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Summer 2006, No 125

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Publication note: The *British Politics Group Newsletter* is published quarterly by the British Politics Group (BPG). Inquiries about the content of the *Newsletter* should be communicated to the Editor – address on front cover. BPG dues are: One year - \$20 or £14; two years - \$35 or £25; three years - \$50 or £35; graduate student dues at ½ of these rates. Lifetime membership: \$500 or £350. Dues and inquiries about membership should be directed to the Executive Director – address on front cover. In addition to the *Newsletter*, the BPG provides an annual annotated bibliography of books on British politics. The BPG offers the Samuel H. Beer for the best dissertation at a North American university of a British politics subject, the Donald E. Stokes Dissertation Fellowship for dissertation research in the UK by a North American working on a British politics topic, and the James B. Christoph Prize for the best paper by a junior (untenured) faculty member at a professional conference. For further details on these awards, see the Activities section below. Inquiries about each award should be made to the Executive Secretary. Periodically, a membership directory is compiled and sent to members.

The BPG was created in the 1970s by scholars devoted to the study of British politics, who wished to stimulate scholarly work on that topic. In addition to the activities noted above, the BPG organizes panels about British topic at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

BPG Electronic Communications – Discussion List – Joel Wolfe has created a discussion list for the BPG. The instructions for its use were revised in 1998 as follows: Send an email to listserv@listserv.uc.edu with this message: subscribe BPG-L, followed by your first name, middle initial and last name.

If you have inquiries about the Discussion List, contact Joel at Joel.Wolfe@uc.edu.

Joel has also constructed a home page for the BPG – <http://www.uc.edu/bpg>

We thank the University of Cincinnati for providing these internet services.

EDITOR'S REMARKS

As time goes by – Some of you, especially those living in the UK and of seasoned years, may recall the television series by the name of the song made famous by the movie *Casablanca*, i.e., *As Time Goes By*. The series, starring Dame Judy Dench and Geoffrey Palmer, is running on America's PBS channels. In fact, I think this may be the second (third?) time around on that venue. My wife and I have become addicted to it. I am not quite sure why that is, but one factor may be that the two leading figures are of our vintage, in that Lionel (Palmer) served in the Korea during the war there and so did I. Yet, unlike that pair, we did not lose contact with each other and married soon after I returned from that Asian nation. Similar to Lionel while there, I suffered a non-combat injury. Serving with the British military, he was kicked in the head by a mule. As a U.S. Marine, I endured a truck accident that sent me to Japan for surgery on my left shoulder.

There has been one flaw in our devotion to the series. That was when Lionel moved in with Jean (Dench) before they were married. Kansas Methodism dies hard in my soul, but fortunately the pair do marry later.

More on Munich – Lessons on the Munich Pact continue to grow, at least for me. A recent *History Channel* program on German tank warfare in WWII stated that without the tanks captured with the fall of Czechoslovakia and the subsequent operation of the Skoda munitions factories, Hitler's armies would have had far fewer tanks to employ against the Soviet Union and other enemies.

Anglophilia – Jay Parini, an American professor of literature, who has written, along with other books, a biography of the poet Robert Frost, offers his assessment of how the U.K. has changed since he first took his junior year in Scotland during the 1960s. He notes that even the term Anglophilia in the title of his essay "The New Anglophilia" [*The Chronicle of Higher Education*, August 4, 2006, p. B9] is misleading since many non-Brits, especially Americans, are prone to applying it to the entire U.K. although linguistically it should refer only to England.

In addition to the less well known expatriates from the States that may affect an English accent (or attempt that), there are those permanent transplants – Henry James and T.S. Eliot – who became more English than the English. They took the saying about ‘imitation’ to that ‘highest form,’ flattery.

Admitting that as a young man he idealized Britain, Parini now finds it much more culturally and racially diverse, and busy, “a buzzing many-layered society.” At the same time, in the steps of many prior observers he finds the island to have acquired some of the less favored attributes of the States, especially a greater materialism.

Yet on balance, the U.K. has strengths that appeal to those devoted to intellectual and political ideas: “Nevertheless, there is still a charm here, a respect for intellectual discussion, a love of books, and a sense of community. The Sunday papers are alive with chat about the latest plays, the latest books. The Brits love their scandals, of course, and they play up the foibles of the great and the good. Their politicians are treated like bumpkins, fools, and knaves, and they work very hard to live up to their reputations. The news media, unlike their counterparts in the United States, are reflectively skeptical of those in power.”

One can agree with that but speculate that, as in the States, those traits are many found mainly among the chattering classes.

ACTIVITIES

Please note, we have listed at the end of this newsletter the explicit BPG activities for the APSA annual meeting in Philadelphia so that you can easily make a photocopy for your purse or pocket.

Nominees for the BPG Executive Committee, 2006-2008 term

The following have been nominated for the five open positions on the Executive Committee. *Ballots will be distributed in September.*

Nominees

John Benyon, University of Leicester
Philip Cowley, University of Nottingham
John Curtice, University of Strathclyde

Florence Faucher-King, Vanderbilt University/
Sciences-Po

Andrew Gamble, University of Sheffield

Alistair Howard, Temple University

Anthony Messina, University of Notre Dame

Paul Webb, University of Stirling

Graham Wilson, University of Wisconsin

Call for Reviews for the British Politics Group Newsletter

Given the difficulties and delays in receiving books from publishers and forwarding them to potential reviewers, we have decided to announce an open call for book reviews for the *British Politics Group Newsletter*. If you have recently read a book on British politics (or comparative international politics related to the UK) that you think is particularly engaging and of interest to BPG members, we would encourage you to write a brief review for the *BPGN*. Reviews should be no longer than 1,000 words, include a summary of the main arguments and methods, and assess the author(s) contribution to scholarship in the field. We also encourage review articles, discussion of useful web resources, analyses of documentaries – any creative idea that would be useful in advancing our understanding and study of British politics broadly defined.

If you have a book review or article in mind, you should *first* contact *BPGN* Editor Tom Wolf (tpwolf@ius.edu) in order to avoid inappropriate texts and multiple submissions on the same book. As always, we retain final editorial content, including the right of rejection. We will also continue to farm out books for review received from publishers.

AWARDS

Samuel H. Beer Prize of the British Politics Group

The Samuel H. Beer Dissertation Prize was developed by the British Politics Group to encourage the study of British politics by graduate students in North America and to reward exceptional work in that area of study. The principle criterion for awarding the Prize is the dissertation’s contribution to the understanding of British politics, regardless of

whether the study is exclusively British or comparative research with a British component.

We invite nominations for the 2007 award of \$300 for the best doctoral dissertation in British politics completed during the calendar years of 2004, 2005, or 2006. All nominees must have received their Ph.D. from a department in the U.S. or Canada. Either the supervising professor or a department's director of graduate studies may nominate a dissertation. Either the supervising professor or a department's director of graduate studies must be a member of the BPG (can join upon submission). No one person may nominate more than one dissertation. Three (3) loose copies of the nominated dissertation, along with a brief letter of nomination, should be postmarked by March 1, 2007 and sent to:

Terrence Casey, Executive Director,
British Politics Group
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences
Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology
5500 Wabash Avenue
Terre Haute, IN 47803
Email: casey1@rose-hulman.edu
Telephone: (812) 877-8281 Fax: (812) 877-8909

The winner of the award will be announced at the BPG's annual business meeting at the 2007 APSA convention.

