leaving them little incentive for resolving the standoff over decommissioning any time soon.

In early January, Northern Ireland Secretary Paul Murphy hinted that he might lift suspension after the review ran its course, which he anticipated would be some time after the Easter, and thus initiate the formation of a power-sharing executive. Under the agreement, if the executive is not created by mutual agreement within six weeks, a new assembly election is automatically called. Under current circumstances, another election would be the only conceivable reason for lifting suspension. No one, however, expects a different result, at least in the short run; and thus the likely scenario is direct rule lasting several years, perhaps with certain modifications as

jointly determined by the British and Irish governments.

Unlike other places in the British Isles, elections in Northern Ireland tend to be ends in themselves. The reason they reinforce, rather than resolve, divisions is that voting, even at this point a border poll, cannot deliver the result that either side desperately wants. For the Protestant majority, it is a greater sense of permanence and stability through an internal settlement that links Northern Ireland to Britain, while an increasingly confident Catholic minority sees the peace process inexorably leading to a united Ireland. As long as Northern Ireland remains polarized by questions of national identity and territorial sovereignty, elections will give voice to communal self-assertiveness that will drown out those extolling the practical benefits of collaborative regional self-government.

¹ Complete set of Northern Ireland election statistics is available at <http://www.ark.ac.uk/elections/>.

ABSTRACTS

From Conferences –

The North American Conference on British Studies/The Northwest Conference on British Studies Annual Meeting, Portland, Ore., 24-26 October 2003

“British Propaganda, the American Press, and the Construction of an Anglo–American Identity in the First World War”

This paper examines the construction of an Anglo-American identity during World War I in the propaganda efforts of Wellington House, a key British propaganda agency, and in the editorial line and coverage of the American press. These two sites for the development of an Anglo-American imagined community are linked circumstantially, insofar as Wellington House efforts were directed clandestinely toward influencing the American press. As the American government abandoned its neutrality and joined the war, and as newspaper opinion shifted to the Allied side, much of the language employed in the press in defense of these shifts echoed that offered by Wellington House. This paper compares

the language employed by Wellington House pamphleteers and the American press, taking the *Atlanta Constitution* and *Milwaukee Journal* as case studies. This comparison reveals considerable success by Wellington House, whose staff would of course judge success by newspaper coverage rather than any certainty that they had caused it. It reveals further that the newspapers sampled transformed during the course of the war from relatively critical, independent agencies of opinion into organs that echoed official British and (eventual) American government lines fairly rigorously. *Jessica Bennett and Mark Hampton, Wesleyan College*

“Negotiating Consent: Nationalism, Feminism, and British Politics between the Wars”

Starting in 1930, the British government held a series of Round Table Conferences in London to encourage the cooperation of Indian nationalists in establishing constitutional reforms for India. The controversy leading up to the signing of the Government of India Act in 1935 focused public attention both at home and abroad in a new way on the issue of Britain’s role as an imperial power. Indian men and women with varying degrees of support for “Home Rule” which included the consideration of dominion status as opposed to full independence gathered in London during the three Round Table Conferences to plead their case in front of British lawmakers. This paper explores the range of responses that Indian leaders expressed at these meetings to proposed changes to British rule in India. In particular, I will examine how Indian feminists came to have a voice in nationalist politics through their participation in these discussions and in their subsequent attempts to make issues such as female political representation an important consideration in future constitutional matters. Through carefully aligning themselves with British feminist institutions and deploying an internationalist rhetoric of gender solidarity, Indian women forged new alliances with sympathetic male nationalists and British politicians in their attempt to direct local and international attention towards what they came to posit as the interconnected causes of improving women’s status and Indian independence. *Michelle Elizabeth Tusan, University of Nevada Las Vegas.*

“Feeding hunger strikers in Britain and the Empire, ca. 1909-1930.” This paper explains how British officials determined whether to “forcibly feed” hunger strikers in Britain and the Empire. Historians have vilified British officials for the practice of forcible feeding, yet there is no study of the process through which British officials determined this course of action. This paper begins with the case of a hunger strike by Indian nationalists in 1932, then demonstrates how British officials in both India and Britain determined their policy on forcible feeding by looking to previous hunger strikes by Irish nationalists and British suffragettes. This paper explains the standards and principles by which British officials attempted to pursue a consistent policy on forcible feeding, despite conspicuous differences among hunger strikers and between their objectives in protesting against disparate British regimes. Historians have previously demonstrated that the British domestic government became increasingly involved in the regulation of nutrition and the alleviation of hunger after the Great War. This paper, by contrast, examines how British officials responded to hunger as a form of political protest at this time, weighing their interests in political expediency, their duty to feed, and their fear of prosecution for murder. *Kevin Grant, Hamilton College*

“Keeping the news British: the BBC, British United Press and Reuters in the 1930s”

In January 1932 the news agency British United Press (BUP) offered to supply the BBC with their overseas wire services—and so unleashed a seven-year dispute that came to involve the BBC, the British news agencies (notably Reuters), Fleet Street, Parliament, and the Foreign Office. The central issue was straightforward: was the BUP merely a front organisation for the United Press of America (UPA), and if so, would taking the BUP news wires fatally compromise the integrity of British news broadcasting. The dispute, however, brought to the surface both longstanding rivalries between the British and American international news agencies, and deep-seated concerns about ‘American’ versus ‘British’ news values. It thus encapsulates a range of tensions in Anglo-American media relations in the mid-C20: as a commercial dispute centring on ‘news’ as a commodity; as a cultural dispute about the ‘national character’ of news; and as a wider international dispute about global American media influence in a time of British imperial decline.