Donald E. Stokes Dissertation Research Fellowship of the British Politics Group

The British Politics Group offers this fellowship to enable a North American graduate student doing research on British politics for her/his dissertation at a North American university to conduct research in the United Kingdom. The fellowship honors Donald E. Stokes, a founding member of the British Politics Group, and co-author of the seminal book *Political Change in Britain*. The award, in the amount of \$500 US is to be used for Ph.D. dissertation research on British politics, broadly defined, including comparative and historical work as well as approaches more specifically focused on contemporary British politics. Application date for the 2007 award is March 15, 2007. Applicants will be notified of the selection committee's decision on their

application by May 15, 2007. Applications should be sent

Terrence Casey, Executive Director,
British Politics Group
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences
Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology
5500 Wabash Avenue
Terre Haute, IN 47803
Email: casey1@rose-hulman.edu
Telephone: (812) 877-8281 Fax: (812) 877-8909

James B. Christoph Prize for the Best Conference Paper on British Politics by a Junior Faculty Member (*Notice that the eligibility for this award is no longer for graduate students but for fresh Ph.D.s or non-tenured faculty.*)

The annual James B. Christoph Award for the Best Conference Paper on British politics presented by a junior faculty member honors the late James B. Christoph, a founding member, eminent scholar of British politics, and former president of the BPG. For the 2007 award, the paper (or poster) must be presented at a conference in calendar year 2006. All conference papers on British politics, whether solely on Britain or comparative, are eligible. The author/presenter must have (A) already received her/his Ph.D. at the time the paper is presented; and (B) been a non-tenured, full-time (tenure track or visiting) or part-time faculty member at an institution of higher education in North America at the time of presentation. The award is \$200, and the decision will be made by a three-person committee of established scholars who are BPG members. Four copies of the presentation should be sent to the BPG Executive Director. The submission deadline for the 2006 calendar year competition is April 1, 2007. Applications should be sent to:

Terrence Casey, Executive Director,
British Politics Group
Department of Humanities and Social Sciences
Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology
5500 Wabash Avenue
Terre Haute, IN 47803
Email: casey1@rose-hulman.edu
Telephone: (812) 877-8281 Fax: (812) 877-8909

ANNOUNCEMENTS

Conference –

52nd Annual Meeting of the Midwest Conference on British Studies, Indianapolis, Indiana, October 27-29, 2006, at the Indianapolis Museum, hosted by Indiana University-Purdue University (IUPUI).

Plenary speakers: Linda Levy Peck, George Washington University, “Murder, Mayhem, and Marriage in Restoration England,” and Mrinalini Sinha, Pennsylvania State University, “Imperial Citizenship: Britain, the United States, and the Death of a Political Ideal.”

For information, contact Phyllis L. Soybel, Department of History/Social Sciences, College of Lake County, 19351 W. Washington St., Gralyslake, Illinois 60030, USA or: psoybel@clcollinois.edu

Publication –

Ian Bache & Andrew Jordan, eds., *The Europeanization of British Politics* (Palgrave, August, 2006). ISBN 1403995192, Cl. £55.

Workshop –

“Gender and International Relations in Britain,” One-day workshop at the University of Bristol, Thursday, September 28, 2006, 10:00a.m. - 5:00 p.m. Papers will include:

Mrysia Zalewski, “Troubling feminist encounters with international relations,”

Jill Stean, “Reflections on ‘Engaging from the margins,’”

Catherine Eschle & Bice Manguashca, “Studying Feminist ‘Anti-Globalisation’ Activism in IR,”

David Black & I Coleman, “Ruling by exception: gendered policing and violence in the neoliberal order,”

Laura Shepherd, “Exploring the potential for a feminist reconceptualisation of (International) Security and (Gender) violence,”

Dibesh Anand, “‘Gendered anxieties and security: Representing Muslim masculinity as a danger,’”

Penny Griffin, “Sexing the economy in a neoliberal world,”

Johanna Kantola, “Feminism and the state in international relations,”

Terrell Carver & Christina Rowley, “Gender and the international in popular culture,” and

Judith Squires & Jutta Weldes, “Beyond being marginal: Gender and international relations in Britain.”

For information contact Judith Squires: judithsquires@bris.ac.uk *or* Jutta Weldes: jutta.weldes@bhris.ac.uk

Recognition opportunity for graduate students

(Repeated from #124) – Erin Ganley of Oxford University Press’ Journals informs us that the journal *Twentieth Century British History* is sponsoring an annual Essay Prize. The aim of the Prize is to encourage a high standard of scholarship amongst postgraduate research students. The competition is open to anyone registered for a higher research degree, or who completed one no later than October 2003. The author of the winning essay will receive: a) Publication of the winning essay in *Twentieth Century British History*, b) a cash prize of £300, c) £200 of OUP books, and d) one year’s free subscription to *Twentieth Century British History*.

The closing date for submissions is 1 September 2006. Full details and an Essay Prize entry form can be found at: http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/weceb/essay_prize06.html

The most recent winner of the *TCBH* Essay Prize was Dr. Dolly Smith Wilson of Texas Tech University, USA for her paper, “A New Look at the Affluent Worker: The Good Working Mother in Post-War Britain,” To read Dr. Wilson’s paper for free online, visit <http://tcbh.oxfordjournals.org/content/vol17/issue2/index.dtl>

For additional details, contact:

Erin Ganley, Assistant Marketing Manager, Journals
Oxford University Press, 2001 Evans Road, Cary, NC 27613 USA

Tel. 919-677-0977, ext. 5163 FAX 919577-1714

Email erin.ganley@oxfordjournals.org
<http://www.oxfordjournals.org>

FROM THE BPG-L

Visiting appointment – The Hansard Society has an opening for a Visiting Academic Fellow. This involves non-financial support to academics working in the field of British politics, who seek a place to base themselves in central London. This would be particularly relevant to those whose research work is compatible with the Society's research agenda. Examples may include: studies relating to Parliament, the legislative process, MPs and Peers, executive-legislative relations, election studies, party studies, engagement and disengagement and new technology and the political process. For more information on the Society's activities, research, and publications, see the website; www.hansardsociety.org.uk

The Hansard Society Visiting Fellows scheme enables self-funded scholar to utilize the resources of the society while carrying out their own research. It is intended to provide an environment to support and encourage academics researching in the areas of British politics and parliamentary democracy. The Hansard Society hopes that the Visiting Fellows will contribute to our own research program and activities looking at key issues in British politics and parliamentary democracy.

Dr. Phil Cowley (Nottingham) was a previous academic fellow and the present occupant is Dr. Sarah Childs (Bristol).

To register your interest or to find out more information, please contact Claire Ettinghausen via c.r.ettinghausen@hansard.lse.ac.uk

Britannica undertaking for your individual and course Web sites – Sorry for what some of you may classify as spam but, as a member of the BPG for about a decade, I thought that I might use this list for something that might benefit you and your students as well as my company, Encyclopaedia Britannica. Formerly a political science professor in the US specializing in British politics (I hope some of you remember me from a few EPOP conferences 6-8 years ago), I am now the manager of the Editorial department at Britannica.

As the academic year looms near, I wanted to let you all know about an exciting undertaking by Britannica. Though Britannica.com remains a subscription service (and most users to Britannica.com can only view the

first 75 words of an article), we have a project to allow individuals to place links on their web sites to be able to read the entire linked article. One of the main goals of this endeavor is to allow a larger audience to sample our articles, but the net effect is to allow individuals in any capacity to use our material in ways that might be helpful to them, their students, their organizations, etc.

As the political science editor for the past six years (though my new role is Senior Manager of the Core Editorial Department), I should say that much, but not all, of our political science material is in very good shape and also our British politics coverage, including a recently published article on Margaret Beckett. I think this gives a unique ability to political scientists to be able to share this information with colleagues both within your universities as well as those at other universities.

So, for example, if you have a course and want to provide background reading to your students, you can go to Britannica.com (<http://www.britannica.com>), search for a particular article, find the URL and place a link on your individual or course homepage.

If you are teaching a course on UK politics, you could look at our backgrounders by people who are likely on this listserve or known to people on this list.

For instance, for information on SNP or Plaid Cymru by David Broughton go to <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9066367>. For information on the Conservative Party credited to Lord Norton and earlier by Paul Webb go to <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9025943>. Information about Labour Party, Liberal Democrats and others by Paul Webb can be found at <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9046719>. Articles about Margaret Thatcher by Hugo Young can be found at <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9071950>. You can find information about Clement Attlee by Lord Jenkins at <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9011182>.

Finally, for members in London and Edinburgh, we have recently revised coverage of both cities (the latter revised by Michael Lynch, chair of the Department of Scottish History at the University of Edinburgh). Go to <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9106217> for Edinburgh and <http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9108472> for London.

In other areas you might find our UK country page useful: <http://www.britannica.com/nations/United-Kingdom> and our Shakespeare multimedia spotlight,

<http://www.britannica.com/shakespeare>.

Please feel free to search around the site but if you don't have a subscription you will only get a sample of the article. If you link to it directly from your web site, you'll be able to get the full content. Please let me know if you do decide to link to our site from a web site that you operate since I would like to know what uses you are able to find for our material for your classes. If you find anything that is problematic in any of the articles or any other issues, please contact me so that I can have it corrected in a timely manner.

Well, I hope that everyone is doing well and I look forward to seeing all my friends on the list sooner rather than later. If anyone is planning to be in Chicago for the Midwest Political Science meeting next year, I would be happy to arrange a group jazz (or other) outing as I did a few years ago for members at the APSA. If you happen to be in Chicago for other reasons and have questions or want to meet up for a drink, let me know. Sincerely,

Michael Levy, Senior Manager, Core Editorial
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc.
331 North La Salle Street
Chicago, IL 60610.

Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill – Alistair Howard asked (25/07/06)

"I would be interested to hear from anyone who is working on (or knows someone working on) academic or activist critiques of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill. Or from anyone interested in discussing this on-list.

"The Bill gives ministers powers to change law without Commons debate (but with some select committee oversight). It is ostensibly a notion to cut red tape. Business folk and lawyers seem to welcome the measure as giving the government power to de/regulate and to implement Law Commission recommendations. John Pilger in the *New Statesman* (with characteristic stridency) said the measure 'marks the end of true parliamentary democracy'.

"This appears to have been controversial but hasn't prompted any discussion on the BPG list."

On 31/07/06, **Barry Winetrobe** responded, "I am aware of a bit of 'topical' work and various blogs on the Legislative & Regulatory Reform Bill – mainly of the 'abolition of parliament' theme – but not of anything

very substantial yet, as presumably those academics interested in it are awaiting the final, and much amended, version to be enacted.

"I assume you are following the Westminster proceedings on the Bill (see e.g.:

http://www.parliament.the-stationary-office.co.uk/pa/pabills/200506legislative_and_regulatory_reform.htm;
<http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/notes/snpc-03998.pdf>; <http://www.parliament.the-stationary-office.co.uk/pa/cm200506/cmweb/wb060722/pub.htm#comp>). I think it finished its Lords Committee stage just before the summer recess. Lord (Philip) Norton would be a good contact as he took an active part in the Lords proceedings.

"I have been following it from the Scottish devolved perspective, as it indirectly has some impact, and will be discussed by the Sc Parliament after the recess, probably initially by its European and External Relations Cttee in September.

<http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/legComMem/LegRegRef.htm> I wrote a short piece earlier this year on this aspect:

http://www.scolag.org/journal/articles/2006_SCOLAG_52-53.pdf

"Happy to discuss on- or off-line
(b.wintrobe@napier.ac.uk)

On 08/08/06, **(Lord) Philip Norton** offered these comments:

"I was planning to write earlier on the subject of collective responsibility – I would not necessarily go along with all points made – but was tied up with other matters, including the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill. Let me deal with the latter and write later on collective responsibility.

"There is not a great deal to add to what Barry Winetrobe has said, or rather to add to the material available through the links provided. As those who have read the proceedings in *Hansard* will know, the Bill completed its committee stage in the Lords on 19 July. Report stage will be taken in the spill-over period, but the timetable will be very tight. It is not scheduled for the first two weeks (commencing on 9 October) and we are expecting prorogation around 8 November. (The State Opening is on 15 November.) The Bill itself was much amended following the growing realization of its implications: these were not immediately picked up in the Commons but when they were the Government

made various significant—but in the view of many, still not sufficient—changes at Report stage in the Commons. There will now be parliamentary scrutiny of orders made under the Act, with Parliament having the ultimate (but not initial) say as to what level of scrutiny should be accorded to each.

“However, it will still be possible for Government to seek to make major changes to primary legislation and, secure in a majority in the Commons, effectively get its way by a single vote. As I argued in the debate on Second Reading:

“Each house will now have the potential to consider every order made under the Bill; there is a mechanism to increase the level of parliamentary approval and also to block the order. On the face of it, that is a major improvement. The problem is that, whatever the level chosen, the process is time-limited and institutionally constrained. An essential resource in Parliament’s arsenal in relation to government is not simply the vote, crucial though that is, but time and institutional mechanisms for debate. Measures are considered over a period of time through structures designed to probe, to force government to justify the particular provisions as well as the principle of the measure, and if necessary to amend it.

“As we have heard, Clause 1(7) permits an order to amend or repeal any enactment. The only measures exempted are Part 1 of the Bill and the Human Rights Act. Leaving those aside, an order may—and it is the potential that is important—make a fundamental change to our constitutional arrangements. Even under the super-affirmative resolution procedure, as under the 2001 Act, there will be a maximum of only 60 days to consider it. That may seem sufficient time, but bear in mind that the normal institutional mechanisms of scrutiny, deliberation and probing are not engaged. The scrutiny will be by a designated committee, which can be overridden by a vote in the Chamber. The House having the ultimate say is justifiable on constitutional grounds but in this instance that is vitiated by the fact that it is a single vote, divorced from any sustained scrutiny by the House itself.

“With Bills, the House can consider and make amendments. Under the procedure in this measure, as with the 2001 Act, neither House can amend an order. A Minister may reconsider a draft order as a result of representations made to him, but it is ultimately up to

the Minister as to what is included. Under Clause 19(2), the Minister ‘must have regard to’ representations as well as resolutions or recommendations emanating from Parliament, but—as we have variously discussed in this House—the requirement to ‘have regard to’ is a soft one in law. The Minister can choose to proceed with the order as originally introduced. A government secure in their majority in the Commons may then seek the approval of the other place, in a single Division, to an order making a draconian change to the law of the land. As such, the provisions of the Bill undermine the basic equilibrium of legitimacy that underpins the parliamentary process. The Government have a right to get their business, but the Opposition have a right to be heard. This measure could be used to undermine the rights of the Opposition.

“In Committee in the Lords there were various attempts to further limit the powers under Bill. The biggest concession made by Government was to agree to remove Clause 3, dealing with Law Commission reports, which had come under sustained criticism—led by a former Law Lord—and which would probably have been subject to major amendment or removal if the Government had not agreed to take it away and come back with other proposals at Report stage. Among the amendments attracting support from different parts of the House, and which we are likely to come back to on Report, are those seeking to ring-fence the measures that can be subject to the order-making power under the Bill: the discussion focused on whether to have constitutional provisions protected under a generic approach (excluding measures affecting basic constitutional arrangements) or a specified list of excluded Acts, or both—as I pointed out, they are not mutually exclusive. A range of other issues are also likely to be pursued, such as protecting the independence of economic regulators, requiring ministers to make a declaration of compatibility with Convention rights, and changing the onus for recommending the level of parliamentary scrutiny from Government to Parliament. I should declare an interest as I moved amendments on all these and garnered support from different parts of the House.