The paper first addresses the history of the BBC news service from its infancy in the 1920s to its expansion into a fully fledged ‘News Department’ in the early 1930s. It outlines the persistent approaches to the BBC of the Canadian-registered BUP throughout the 1930s; the BBC’s eventual decision during 1936/7 to adopt the BUP news service alongside its established news agency services; and the outraged response of the British news agencies, manifested in a covert campaign orchestrated by Sir Roderick Jones, Managing Director of Reuters, to discredit the BUP.

The paper then discusses the motivations of the key players: why the BBC initially felt the BUP were both superfluous to its requirements as a news provider and inappropriately ‘American’ (i.e., slick, speedy and speculative) in its news values, and why these attitudes changed, along with the BBC’s own vision of its news service, during the 1930s; what the BUP’s encroachment represented to Reuters, at that time under commercial threat globally from both UPA and the Associated Press, and with its world-wide reputation as a British and Imperial news agency dwindling; Jones’ decision to invoke political fears of Americanization, lobbying the Foreign Office to rule whether American-owned news agencies should be in a position to ‘influence’ the output of a news organisation (the BBC) whose reliability was of the utmost political importance. The impact of the revelation (again orchestrated by Jones) that the BUP was indeed, despite its repeated denials, a de facto subsidiary of UPA, is considered alongside the more significant impact of the Munich crisis, which in exposing the limitations of both BBC and Reuters news coverage persuaded the BBC of the urgent need to expand its international news gathering operation, including—and even beyond—BUP.

Above all this dispute demonstrates two aspects of the debate about American influence in this period. First, it underscores the commercial, cultural and political complexities behind the simple pejorative label of ‘Americanization’. Second, it makes clear how the BBC saw Americanization as something that could be contained, accommodated, even made ‘British’. Arguably it was by becoming more ‘American’ in its attitude to news that the BBC would, over the course of the Second World War, establish and cement the uniquely powerful worldwide reputation of ‘British’ broadcast news. *Siân Nicholas, University of Wales Aberystwyth*

“Eclipsing the Great White Mother: Virginia Woolf and Queen Victoria”

In a 1905 book review, Virginia Woolf warns her readers about assessing an author’s relationship to “the great dead,” arguing for a highly personal, imaginary relationship between writer and historical figure rather than a more literal one born of actual acquaintance or familiarity with a person’s life from reading traditional biography (“Literary Geography”). In this paper, I reconstruct Woolf’s imaginary relationship with Queen Victoria by tracing her function in Woolf’s oeuvre. Focusing in particular on the essay “The Sun and the Fish” (1928) and her two essays on “Royalty” (1939), I consider not only the ways Woolf reshapes Victoria but also the role Victoria plays in Woolf’s struggle to reconcile the relationship between art and politics, such as her conflicts surrounding the demands of her art, her belief in the power and sanctity of the imagination, and her sense of responsibility as a woman to promote progressive social change.

If, as Woolf writes in *A Room of One’s Own* and *Three Guineas*, respectively, “we think back through our mothers if we are women” and “as a woman, I have no country. As a woman I want no country. As a woman my country is the whole world,” then Queen Victoria occupies a paradoxical place in Woolf’s imaginary. She is both one of Woolf’s “mothers,” as Jay Dickson has argued, and a potent and enduring symbol for her country—the very nation Woolf criticizes for contributing to the exploitation of women, colonized subjects, and Jews. Queen Victoria, as mother of the Empire, Victorian Ur-mother, literary foremother, and one of the most famous female historical figures of her time, poses a contradiction for Woolf, whose writing honored real and symbolic mothers and a matrilineal tradition opposed to arrogance, hierarchy, war, and domination.

In this paper, I argue that Woolf “makes Victoria new,” to borrow Ezra Pound’s injunction, not by offering a new version of the Queen, but by highlighting her status as imperial icon and the power of such images to transform the collective imagination—and, potentially, the political landscape. In Woolf’s imagination, Victoria is associated not only with imperialism but also with the making and

working of national and imperial symbols, and with the public’s worship of such symbols. Woolf’s essay “The Sun and the Fish” and her two essays on “Royalty” articulate what Natania Rosenfeld has identified in another context as Woolf’s distrust of symbols and of representation that fixes meaning. For Woolf, Queen Victoria—as bad prose stylist, as symbol of Empire, as meta-symbol—personifies this type of representation—representation that harnesses memory, limits the imagination, and furthers undemocratic forms of living. In other words, Queen Victoria was for Woolf a reminder of how not to write. *Janet Winston, English and Women’s Studies, Virginia Commonwealth University*

BOOK REVIEWS

Errata – In the last issue, the final word in Jerry Waltiman’s review of *The English Judge* and *As Far As I Remember* was clipped in half. Instead of reading “me,” it should have read “means.”

Simon Rogers, *The Hutton Inquiry and its Impact* (London: Politico’s Guardian Books, 2004), xxvi & 374 pp., Pb. £7.99

This is a book that those fascinated by the Hutton Report and the dustup it evoked will want to have at hand in order to refresh their memory and drag out debating points. The text is supplemented by a *dramatis personae*, a time line (10 pp.), a glossary (4 pp.) and three appendices, one of which has the website for the full Report.

For those that are long time *Guardian* readers, it will be seen as even handed; others may disagree. The book features David Aaronovitch, Oliver Burkeman, Vikram Dodd, Jonathan Freedland, Tom Haggold, David Hencke, Simon Hoggart, Ewen MacAskill, Richard Norton-Taylor, Polly Toynbee, Nicholas Watt, Matt Wells, and Michael White. In addition, Alan Rusbridger wrote the Foreword, from which I offer this excerpt: “At every turn, the politicians, civil servants, and spooks were exonerated. At every turn the BBC journalists, managers, and governors were damned.” Rusbridger adds that when the Hutton read the Report, “There was an air of disbelief in the courtroom.” (p. vi)

For those that want an overview of the Report, Hutton's 14 pp. Summary is reprinted. The heart of the book is the 200+ pp. "THE EVIDENCE DAY BY DAY" with sketches by Aaronovitch, Burkeman, and Hoggart.

There are a few minor pagination errors, which may be expected from a book rushed so quickly into print, but the product is one that, assuming the Report has a long-life in British political discourse, one will return to time and again. *T.P. Wolf, Indiana University Southeast*

Melanie Latham, *Regulating Reproduction: A Century of Conflict in Britain and France* (Manchester & New York: University of Manchester, 2002), xiv & 262 pp., Bibliography, Index, Cl. \$69.95.

Contraception, abortion, and assisted conception are components of a comprehensive policy attempting to regulate reproduction. These topics are not the usual stuff of politics: they often involve moral issues; they require politicians to master new medical technologies; and they involve, fundamentally, women's rights and status. Complementing her background in law, Melanie Latham has gathered these political elements and used them to present a comprehensive look at the development of reproduction regulations in Britain (referred to as UK throughout the book, despite the title) and France.

The author's ambitious goal in writing *Regulation and France* is to examine the way policy actors have dealt with contraception, abortion and assisted contraception legally and politically during the twentieth century. In the first chapter, she attempts to set out the theoretical framework for analysis. Perhaps due to an effort to pare down the literature reviews which were, no doubt, part of the dissertation that serves the basis for the book, the framework is neither clear nor systematic. At first she indicates that policy community theory will provide the basis for the three main organizing themes for the book (pp. 4-5) However, there are only two themes discussed in that section. Then, the author concludes the chapter by presenting short and unconnected expositions of other concepts including: policy styles; political opportunity structures; the

political community model; medicalisation; feminism and reproduction and various capacities of groups to influence policy. Most of these terms appear here and there in the chapters that follow, but they are not particularly useful in integrating the findings into a coherent analysis.

The contribution of the book is, instead, as a very useful and comprehensive source of information about reproduction law and politics. The book is organized according to the three component issues. For each, there is a chapter that describes the parallel development of law in the UK and France since the early 1900s. Some of the information, especially on contraception and abortion, can be found in other books but not in such a handy and detailed form. The chapter on assisted contraception law charts a lot of new material and the descriptions of the contrasting rights of women's access to new technologies the two countries is especially interesting. In all three chapters on law, the author focuses on those different aspects of the common law/status law legal system in Britain and the code/civil law system in France to explain variations in the patterns of change and the content of the laws.

Each of these law chapters is followed by a chapter that details the policy conflicts and interest group politics related to the development of the statutes and case law in the two countries. This positioning of law followed by politics differs from usual approaches in policy analysis literature where the conflicts that lead to the enactment of a statutes are presented first. However, the opposite plan works for this author whose primary focus is on law as the framework for politics, rather than politics as the context for law. These policy conflict chapters deal especially with the ideas and activities of feminists on each of the issues and how their goals, organizations, strategies and influence vary cross nationally and over time. Their activism is shown in relation to other participants, especially the health policy community, organizations of doctors, churches and pro-life advocates.

The conclusion concentrates almost exclusively on the feminist question. Given the interest of the author in the gender aspects of reproductive policy, it is surprising she does not foreground this topic in the title and first chapter of the book. Latham's

findings reinforce others' conclusions that, on the issues of contraceptive and abortion, feminists both inside and outside the state have been extremely influential in determining the content of policy reforms. Their success has been less in the area of assisted contraception, perhaps due to the lack of unity among women's rights activists with respect to whose interests—women seeking to have children or women at risk of exploitation—should take precedence as they seek to influence policy. And, as new biomedical technologies in relation to reproduction challenge feminists and policy makers alike, it is also an issue which, unlike abortion and contraception, remains unsettled. *Dorothy McBride Stetson, Florida Atlantic University*

Kimberly Cowell-Meyers, *Religion and Politics in the Nineteenth Century: The Party Faithful in Ireland and Germany* (Westport & London: Praeger, 2002), xii & 145 pp., Bibliography, Index, C1 \$59.95

After some years of dormancy, religion re-emerged in 19th century Europe as the center of political conflict. In *Religion and Politics in Ireland and Germany*, Kimberly Cowell-Meyers presents a thorough review and cogent analysis of two of those instances. The story of church-state conflict in Ireland and Germany is fairly well known and this book breaks no new historical ground, however the author relates that account with acuity for both countries. What is most rewarding in this fine book is the author's explanation for how conflicts with similar origins could lead to such divergent outcomes in different contexts.

In Germany, Bismark's effort to unify the disparate German *Länder* included an assault on the rights and privileges of the Roman Catholic Church. Believing that the church was an ideological and institutional threat to the expansion of state power and to the development of German nationalism, Bismark imposed various disabilities on lay German Catholics and on church leaders (pp.18-21). The unintended consequence of this action was to unify German Catholics in a way they had not been unified before (p. 27), strengthen the power of Catholic political clubs (p. 30), and lead to the formation of the *Zentrum*, the Catholic center party that effectively defended Catholic political interests in Germany (pp. 31-34). In light of this

opposition, Bismark eventually dropped most of the legislation that discriminated against Catholics (pp. 43-45), and as a result religion eventually dissipated as a point of political cleavage in Germany. Ironically, Bismark accomplished his goal of unifying the German state not by confronting religion, but by ignoring it.