“Basically, it is a case of watch this space—or, rather, read *Hansard* in late October/early November to see what progress we make.”

On 08/08/06 **Christopher Hobe Morrison** added

in reply to Norton's "we are expecting prorogation around 8 November" that "Maybe 5 November would be a more appropriate date."

More on Collective Responsibility – On 13/08/06, **(Lord) Philip Norton** offered these remarks: "Apologies for not having commented earlier. The meaning of collective ministerial responsibility is a complex one in terms of substance and breadth. In terms of substance, it is generally taken to mean that ministers are responsible as a whole for the decisions of the government. Once the decision is taken, they are required to support it, both in voice or vote. In terms of breadth, it is generally taken to apply to all ministers.

"Let me turn to the qualifications. Although no Cabinet minister has voted against government policy in modern history (except when the convention has been suspended, as it was on three occasions in the twentieth century), some have expressed disagreement with government policy through speeches (in Labour's case) at the party's NEC, through surrogates (such as their PPSs), through leaks or even, on exceptional occasions, absenting themselves from a vote. One Cabinet minister, Reg Prentice, abstained in the second reading vote on the Scotland and Wales Bill in 1976. (He resigned five days later but, under the convention would have been expected to resign in advance of the vote or, failing that, be dismissed by the Prime Minister following the vote.) During the Thatcher administration, one Cabinet minister, Jim Prior, was believed to have been absent without official leave in at least one vote.

"In respect of breadth, there is some uncertainty (as in earlier contributions on this topic show) as to how far the convention extends. Does it encompass junior ministers and parliamentary private secretaries (PPSs)? In terms of junior ministers, the position in the 19th Century was rather confused. On a number of occasions, Gladstone had to explain the failure of junior ministers to vote for government proposals. (Queen Victoria had earlier made clear to Palmerston that she was not amused by the prospect of junior ministers voting against a government proposal on the National Gallery.) However, by the 20th Century, the convention extended to all ministers, senior and junior. Thus, the seniority of a minister has no bearing in terms of the convention: all are bound by it. The only distinction sometimes drawn, as by Wade and Phillips, is that

'while (junior ministers) share the consequences of collective responsibility, their role is negative; that of the Cabinet is positive.' (In other words, junior ministers are bound by decisions that they themselves did not make.) Even this is open to qualification as some junior ministers serve on Cabinet sub-committees and some decisions are taken by a small number of Cabinet members rather than the full Cabinet.

"As for the PPSs, they can be described as having been spasmodically liable to the convention. Though a PPS is restricted in terms of what s/he can say and do in respect of the policy of their minister's area of responsibility, there is less certainty in terms of actions beyond that. It all depends on the Prime Minister. The PM may require a minister to dispense with the services of a PPS who votes against the Government, but practice varies. In 1967, Harold Wilson required the resignation of seven PPSs when they voted with the Opposition, but the ban on their employment was lifted a few months later. In 1977, seven PPSs were among the 76 Labour MPs voting for a reduction in arms expenditure: they were rebuked but remained in post. Two of them later voted against provision of the Scotland and Wales Bill, apparently without invoking official reaction. In 1986, one PPS was among 72 Conservative MPs voting against second reading of the Shops Bill: a further four who abstained offered their resignations as PPS but these were declined. There is thus no continuous practice of requiring the dismissal of PPSs who oppose the Government, by vote or abstention, in the division lobbies. Practice, though, has hardened in recent decades. Margaret Thatcher revised the Cabinet Memorandum on Procedure to make it clear that it was deemed inappropriate for a PPS to vote against the government and that stance has been maintained since, encompassing any dissenting voting behaviour. However, PPSs retain greater freedom than ministers to speak on issues and this has been used for PPSs to signal the view of their minister on particular policies; it is frequently assumed that a PPS would not make a political speech without the concurrence of their minister.

"The extent to which the convention should apply, constitutionally, to PPSs is questionable. The doctrine is one of collective ministerial responsibility and PPSs are not ministers. They are not members of the Government and receive no ministerial salary (hence

the need for qualification whenever they are included in the 'payroll vote'.) However, the political reality is that if PPSs wish to advance on to the first step of the ministerial ladder (rather than simply hold it), then they need to be loyal to the Government. Loyalty is perceived – and perception is all – as necessary, albeit is, in practice, not sufficient: there are various MPs whose highest position has been that of a PPS.

“Despite the various caveats, the doctrine of collective responsibility is clear in term of consequence for ministerial action and serves as a general operating framework for ministerial action. A Colin Turpin once succinctly put it, ‘the principle does express in a general way the actual practice of government.’”

David Baker responded: “This is a succinct and comprehensive trawl through past precedent and accepted theory, as one would anticipate from Professor Norton, but it still seems to me that a ‘doctrine’ (defined as ‘a belief – or system of beliefs – accepted as authoritative by some group or school’ – see wordnet.princeton.edu/perl/webwn) which ala Turpin – suggests that ‘the principle does expose in a general way the actual practice of governments.’ Still allows huge potential scope for interpretation and therefore wide variation of application (i.e. exceptions to the ‘rule’) depending on the character/personality of the PM and relationship with his/her senior advisors, plus the vociferousness, or otherwise, of the media onslaught, once alerted to any discrepancy by an individual from the approved doctrine.

“Thus, both ministers and their PMs, often use claims of ignorance of misbehaviour by lower officials as an excuse for their own culpability, and this seems to work to some extent with the electorate too. Thus, it is more a powerful instrument for disciplining personal errors of judgment or impropriety, as in the case of Peter Mandelson for failing to disclose a substantial loan by a Cabinet colleague in 1999, than for cases of general ministerial responsibility.

“Nor should we forget that ‘Collective responsibility amongst groups of Ministers developed in the 18th and 19th centuries as a means of wresting political control from the Monarch.’ And ‘In addition to these officially sanctioned exemptions, there are also authorized ‘breaches’ of collective responsibility and the principle of confidentiality, such as the leaking of information to the media and the publication of ex-ministerial memoirs

or diaries.’ From: ‘The collective responsibility of Ministers, an outline of the issues’ – <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2004/rp04-082.pdf> And from the same source: ‘Bye the bye, there is one thing we haven’t agreed upon, which is, what are we to say? Is it better to make our corn dearer, or cheaper, or to make the price steady? I don’t care which: but we had better all tell the same story.’ [Lord Melbourne (Prime Minister) to his Cabinet in 1841 on the Corn Laws – Spencer Walpole, *The Life of Lord John Russell*, 1889, vol. 1, p. 3691.

Barry Winetrobe adds – “David Baker cites a House of Commons Research Paper, the first edition of which I was author. I also wrote a companion Paper on individual responsibility, the current edition of which is: <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2004/rp04-03.pdf>. I’ve also been interested in the concept of collective responsibility under devolution, especially in the context of formal coalition government, i.e., a notion of what I’ve called ‘*collective coalition responsibility*’ holding not just individual ministers together, but coalition partners themselves (see ‘Collective responsibility in devolved Scotland [2003] *Public Law* 24). This is quite novel in UK constitutional history given the rarity of coalitions and the like (it is written up in Scottish Executive guidance such as the *Scottish Ministerial Code* and the *Guide to Collective Decision Making*), but presumably some similar sort of constitutional convention/‘rule’ applies in those jurisdictions where coalitions are more common or the norm.”