There were similar church-state issues in Ireland. The largely Protestant United Kingdom had been imposing disabilities on Roman Catholics, particularly those in Ireland, for years (p. 60). Moreover, the British state was both expanding its powers, and liberalizing, in ways that created conflict with the corporatist claims of the Roman Catholic Church (pp. 65-66). As with Germany, the Catholic Church tried to mobilize the Irish Catholic population into a political movement that could secure rights for individual believers, along with social and political privileges for the church as a whole (pp.75-76). Cowell-Meyers persuasively demonstrates, however, that this effort largely failed. Irish Catholics did mobilize during this period, but that they did so less on the basis of political Catholicism and more as a result of struggles over land reform and home rule. Nationalist mobilization, rather than confessional politics, became central in Ireland. Ironically, however, this did not conclude in the full pacification of religion in Ireland, but simply subsumed that cleavage in what progressively became a more violent and destructive dispute.

I particularly value the comparative framework of this book. The selection of cases is determined by a well-defined theoretical question: what was the nature of church-state conflict in 19th century Europe? Cowell-Meyers is right, I think, that there is much similarity in her two case studies. As her careful reviews of Ireland and Germany demonstrate, however, there are also numerous differences between them that make it difficult to make sweeping conclusions about the nature and conditions under which religious conflict is politicized. Among the key dissimilarities that she notes was the fact that the British state was lessening its disabilities against Catholics during this period, while Germany was advancing them. Clearly, this would have created less an incentive for political mobilization around religion in Ireland than in Germany. Moreover, that Ireland was a colony helped determine that nationalist, rather than religious, politics would dominate that dispute. In short, while the book provides a helpful

and interesting read on the history of each country, it does not – possibly cannot – provide an answer to the question for why religion will or will not come to dominate the politics of a particular state. Finally, the other question I wished Cowell-Meyers might have pursued is how the politicization of religion impacts a particular church. An interesting contrast between the countries is that the Roman Catholic Church in Germany was more successful at mobilizing Catholics for religious politics at the end of the 19th Century than its Irish counterpart; however, by the mid-to late 20th century religion as a political variable was much more significant in Ireland than in Germany. Does the politicization of religion, in short, bring some short term political relevance to the church, but weakens its institutional hold over time?

That said, this is a very helpful book, particularly in its treatment of the church-state relations in Ireland and Germany at the end of the 19th century. *J. Christopher Soper, Pepperdine University, Malibu, California*

Lawrence Black, *The Political Culture of the Left in Affluent Britain, 1951-64: Old Labour, New Britain?* (Houndmills & New York: Macmillan & Palgrave, 2003), ix & 263 pp., Bibliography, Index, Cl. \$72.00.

Black, visiting professor of British history at Westminster College in Missouri, provides a survey of British left during the emergence of the “affluent society” in the period of Conservative ascendancy between 1951 and 1964. This subject is not without interest for us today. “Affluence” was to the socialist project of the immediate postwar period what “globalization” is today following the end of the Cold War. Both reflect a triumphant capitalism which threatens to erode class consciousness and class solidarity. Each represents an expansion and deepening of the circuit of capital—the one functionally, the other geographically. And both are linked to American hegemony in terms of cultural as well as material consequences. By the “left,” Black refers specifically to socialists rather than more broadly to progressives generally such as trade unionists, social democrats or peace activists. He locates the British left during this period organizationally among the Labour Left, the British Communist Party, and the New Left. The book argues that the left rejected

the “affluent society,” and its condemnation is the cause of the left’s decline in Britain in the two decades following the Second World War. The work is an implicit apologia for Revisionism within postwar Britain and for its current modality of Blairism.

Black approaches its study of the British left from the perspective of the “new political history.” This theoretical perspective is heavily influenced by the “cultural turn” of contemporary postmodern social theory. It seeks *inter alia* to recover the role of agency in interpretations of the political by emphasizing the centrality of the social constructions of identity to the political process. As Black explains the “new political history” project, “In redefining the category of ‘the political’, by seeing it as a more diverse activity and setting it in a wider context, this recognizes what has been termed ‘the relative autonomy of politics’. This stresses that politics can’t be reduced to other determinants—it is not solely or even primarily an expression of socio-economic changes or of class and popular ‘interest’. It regards politics not as a barometer of social change and popular opinion, not as simply responding and trying to attune to an a priori social context, but as integral to the making and understanding of these.... Parties make their own history by building constituencies of support. It focuses on language in the assembling of support, but also scrutinizes political culture—party life, traditions and values and how these conceive of the electorate; on how political discourses are constructed, but also how they are conveyed and received.” (p. 4)

Rejecting materialist explanations of the trajectories of parties and movements, the new political history places the responsibility for success or failure on the political agent, and especially on its discursive practices. Thus, contrary to conventional social scientific wisdom, the decline of the left was not the ineluctable consequence of socioeconomic transformations within advanced capitalism, such as the diminution of the working class or its *embourgeoisement*. Instead, Black argues, “. . . the left’s fortunes were contingent upon how it understood and described these changes and communicated with those experiencing them.” (p. 4)

The book advances three logically interconnected theses about the left and the postwar “affluent society.” The first is that British socialists condemned the multivalent social and cultural changes occurring in Britain in the immediate postwar decades. These changes were marked by the diffusion of television, mass advertising and consumerism. Accompanying these changes were the increase in automobile ownership, the breakup of traditional working-class communities and the suburban migration. A new youth culture and leisure-time activities increasingly characterized the life-world of workers. The expansion of personal credit (and its ersatz affluence) led to the homogenization of lifestyles across classes. As a consequence, traditional class identities and class consciousness were undermined, and they were replaced by an emergent instrumentalist orientation characteristic of the “affluent worker.”

The author provides ample and persuasive evidence of the left’s visceral reaction to these developments—and to the rampant individualism, acquisitiveness, and anti-social behavior which they were seen to encourage. Black depicts the British left, paradoxically, as elitists who objected to the decline in cultural and aesthetic values brought about by mass affluence. The left interpreted the ensemble of social and cultural transformations as constituent of a new stage of capitalism, whose illusionary affluence and classlessness made it all the more seductive and hence powerful. For most, these changes reflected the essence of American capitalism and were a harbinger of an insidious brave new world for Britain and the world.

Black argues that the left’s reaction was less the product of concrete political analysis than a reflection of itself as a community of identity. He vividly reconstructs this community, suggesting that the left’s political organization in branches and cells was the functional equivalent (and hence a surrogate) of a religious community or an extended family. The book guides its readers through the everyday experiences of the British left as a community—attending meetings, selling subscriptions, and always canvassing—to show the centrality of personal commitment to the cause of socialist transformation. For Black, an important component of this experi-

ence was a puritanical self-righteousness and a self-conscious rejection of all things bourgeois.

So far, so good. Black’s subsequent two arguments are much more tenuous. The book’s second thesis is that the left’s rejection of the affluent society was not shared by a coalition of forces to the left of center. Relying primarily on the writings of Tony Crosland, Black argues that Revisionists within the Labour Party welcomed the social and cultural manifestations of affluence. Fair enough, but he then proceeds to argue that, apparent differences to the contrary, the Revisionist acceptance of affluent society’s cultural revolution was shared by the proponents of the New Left. In their common rejection of reductionist economism, writes Black, there was a fundamental convergence between the orientations of Revisionism and the New Left. This theoretical move is baffling, if for no other reason than it appears to be entirely gratuitous. (One can only speculate as to what motivated it. Perhaps by linking Revisionism with the New Left, Black wishes in postmodern fashion to subvert traditional Left-Right categories of political analysis. Or perhaps, by positing that the Revisionist acceptance of affluent society was also adopted by the New Left, his work might appear less obviously polemical.) In any case, this argument relies far too heavily on rather superficial readings of passages from the writings and speeches of Revisionist and New Left figures. Black’s handling of the boundaries of those camps is a bit too fluid as when, for instance, Hugh Gaitskell is quoted to represent the opinions of the socialist left or when Ralph Milband is cited as representative of the post-economistic, cultural left. Even more troubling is Black’s lack of consistency in classifying the New Left generally: at one point it is considered a part of the socialist left, and, at another point, it is part of the post-socialist coalition which along with Revisionism rejects the Old Left.

Black’s third, and principal, thesis is that the left’s rejection of the “affluent society” was the cause of its electoral unpopularity and political decline in postwar Britain. This view challenges standard socioeconomic and materialist interpretations of socialism’s decline in the post-war period (from Abrams and Rose’s *Must Labour Lose?* to Sassoon’s *One Hundred Years of Socialism*). Unfortunately, Black offers no evidence—

whether systematic or anecdotal—in its defense. The book simply begs the question as to whether the British public actually perceived the left as puritanical in its orientation to consumer society, disagreed with the left's position on the subject, and voted on the basis of these perceptions. Given the voluminous research in this topic, Black might have addressed empirical findings by psephologists examining the historical period. If the author wished to avoid materialist interpretations of the left's decline, he might at least have considered other rival hypothesis about the electoral consequences of changing political attitudes in Britain. Even more tenuous is Black's implicit identification of the electorate's perception of the left with the electoral decline of the Labour Party. The party was dominated during this period by a coalition of trade unionists and Revisionists—both of whom, as Black acknowledges, accepted the “affluent society”—rather than by its left. Perhaps most troublesome are the pesky, obdurate facts of British elections. Labour's electoral decline during the period of the book was actually rather moderate (its share of the popular vote falling from 46.1% in 1950 to 44.1% in 1964), whereas the party's decline in the subsequent period under the leadership of Wilson and Callaghan, who both embraced Britain's consumer society based on a robust national capitalist economy, was much more precipitous (falling from 44.1% of the popular vote in 1964 to 37.0% in 1979). Sadly, it seems that analyses of voting behavior are no longer quite so compelling for social theorists as are interrogations of identity. *Jeffrey Freyman, Transylvania University, Lexington, Kentucky*

L. J. Butler, *Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002), xv & 249pp. Biblio., Index, Pb. \$24.50; Cl. \$65.00.

The dissolution of the British Empire is a subject that has received a great deal of scholarly attention and Butler's contribution is a useful addition to the literature. The author addresses the often-used themes of nationalism, British relative decline and the importance of the United States and the Cold War. However, he also examines the impact of the dissolution of other European imperial orders and the spill-over effect of British reforms and conces-

sions in one area leading to protests and pressures in neighboring regions. For example, moves toward self-government and independence in the Gold Coast encouraged similar demands in Nigeria and throughout West Africa.

The book focuses on British imperial policy from the end of the First World War until the late 1960s. These dates represent a period when Britain was faced with the growing challenge to maintain its global influence in the face of changing, and unfavorable power realities. By the end of the 1960s all of Britain's major colonial possessions had been lost, the Commonwealth had not developed beyond a fraternal organization and the European Community and Anglo-American Special Relationship remained as the twin pillars of British foreign policy. This was a far cry from the ‘three rings’ of empire, Europe and the U.S.A that British leaders had hoped for.