Robert Melville offered this remarks: “Wrt Professor Norton’s reference to the employment of surrogates to express disagreement with their government’s policy, the following observation by Iain MacWhirter in today’s (Glasgow) *Sunday Herald* may be of interest: ‘Jim Sheridan’s resignation from his post as parliamentary private secretary to the defence secretary, Des Browne, suggests there is life on the Labour backbenches.

There is even a suggestion that the MP of Paisley had the tacit endorsement of his boss.’

“David Baker’s reference to the Cabinet’s policy on Corn Laws perhaps raises the question – in my mind, at least, because it does indicate that a cabinet discussion actually did take place—whether there can be

collective responsibility in the absence of collective decision making? Of course, it could be argued that the division of responsibilities makes collective responsibility for a whole host of decisions that never reach Cabinet necessary if the government is to function at all. But this presumably requires some sort of prior agreement conjoined with a continuing expectation that good political judgement will be exercised on what sorts of decisions will actually be brought to Cabinet. In relation to all of this, am I mistaken in believing that the present government is reputed to spend very little time discussing anything, especially when it comes to some very important and politically consequential matters? But this is perhaps only to raise yet again the question whether Britain's Prime Minister is (unfortunately) becoming somewhat presidential."

Philip Norton added these comments: "To the case of Jim Sheridan one could add Ann Keen. She is Gordon Brown's PPS and has signed a letter calling for the recall of Parliament. It is, as one might expect, being assumed that she would not have done so without at least having informed her boss.

"The question of whether you can have collective responsibility without collective decision making is a pertinent one. As I indicated in my earlier posting, those who make the decisions can vary – it is not necessarily the Cabinet. Junior ministers may be involved in Cabinet subcommittees, but mostly they are required to support decisions they have had no say in. Ministers, both senior and junior, may feel excluded especially in the field of foreign policy. Even without collective decision making, though, could one do without collective responsibility? The crucial relationship today is not that of crown ministry but of government and parliament. The doctrine has some important consequences, not least the convention that a government defeated in a vote of confidence in the House of Commons resigns or requests a division.

"David Baker touched upon a further complication. I had thought of ending my original message by noting the concept of collective ministerial responsibility does, at least, entail fewer definitional problems than that of individual ministerial responsibility. David appears to merge the two. Peter Mandelson's resignation because of his undeclared acceptance of a loan from Geoffrey Robinson does not engage the doctrine of collective responsibility – I don't think there is a

government policy on the subject – but raises interesting questions about individual ministerial responsibility. In that case, of course, Mandelson resigned because of what he had done and not what his Department had done. Individual ministerial responsibility is often discussed in terms of culpability, and the extent to which ministers no longer resign for mistakes made in their name (in fact, they rarely did and the case of Crichton Down is often misinterpreted), but its real importance is arguably in relation to line control within a Department.

"There is a problem, of course, in the relationship between the two in that collective responsibility may be invoked in order to protect a minister who is accused of individual policy or administrative failure. In such cases, whether the protection of collective responsibility is afforded a minister depends on the politics of the situation. As G.H.L. May noted of conventions, they cannot be understood 'with politics left out.'"

BOOK REVIEWS

(This item is an innovation a point-counterpoint book review. Our initial impulse was to label this type of contribution: "Take your corner and come out swinging," but decided that was too lengthy. Seriously, we welcome future contributions of this type.)

Jonas Pontusson, *Inequality and Prosperity: Social Europe and Liberal America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), xiv & 242 pp., Bibliography, Index, Cl. \$49.95, Pb. \$19.95.

Point-Counterpoint Review:

"Politically Relevant Research: Defending *Inequality and Prosperity*"

Britain's elites take obvious pleasure in liberal economics' recent success. Fears that Germany or Sweden might have lessons for Anglo-capitalism were eclipsed during the 1990s by the happy coincidence of low unemployment, consumer price stability, and an asset bubble. They may also rest easy in the knowledge that inequality is the natural correlate of prosperity—legitimate, even—as it results from necessary incentives for work and investment. By contrast, 'social Europe' pursues equality, preventing market rewards going where they should and imposing unsustainable social overheads.

Seen thus, the industrialized world divides into a flourishing but increasingly unequal liberal camp on the one hand, and a collection of stagnant communitarian welfare states on the other. To the latter *The Economist* (and Tony Blair) recommends lower spending, consumer-led growth, and supply-side flexibility.

Social scientists are also wont to sort countries into overly broad and static categories. Most recently, 'varieties of capitalism' scholars distinguish 'liberal' from 'coordinated' (or social) market economies—with Britain and the US exemplifying the first and Germany and Sweden the second. Underpinned by a functionalist logic of micro-economic coordination, they show how institutions sustain difference through time even in the face of common pressures (as from new export competition, for example). Some go further, pursuing general theories of institutional change and stability.

Jonas Pontusson's *Inequality and Prosperity* is a convincing rebuttal of the political cant and a refreshing antidote to academic abstraction. Presenting comparable data for seventeen countries, Pontusson replaces broad generalization with careful description of policies, institutions, and outcomes. He demonstrates that egalitarianism need not be incompatible with growth and efficiency, and that the social democratic Nordic economies are doing better than liberal economists allow—and in some ways better than the liberal economies themselves.

Pontusson's research was sponsored by the New York-based Century Foundation, and as such speaks more to trans-Atlantic policy debates than the theoretical problems of political science. However, it is published in the Cornell Political Economy series, and adopts a broadly institutionalist framework consistent with the 'varieties' school. Taking their categories as heuristic devices, Pontusson is able to emphasize both the national level (where policy is made) and the group averages (on which the debate has focused).

This is a valuable contribution on both the policy and academic fronts, and is accessible to both graduate and upper-level undergraduate audiences. On the policy front, Pontusson brings an infusion of international data to American and British debates over how far polities should attempt to reduce market inequalities. His message is both substantive and methodological.

Pontusson's first chapter sets out the presumed

trade-off between arrangements to promote equality and those that enhance economic efficiency. Whether or not this trade-off is real, it lies at the heart of contemporary policy debates—and it is politically negotiated in the real world. Just as capitalism produces inegalitarian outcomes, democratic politics creates egalitarian pressures. Where the median household income is less than the mean household income "as majority of households stands to gain from progressive taxation and redistributive spending." (2) On the other hand, everyone must worry about overall levels of economic activity. If the neoclassical economists are correct, market-inhibiting measures restrain growth, reduce employment, and ultimately hurt even the worst off. And as Anthony Crosland long ago acknowledged, without economic growth there will be no redistribution.

Yet the efficiency/equality trade-off is less clear in practice than in theory. At the very least it is modified by nationally-specific institutions (which Pontusson emphasizes) and cultural adaptations (to which he only alludes). Pontusson adds that policy choices also matter, and moreover that they do not follow directly from institutional arrangements. He might have added that policy outcomes will also be affected by the particulars of a country's insertion into global capitalism—that is, by what is happening elsewhere at any given historical point.

In a brief chapter, Pontusson outlines the varieties of capitalism approach, broadly adopting their distinction between the social market economies (SMEs) have more cohesive business organization, wider collective bargaining coverage, more extensive employment protection, and more generous welfare states. The SMEs are further subdivided into a social democratic Nordic group and a conservative Continental group including Germany. Nordic countries are marked by their distinctively universal welfare state, which stresses public provision of services as well as comprehensive transfers. The Continental SMEs tend to have tighter job protection rules and less active labor market policy, while at the same time hinging their welfare state on employment experience. This turns out to be an insidious combination since job security legislation tends to hinder job creation and low employment is especially costly in insurance-based systems.