One of the valuable aspects of the volume is that the author focuses not only upon the formal empire but also the dominions and the ‘informal’ empire where Britain was able to exert political, military or economic influence. This is significant given the contention that colonial rule was only one means for Britain to exercise a global role. The presence of military bases, the Sterling Area and the Commonwealth provided other options for British policy makers to maintain ‘imperial’ influence. The goal of policy makers was to remain a world power, defined alternately in terms of military and economic power and prestige. While the diversity of Britain's sphere of influence and its value to Britain is clearly demonstrated, the author's main point is the consistent assumption by British decision makers it would continue to remain of value to Britain and that they would control the process of change should any occur. For instance, independence for colonies would not be the ‘end of the relationship’ but the beginning of a ‘new set of relationships.’

It has often been stated that British leaders demonstrated flexibility and pragmatism in adapting to changes in the international environment that led to a relatively smooth process of decolonization. However, Butler portrays a series of reactions to international and local developments that demonstrate an inability to remain in control of events. The author paints a picture of crises, international pressures,

economic costs and local demands that thwarted the numerous British plans and reports that promised an orderly transformation. The impact of the Second World War changed Britain's circumstances but not its objectives as decision-makers envisioned a gradual process of change through developmental aid and education to self-governance and eventual independence. It was this loss of control and British leaders' reaction to it that ultimately determined the course of events, although successive British governments attempted to portray a largely reactive policy as a deliberate and managed one. The legacy of failed British schemes of federations, multiracial guarantees, economic development programs, the Sterling Area, military basing agreements and alliances, and parliamentary systems illustrates both the paternalistic outlook of British policy and the consistent underestimation of local demands.

The author challenges the notion that fatigue played a role in the dissolution of the empire as he asserts that no Prime Minister envisioned a loss of influence as a result of the move from empire to Commonwealth. British leaders wanted to maintain the global influence of a hegemonic power but lacked the economic and military means to maintain it by force. Their efforts to find alternative solutions were doomed to failure as it no longer possessed either the economic or military strength to lead a voluntary association and attract states into its sphere of influence. Butler does not discuss the concept of imperial overstretch but he demonstrates how Britain's ambitions no longer matched its capabilities forcing a series of concessions that only hastened its overall loss of control. He does remind us that Britain did use military force to quell several insurrections but as the political and economic costs grew this no longer became an option. Indeed, reading this work one can conclude that Britain did not have an imperial policy per se. There were 'unspoken assumptions' about the nature of British interests but the imperial policy was always defined in terms of power. British Prime Ministers were not particularly interested in the details of colonial policy or of the work of the Colonial Office but in the value of the empire to meet other economic or strategic goals.

One weakness of the work is its neglect of the impact of domestic politics on British colonial policy and on the relationships within government. There are several allusions to the importance of public opinion, such as quotes from Macmillan about his party's chances for reelection and of various colonial ministers offering their resignation, but the importance of anti-colonial sentiment in Britain is not discussed. There are also references to periods of tense relations between the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office but these are not developed. This is disappointing as Butler refers to several Colonial Office plans and reports but it is not clear how much impact they had on government thinking. The emphasis in this book is on external events and how successive British governments responded to them.

Butler provides a broad overview of British imperial policy. A work of history rather than political science, the book's value lies in its coverage of the 'informal' empire and in demonstrating the diversity Britain's sphere of influence and of the variety of efforts leaders took to maintain Britain's status and, unsuccessfully, to stay in control of events. Necessarily brief in parts (especially on Britain's complex relationship with South Africa), this is a book that would serve as a very useful reference for those interested in a work that examines British efforts to remain a world power and which incorporates several of the major explanations of imperial dissolution. *Roger Murphy, Western Kentucky University*

Paul F. Whiteley & Patrick Seyd, *High Intensity Participation: The Dynamics of Party Activism in Britain* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2002), xx & 258 pp., Index, Bibliography, CL. \$57.50.

This volume and the one by Whiteley and Seyd that was reviewed in BPGN #14 impress this reviewer with the immense progress made in the study of partisan activists since he first interviewed those political types more than 45 years ago.

High Intensity and *Grassroots* are similar in that each has an empirical base drawn from survey data about party activists, but where *Grassroots* focuses on the Labor-or New Labour-Party, *High Intensity* examines the status of British party activists in

general. Both books conclude that the plebiscitary model of parties is likely to be the future of those institutions in Britain.

While *Grassroots* addresses the fate of activists within New Labour, *High Intensity* examines why people, not just those committed to Labour, become party activists, especially those that are highly involved. The matter of British party activism is one that Whiteley and Seyd have examined in depth for years. They are unquestionably the most well-informed persons on this topic and that generalization encompasses party professionals, as well as academics and journalists.

Early on *High Intensity* reviews and assesses the current state of British parties when compared to the famous APSR famous 1950 report on political parties, which generally set out the Conservative and Labour versions as, in Max Weber's terms, the ideal type to which American parties should aspire. What Seyd and Whiteley find is that British parties are still programmatic, as the APSA report praised, but there have been significant changes. Among those are, on the one hand, the greater effort to recruit individual members, a responsibility no longer left to the local party units, but now managed from the national level. On the other hand, the determination of key decisions, e.g., leadership selection, now involves all party members, not just the Parliamentary Labour Party or the 1922 Committee. Whether the latter example strengthens or weakens the Leader is still debatable.

Some of the changes compel us to revise our understanding of party operations, e.g., Austin Ranney's 1965 Pathways to Parliament demonstrated that the national party rarely intervened in selection of candidates; now the formal policy is that the national party will. (For long time teachers of comparative politics, such changes are nearly as devastating to one's lecture notes as Mitterand's abandonment of the prefect.)

Chapter 2 reviews five models of political participation: Civic Voluntarism (Nie & Verba), Rational Choice, Social Psychological, Mobilization, and General Incentives, which the two authors have

utilized before. Chapter 3 consists of empirical testing of the five, an exercise that will challenge the non-mathematical reader. None perform completely in explaining participation but the General Incentives model is the most effective version.

Susan Scarrow [*Parties and Their Members*, 1996] noted in her examination of British and German parties, money, not members, was the principal resource that some party leaders preferred, an observation that David Adamany [*Political Money: A Strategy for Campaign Financing* (1976)] made of American political leaders 30 years ago. His explanation? Money is fungible, it can purchase what the party or a campaign needs, whether that be equipment, personnel, or products. Volunteers or loaned equipment limit the uses to which these resources can be utilized. Chapter 4 explores the approach of British parties toward the matter of membership recruitment in the distinctive time periods for which Whiteley and Seyd have survey data. Again the mathematically timid will be challenged by the analysis employed, but in recent years, British parties have increased efforts to expand membership and consequently garner additional funds for the parties.

Chapter 5 takes this matter several steps further, examining how Labour reversed the trend in membership declines. Once members are recruited, they must be retained, which is the focus of Chapter 6.

Chapter 7 is an extensive perusal of factors that influence voting, and although the terminology is slightly different, the variables formulated by the folks at Michigan decades are key for British voters too; partisanship, candidate orientation, and issue orientation, especially economic ones. While party membership grew with the emergence of a fresh approach in the mid-1990s, it has since declined. Perhaps more important, voting rates have dropped. The final chapter is not optimistic that these trends will be reversed and offers reasons for that dreary outlook. Anyone, student of British politics or not, who wishes to understand partisan activism will be enriched by reading this book. *T.P. Wolf, Indiana University Southeast*

POT POURRI XXIV

American television's view of the English? – NBC Television's situation comedy, "Will and Grace," which is about a gay fellow, Will, played by Eric McCormack, who shares an apartment with a non-gay woman, recently offered this perspective on the English:

Lorraine (Minnie Driver, playing a British woman of loose sexual morality) "You're a natty dresser. Are you English?"

Will (Eric McCormack) "No, I'm gay."

Lorraine, "It's the same thing!"

(One might term this a cross-cultural misperception, but Minnie Driver is British.)

On the popular culture front – Anne Robinson, host of *Weakest Link*, "In the animal kingdom, what "C" is a large North American reindeer?" Contestant, "A moose."

On the matrimonial trail –

A) Classified advert in the *Adscene* (Kent) "Academic Kent Male, N/S, Christian, Selling house, *tall sphincter*, with no family ties, mature or older." (Emphasis added, of course.)

B) Wedding report from the *Manchester Evening News*, "The bride wore a gown of heavy Oldham Corporation Glassworks."

Kipling on the US and its impact on the Dominions – "He [Kipling] might complain that the British were throwing away their Empire in 'lumps' (although they had not even begun to do so). He could despair that the Australian motor car market was dominated by the Americans rather than by Morris of Cowley. But in the early 1930s he could not suppress a sense of optimism about the future of the dominions, especially Canada. The diamond jubilee of the Canadian Confederation in 1927, celebrated at Westminster Abbey to the strains of 'Recessional,' had been a heartwarming experience, a 'step on threshold of a new life and self-knowledge for the Dominion and the Empire'. Canada was 'awake, aware and resolute' and continued to be so during the subsequent decade. It was a 'miracle' that she had been able 'find herself' and 'pursue her own destiny' despite the 'moral disorder' of her enormous southern neighbor. Above all, what a relief she was not following the wrong Roosevelt's 'pernicious example' of setting up some kind of New Deal." [David Gilmour, *The Long Recessional: The Imperial Life of Rudyard Kipling* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2002), pp. 287-298.]

Wisdom from a political oracle? – "Clearly, the future is still to come." (Peter Brooke, when Secretary for Northern Ireland)

And another one – "Youth would be an ideal state if it came a little later in life." (H.H. Asquith)

Comments about events from around the Commonwealth –

A) "We can beat the Liberals with one engine tied behind our back." (Joe Clark, when Prime Minister of Canada)

B) "Banana to serve one-year term, sodomy appeal turned down." (New Straits *Times*, Malaysia) [This refers to the first president of Zimbabwe, who before being deposed by Robert Mugabe, had the title of "The Reverend Comrade, His Excellency, the President Canaan Banana." Certainly, an illustrious label, especially the 'Reverend Comrade' portion.]

Mistreatment of Cornwall, or Are the English 'giving it' to the Cornish again? –

[We are grateful to Professor Richard Rose, Strathclyde University, for providing us with the copy of the following communiqué, which addresses a matter often overlooked as we contemplate the great issues of the day. *The Editor*.]

"26th January 2004

The Rt. Hon. David Blunkett, M.P.
The Home Secretary,
The Home Office,
Whitehall, London.

Dear Sir,

'Only English culture sanctioned by English law'

In his capacity as a supporter of the Highways Agency's proposed A30 re-alignment between Bodmin and Indian Queens in Cornwall, Mr Tim Jones, Chairman of the Devon and Cornwall Business Council, at the Public Inquiry on 15th January 2004, made a reference to the "massive infrastructure projects in rural China". He was asked by me, (Objector No. 22, "discrimination on the grounds of property" European Convention of Human Rights, Article 14), whether the Chinese policy of using infrastructure projects to destroy the culture, language and institutions of Tibet, and by implication, to promote its own culture, was being applied here in the case of Cornwall?