The Nordic SMEs are consistently the more equal through time, and the United States is, of course, the

most inegalitarian single country. On the other hand, gross earnings inequality for households worsened across the OECD during the 1980s and 1990s. This appears to be explained by trends in labor markets, including most especially the distribution of, and rewards for, work. At the same time, declining unionization and falling government employment have helped reduce wages. Over the same period government taxes and transfers have counteracted rising gross earnings inequality, meaning that disposable income is more equally distributed than market income. The sustainability of such efforts is politically uncertain, however, especially given the demographic burdens of aging on healthcare and pension systems.

Among the most common claims made about egalitarian efforts of the social markets is that they produce negative employment effects. In fact, as he shows in Chapter Four, there is no consistent positive relationship between equality and unemployment. Neither overall unemployment nor unemployment for the less well educated is higher in the SMEs. Where the liberal market economies (LMEs) do outperform SMEs, however, is the crucially important duration of unemployment spells and the overall level of job creation. And while employment *rates* are very high in the Scandinavian economies (because of high female labor market participation), employment *growth* has lagged in both the Nordic and the Continental economies. Herein lies the best case for the neo-liberals: that wage inequality can help create jobs.

Job creation is essential, of course, since it helps reduce social exclusion and pays for redistributive welfare states. In the remainder of the book Pontusson has two main purposes: to derive from the historical data more palatable paths to higher employment, and to show that some of the usual targets of neo-liberal critique are not, in fact obstacles to job growth.

In individual chapters he treats unionization, alternative welfare state arrangements, and firm-level arrangements (codetermination, employment protection, active labor market policy, and skills-creation). As have others, he finds no evidence that SME arrangements of this kind have produced poor economic outcomes. He acknowledges however, that the post-1980 period has been more challenging, especially for the Continental SMEs. Of these factors, however, the only serious obstacle to employment growth is job protection

legislation that is common in Germany (as well as France and Italy). Protecting particular jobs (as opposed to ensuring workers have access to employment opportunities) appears to damage employment growth, because employers at the margins refuse to hire workers they cannot easily shed.

Unionization, by contrast, is especially propitious for employment. First, they need not hurt manufacturing competitiveness—as so often assumed in Britain and the US. On the contrary, relative unit labor costs in much more unionized countries *declined* over the 1990s (106-7). And of course Germany and Sweden are net exporters, unlike Britain and the United States, where unionization has declined dramatically.

Second, and perhaps more controversially, by helping central banks do their job extensive and centralized collective bargaining coverage contributes to macro-economic stability. Central bank independence, as Britain's Labour Government understood, is associated with greater price stability—but also historically favors low inflation over low unemployment. Because centralized wage bargaining introduces greater predictability, central bank independence *and* high collective bargaining rates outperformed others in both inflation and unemployment (109).

This last point turns out to be important, because Pontusson believes Europe could add jobs through macroeconomic expansion. History suggests that, since wage demands are better coordinated in the highly unionized social market economies, central banks can do more to stimulate demand—and so raise employment—without risking inflation. Moreover, because they compete effectively in global trade (thanks to highly skilled workforce and high factor productivity) SMEs can stimulate demand without causing current account difficulties and currency depreciation. On this front, they have more scope than the consumer-led Liberal Market Economies—although European monetary union has clearly complicated this calculus.

The book also carries important methodological lessons. As suggested above, broad categorical comparisons too often substitute for careful examination of policies and institutions in their historically specific, interdependent and dynamic context. Among Pontusson's key points is that we should judge the economic impact of institutions and policies at the national level rather than generalize about 'social

Europe,' or worse, the European Union as a whole. Throughout the book Pontusson reports both individual country outcomes and group averages. In highlighting the range within group limits he demonstrates the inadequacy of sweeping generalizations. Thus, for example, the employment record of liberal economies is quite varied, with job creation much more marked in the United States than in Britain. Some will object that France and Italy are excluded from either group as too idiosyncratic—generally boosting SME averages. But this allows him to emphasize what works (Nordic policies that promote female workforce participation, for example) rather than what does not (France's job-destroying work rules). And as Vivien Schmidt and others note, France is very much *sui generis*.

Although less concerned with advancing policy solutions, Pontusson also implies that policy transfer is possible. Without implying that all is well, he offers a menu of modest reforms for both LMEs and SMEs. Emphasizing institutional interdependencies and adaptation, varieties of capitalism (VOC) scholars are justifiably skeptical that arrangements in one place will work in another. Others emphasize cultural obstacles to policy success. The key for Pontusson is in transferring policies rather than institutions. Thus, for example, countries should seek to maximize employment rather than protect jobs. How they do so will depend on institutional (and cultural) context, as well as on timing.

The least useful part of the book is his contribution to the VOC debate over systemic convergence, and specifically whether SME institutions can survive globalization. He concludes that they will, but his treatment of the relevant pressures (changing corporate finance, for example) is only schematic.

However, the overall project does suggest a way forward for political scientists, who too rarely engage in policy debates. First, we might shy away from amorphous categories (for example, institutions) and gross processes (for example, change) and turn instead to the distributive impacts of existing economic arrangements. Second, we must remember that capitalism entails change. This means, for example, that the balance of growth promoting and growth inhibiting effects induced by egalitarian institutions is likely to shift over time as well as vary across nations. Hopefully Pontusson's book will provoke an adequate empirical response from defenders of liberal economics.

Alistair Q. Howard, Temple University

“Professor Pontusson Doth Protest Too Much”

The transatlantic policy debate on how nations should adapt to globalization has reached something of an intellectual standoff. Americans and Britons admonish their continental colleagues for not liberalizing their economies while Europeans resist the notion, fearing rising inequality and social instability. Into this mix steps Jonas Pontusson with *Inequality and Prosperity*. His fundamental purpose is to counter the market-liberal orthodoxy that there is a fundamental trade-off between equality and prosperity. Drawing on the varieties of capitalism (VOC) literature, he contends that those economies that promote redistribution perform just as well as market-oriented systems; there is no trade-off between growth and equality. Pontusson should be admired for grappling with a vital question, but problems arise in the details of his analysis. Like many a great novelist he has started with the ending and worked the plot back to the beginning. Despite globalization, European social market capitalism is still viable (and, with its emphasis on equity, implicitly morally superior). He then spends 200 plus pages rounding up economic data to push the reader to that conclusion. Unfortunately, his commitment is such that he does not offer a fair presentation or interpretation of the evidence. Contradictory cases are left out, data is manipulated, and obvious anomalies ignored. The net result is a rather unconvincing polemic that actually does a rather poor job in supporting the very point he is trying to make.

Pontusson begins by laying out his two key classes of economies. Social market economies (SMEs) are distinguished by densely organized business communities, strong unions with highly institutionalized collective bargaining systems, and extensive public provision of social welfare and employment protection (p. 17). That is, non-market forms of economic coordination predominate. In liberal market economies (LMEs), market transactions define relations among economic actors. While consistent with the VOC literature, his selection of cases is problematic. Liberal economies include Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland make up the social market economies. Other major European economies, specifically France, Italy, and Spain are

excluded. Why? “Among European countries, strong unions and large redistributive welfare states certainly do not distinguish France, Italy, and Spain.” (p. 9) Of course, they do not particularly distinguish Switzerland either. Alternately, Great Britain has both a greater union density and a much higher level of unionization than the US. Should they be analyzed separately? If we look across economies we can find elements that deviate from ideal typical liberal or social market economy in *all* systems. Using one of these to toss a state out of consideration is rather arbitrary. The most egregious example in this case is France, which he claims can not be labeled an SME because it lacks strong and encompassing unions. To be sure, trade union density in France is quite low (10% of workers according to the OECD), but the percentage of workers covered by collective bargaining agreements—a more revealing measure of the influence of unions—is a quite high 90% (Pontusson is kind enough to include data for some of his “excluded countries;” see Table 5.2 on p. 99). So France does not look that different after all. Yet excluding France (not to mention Italy, Spain, or Japan) serves to boost the SME group averages. Pontusson is cherry-picking his cases.