He said he was sure that that was not the case. Unfortunately, Mr Jones' assertion is difficult to reconcile with the government's failure to recognise the right of the Cornish to exist as an indigenous Celtic national minority of Britain. Official funding to promote, as Cornish, Cornwall's own cultural heritage and language is denied while English Heritage is funded to assert racial supremacy by claiming as English, rather than British or Cornish, the pre-England archaeological sites of Cornwall.

There is, furthermore, the concurrence of such facts as; the concept of an unwritten constitution which does not protect indigenous national minorities and has neither been considered appropriate for adoption by any Commonwealth country nor proposed by anyone for Afghanistan or Iraq. The non-existence of a statutory guarantee of equality before the law permits official bias and the "powers and general law applicable to the Duchy of Cornwall", (Tamar Bridge Act 1998, s.41) are discriminatory. This 1998 Act appears to be confirmation of those feudal prerogative powers (over land and minerals) written into the Duchy Charters of 1337/8 with the intention of maximising Duchy profits in Cornwall in order to relieve English people of general taxation for the upkeep of the heir to the throne. The government has threatened to withdraw the Cornish Mining World Heritage Bid to UNESCO if it contains any reference to the constitutional relationship between the Cornish mining organisation, the Stannaries, and the heir to the throne.

In addition, applicants in Cornwall for Adult Further Education, e.g., Cornish language lessons, and children in schools, are having their declarations of Cornish nationality deleted from their application forms and 'English' subsequently inserted dishonestly on their signed documents. The culture of racial intolerance is being engendered in English people by the official anti-Celtic history curriculum for schools which flouts intellectual integrity by beginning, "Romans and Anglo-Saxons" and, apparently in step with government policy, the Police, the Crown Prosecution Service and the Commission for Racial Equality avoid prosecution in cases of incitement to racial hatred and discrimination against Cornish people.

I would, consequently, be most grateful if you would kindly reassure Cornish people of your support for the response made by Mr Jones, and the principles of international human rights, by including the Cornish within the provisions of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. This would be a welcome and practical demonstration of government sincerity and confirm that it is not adopting a self-

righteous policy of imposing cultural uniformity to eliminate the national identity, culture and language of the Cornish indigenous national minority for the advantage of the English national majority.

Yours faithfully,

Colin F. Murley.

9 Coombe Park, Bal Lake, Camborne, Kernow TR14 OJG"

Something for the man who has everything –

almost – In late January, the Foreign Office announced that Bill Gates, the founder and CEO of Microsoft, will receive a knighthood. One might assume, evidently mistakenly, that this was for humanitarian deeds by Gates through his Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, but Jack Straw in his announcement of the honour stressed the Microsoft magnate's role as a global businessman and his contribution to information technology.

Another view of Scottish architecture after

devolution – "As to the Scottish Parliament – many (including us) are disillusioned by the high cost and lack of control on the building site. This in itself overshadows any achievements. We visited the building site a few weeks back and I certainly was not impressed. I know bairns and fools should not see a job half done but... The site is wrong, the design is a mish-mash and a lot of blame credited to the late David Dewar – I don't like that either."

[From a long time friend of the editor. The writer is a Scot, born and reared in Glasgow – actually Paisley, who spent several years in Canada and the States before retiring with spouse in southwest Scotland, along the coast.]

Until the cows come home or we thought this happened only in Chicago!

–The Cambridgeshire District Council, for the second year in a row, discovered that Brenda Gould of Newmarket has listed the names of two cows on the electoral register. The previous year, in addition to the cows, "Henry and Sophie Bull," a dog, "Jake Wooflies" was also listed. When Gould failed to appear in Ely Magistrate Court, she was ordered to pay £100 fine and £110 in court costs.

MEMBERSHIP NEWS

Kudos –

Nelson W. Polsby of the University of California, Berkeley, received the American Political Science Association's Frank J. Goodnow Award for Distinguished Service at the Centennial Meeting of the APSA.

Austin Ranney, a former BPG member, has been elected a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy. The Academy, established in 1902, recognizes distinguished service in the humanities and social sciences. Its membership is limited to 750 scholars and consists of Fellows, who are resident in the UK and Corresponding Fellows who are not. In the field of British politics, Ranney is probably best known for this book *Pathways to Parliament*, which demonstrated that much of what we thought we knew about the selection of MPs by their parties was folklore and not factual

During the debate on the Hutton Report in the Commons on February 4, Michael Howard, the Tory Leader, referred to the Lord Norton of Louth's report for the Conservative Party.

Bob Worcester of MORI and the LSE appeared on NBC-TV's Evening News, Saturday, March 20, 2004, in conjunction with a segment about the street demonstrations in the UK, marking the anniversary of the initiation of the Iraqi war.

New members –

Peter John - School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, University of London, Malet Street, Bloomsbury, London WC1E 7HX, UK

Richard Wyn Jones - Institute of Welsh Politics, Landinam Bldg, Penglais, Aberystwyth, Ceredigion, Wales SY 23 3DB, UK

Christopher Wiezien – Reader in Comparative Government and Fellow of Nuffield College, University of Oxford, Nuffield College, Oxford OX1 1NF, UK

Change of address –

Sydney A. Van Atta, Department of Political Science, SUNY – Oswego,
435 Mahar Hall, Oswego, NY 13126

New or changed email address –

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Richard Wyn Jones - rlj@aber.ac.uk

Sydney A. Van Atta - avan1@oswego.edu

Christopher Wiezien -

Christopher.Wlezien@nuffield.oxford.ac.uk

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