The majority of the book is turned over to extensive comparative economic analysis between liberal and social market economies. Dozens of tables and graphs—Pontusson is especially fond of scatterplots—are presented. (One cannot help but get a sense that the sheer volume of statistics is intended more to beat the reader into submission rather than to enlighten.) Two major concerns can be raised with Pontusson’s methodology. For, it is nothing more than tables and scatterplots; except in a very few instances, there are no regressions or other econometrics. Ultimately, if you want to make the case traits of SMEs do not negatively impact employment and growth, then you need to be able to show *how much* these factors matter to those outcomes compared to other variables. Correlations alone may be spurious, and are certainly not a strong basis on which to advocate policy transfer.

The larger concern is that, in far to many instances, the evidence is contorted to produce the desired interpretation rather than objectively presented. A few examples should suffice to make the point. Pontusson dismisses higher average growth among liberal economies as attributable almost entirely to Ireland’s rapid

development. Take them out of the equation and “...the average growth rates of LMEs and SMEs turn out to be exactly the same from 1980 to 2000: 1.8 percent per year” (p. 7). While true on its face, SME’s grew faster in the 1980s and have slowed since. If we compare growth rates from 1990-2005 (using IMF data), the average rate among SMEs was 2.1%. For LMEs it was 3.4% (or 1.9% and 2.8% if the high-flying economies of Norway and Ireland are removed from the calculations). Why should the performance of these economies in the 1980s be considered a *better* predictor of future performance than that of the last fifteen years?

On employment growth, Pontusson presents data showing that both unemployment and employment rates are similar for liberal and social market economies, albeit with higher long-term unemployment in SMEs, contradicting the idea of an egalitarian trade-off. Yet the exclusion of other European economies is keenly felt on this score. Moreover, he parses the data to produce a favorable result. “Over the 1990-2002 period, the average growth rate of service employment in LMEs outpaced that of *continental SMEs*, but the difference in group averages is *entirely attributable to Ireland’s exceptional growth rate*” (p. 83, emphasis added). Based on the data in Table 4.6 (p. 83), the overall LME growth rate from 1990-2002 was 2.4%, which drops to 1.9% if Ireland is excluded. The rate for continental SMEs was 1.8%, but that for Nordic rates was only 0.9%, rendering an *overall* SME rate of 1.4%. Service employment growth rates are one third higher in LMEs, even without Ireland.

The most egregious example comes on the question of average hours worked. Pontusson raises the canard that America’s “jobs miracle” of the 1990s came at the price of working vastly more hours (p. 11), which he backs up using OECD data. However, more recent revisions of the same data series shows only a small increase in hours worked for Americans during the 1990s. Pontusson know this as he addresses the point in a footnote (f. n. 14, p. 222), but he simply dismisses it as “implausible” without explanation. More to the point, this paints a false comparative picture. In 1979 (again, according to the OECD), Americans worked 1834 hours per year. In 2005 it was 1804 hours per year. The French, alternately, worked about 1856 hours in 1979, but only 1535 hours in 2005. In

(western) Germany, the respective figures were 1758 and 1421 hours. Americans work about the same number of hours per year as always, but Europeans, for reasons either voluntary or involuntary, work much less than in the past. Such underutilization is a fundamental structural problem of European economies. (It also directly relates to employment rates as these can be maintained by spreading hours among more employees.) In all of these instances, Pontusson presents the data in a way that is statistically accurate but substantively misleading.

Even on comparisons that are empirically uncontroversial, difficulties arise. Much of the analysis focuses on the distribution of income and Pontusson's basic conclusion is that, while inequality has risen across the developed world, it remains even greater within the liberal economies. Even supporters of liberalism recognize that it tends to produce less equitable results. The important question, however, is what does this mean? Which, after all, is better for the average person: a 25% improvement in the equitable distribution of income or a 25% increase in per capita GDP? This is not merely a rhetorical question; this roughly represents the difference in actual economic outcomes between the United States and European social market economies. An underlying assumption of this book is that a more equitable distribution of income, even at a lower absolute level of income, is a superior economic outcome for all concerned. An explicit defense of that proposition would have been helpful to Pontusson's cause.

All of this highlights the fundamental flaw in *Inequality and Prosperity*: Pontusson is asking the wrong question. He maintains that the categorizations of the VOC literature are merely heuristic devices (p. 17), and then becomes the prisoner of those heuristics. This book devolves into a battle between liberal and social market economies with Professor Pontusson offering a staunch defense of the European social model using weapons of massed statistics. As the discussion above notes, however, a more sober analysis of comparative economic data suggests a different conclusion. On a range of economic measures—employment, but also GDP and productivity growth—liberal economies have tended to outperform most of those in social market category, especially since 1995, *however*, there is a good deal of variation within these groupings, and many

SMEs (Nordic states) have also prospered. In short, broad categories like LME and SME are not especially robust predictors of economic performance. The logic that Pontusson pushes, however, is that since *some* social market economies are thriving, the model still works and has applicability elsewhere. The important question, then, especially for those seeking to defend the European social model, is *why* are some SMEs doing so well while others falter?

Pontusson's answer resides outside of the models: poor performance in SMEs results from external shocks and macroeconomic policies. The main laggard among SMEs is, of course, Germany and Pontusson attributes most of Germany's economic problems to reunification with the former East Germany (p. 71). Only scant anecdotal evidence supports this point, so we are left to accept it on supposition. Econometric analysis is desperately needed here. (The inability of the German social market model to fix the eastern Länder equally does not bode well for Pontusson's policy aim—transferring elements of this system further afield). For other SMEs, problems stem from the fiscal and monetary restrictions resulting from EMU. Barring those restrictions, expansionary fiscal policy could drastically improve growth and employment (pp. 110-111)—a point he claims is accentuated by the trade surpluses generally held by SMEs (p. 97). (He bases this point on an idea developed by David Soskice, but one that is not supported by the wider economic literature.) Yet variations in both performance and types of capitalism cut across the eurozone. Alternately, fiscal expansion would only translate into higher growth and employment if it did not spark inflation, spurring a counterbalancing interest rate increase by the European Central Bank. And it is not as if eurozone states have not done this; France and Germany have busted the limits of the Stability and Growth Pact without much economic benefit. Fiscal expansion equally failed to fix economic problems in Japan. Empirical support for the claim that a positive external balance enhances the efficacy of fiscal policy to stimulate aggregate demand is weak. Certainly German reunification and EMU play a role in explaining SME performance, but putting these forth as *the* factors that explain economic shortcomings is unconvincing.

Not that there are not factors to explain these outcomes. One is nestled within Pontusson's own

data—Nordic SMEs have fewer employment protections that hinder firing workers than do continental SMEs (p. 119). Exploring the economic significance of such differences, particularly compared to macroeconomic factors, would certainly seem a fruitful exercise. (Indeed, while noting that employment protections raise unemployment, Pontusson draws back from advocating their elimination.) In terms of the direction of CPE in general and VOC research project in particular, what is desperately needed is more research that unbundles the concepts used to distinguish the different models of capitalism, examine how these vary across a range of states (without first putting them into restrictive categories), and then connect these systematically to disparities in economic performance. On a broader level, Pontusson accepts the VOC idea of comparative institutional advantages—that certain economies are better at certain things. SMEs thrive in producing incremental innovations in stable technological sectors. LMEs gain through flexibility and an environment conducive to radical innovation. Globalization has not per se altered these advantages (hence we still see a diversity of capitalisms), but it might have altered the comparative returns of these systems (i.e., more flexible systems extract greater gains from IT and other cutting edge technologies). Yet questioning the utility of the social market model is heresy; it cannot be contemplated.

Being “on message” is the key, because the ultimate goal of *Inequality and Prosperity* is to offer policy reforms. For SMEs, Pontusson suggests moderate reforms to enhance human capital (i.e., expansion of education and training), with the Nordic countries serving as a model. Beyond that, his goal is to preserve the core of the social market model, principally wage compression, while reducing employment protections—governments should be improving people’s ability to find work rather than protecting those in work—and returning taxation to focus on income rather than payroll taxes (pp. 214–16). Reforms for SMEs thus come with a “small r”. Liberal economies, for their part, would do well to adopt the core elements of the social democratic approach to economic and social policy. He identifies these as (1) wage solidarity; (2) active labor market policies; (3) public investment in education; (4) family policies to facilitate female labor participation; and (5) universalism in the provision of

public welfare (p. 218). Liberal systems require REFORM. Putting aside that the economic record does not make it clear that such reform is needed (unless one’s concern is with equity above all else), this raises the question: Why will structures crafted for Scandinavia work in Britain or the US? He makes a distinction between ‘social democratic policies’ and ‘social market institutions’, noting that the former are more easily transferred than the latter (p. 218). Nevertheless, it is unclear how one can transfer the policy (i.e., wage solidarity) without the supporting institution (i.e., strong unions and centralized bargaining). As Britain in the 1970s showed, pursuing wage coordination without encompassing unions is a recipe for disaster. He also recognizes the cultural dimension. Economic institutions and policies alter individuals’ incentive structures, yet how they will respond to those incentives is “. . . embedded in a particular cultural context and will vary across countries and also over time.” (p. 211). Can one rally support for a policy of social partnership and solidaristic wage compression in a highly individualistic economic culture like the United States? Skepticisms should outweigh optimism on this point, which augers against the wisdom of undertaking such substantial reform in the first place.

For students of comparative political economy and the VOC literature, *Inequality and Prosperity* should certainly be read; it is the most recent and definitive word on the subject by a major name in the field. Regrettably, the book is so dedicated to a particular viewpoint that it strays from objective analysis and does little to advance our understanding of the dynamics and variation in capitalist economies in the era of globalization. Theoretically, it serves to demonstrate the decreasing returns of sticking rigorously to the VOC analytical framework. Politically, simply pointing out that there are some SMEs that are prospering is not enough. Those who truly wish to revive and reinforce the social democracy need to be able to take a cold and calculating look at these systems to determine what works and what does not. Liberalism need not be embraced, but there must be a willingness to abandon some of the comfortable propositions of the social market model. For that, there is no alternative. *Terrence Casey, Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology*

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POTPOURRI XLVIII

“How’s that again”? – “Churchill, Stones to spend night together” – The headline on the front page of the Louisville *Courier-Journal* of Tuesday, August 8, 2006. The explanation is? The Rolling Stones are to perform in September at Louisville, Kentucky’s Churchill Downs, the site of the Kentucky Derby. Tickets will range from \$65 to \$300 for the 65,000 seats in the infield where thousands become legless each year on the first Saturday in May.

The Royals still get no respect! – “Today in England, a jockey is to be reprimanded for head butting a horse. The good news? Camilla is going to be fine.” [Comedian Jay Leno on America’s “Tonight Show,” July 26, 2006.]

The frailties of ‘gummint’ enforcement –

a) In Bath recently, police officers explained why they did not pursue a man who was riding a stolen moped: The thief was not wearing a helmet and the officers were under orders not to conduct a pursuit in such instances because a thief might fall from the vehicle, be injured, and sue the city for damages.

b) Britain’s Environmental Agency was fined several thousand dollars (pounds sterling, if you will) for permitting toxic waste from one of its monitoring stations into the River Exe in Somerset.

Around the former empire

Cooling the drinks in Newfoundland – A relative of the Editor says that when the relative spent a summer in Newfoundland he saw his first iceberg. When he commented to a local townsman of Herring Neck that it was a large iceberg, the latter observed “Ah no me son, that’s just a little ice cube we drinks in our whiskey.”

MEMBERSHIP NEWS

Kudos

Donley T. Studlar – Will spend the 2005-2007 academic year at the University of Aarhus as the recipient of a Fullbright Commission award and two grants from the host university. Appropriately, for a

non-smoker, Studlar will do research on measures to control tobacco (and presumably those that use it) in the EU. He will return to the west side of the Atlantic for the Christmas holidays and perhaps on other occasions. In the meantime, he can be contacted by his long-standing email address: dstudlar@wvu.edu But see an alternative below under ‘changes.’

Professor Sir Robert Worcester – Following a unanimous vote by the University Court, Worcester was installed as the University of Kent’s new Chancellor July 13, 2006, having been awarded an honorary degree from the university the day before. He assumed the duties of Chancellor August 1, 2006. Sir Robert is the founder of MORI (Market & Opinion Research International). In 2005, he was appointed a Knight Commander of the British Empire (KBE). He is a Deputy Lieutenant of the County of Kent, a Kent County Council appointed Ambassador, a trustee of the Kent Foundation, and a non-executive director of both the Kent Messenger Group and the Medway Maritime Hospital Trust. Academically, Sir Robert is an Honorary Professor of Politics at Kent, a Governor and Visiting Professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science, and an Honorary Professor in the Department of Politics and International Studies at Warwick University. He has also exercised significant roles in several environmental organizations, is a Freeman of the City of London and currently co-chairs the Jamestown 2007 Commemoration British Committee as Chairman of the Pilgrims Society. He is Vice-President of the United Nations Association, Governor of the English-Speaking Union and of the Ditchley Foundation as well as a Trustee of the Magna Carta Trust.

New Addresses

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New or Changed email Addresses

Donley T. Studlar – Continue to use his email address above, but to contact his host department, use ps@ps.au.dk

Rest in Peace – (We print here three commentaries on the life of Leon Epstein and welcome additional remarks about him to be published in our next issue.)

Leon David Epstein (May 29, 1919-August 1, 2006) – The third weekend of August, we learned of Leon’s passing. Here are comments of some BPGers that knew him, as well as the obituary from the University of Wisconsin website.

From the Editor of the BPG Newsletter - OK, I’ll level with you, when I heard that Leon Epstein had died, I wept. Don’t ask me why. I don’t know, but my wife says she does. I note that I wept because I have already mentioned that to some BPGers and I don’t want their word to be doubted.

I met Leon in August 1976 when I arrived at the University of Wisconsin-Madison to begin the academic year as a Fellow in the National Endowment for the Humanities College Faculty-in-Residence seminar program. Leon was to lead the seminar and he did a magnificent job, inviting members of his department, as well as distinguished political scientists from around the country to give presentations to our group.. The seminar focused on political parties, which was an ideal topic for me since I shared Leon’s interest in both British and American parties.

Before I arrived, I was familiar with Leon’s work, including his *Politics in Wisconsin* (1958), his APSR articles on British parties, and had used as textbooks his *Political Parties in Western Democracies* (1st ed., 1967) and *British Politics in the Suez Crisis* (1964). The latter I continue to regard as the exemplary treatment of a complex political event.

The seminar was one of those experiences that marvelously enrich one’s career. Although several members of the group have died, I still maintain contact with some. Regrettably, a few years after our time at Madison the NEH discontinued this program: it was too expensive.

At our first session, Leon advised us not to spend all our time in the library working on our projects but to enjoy the environment of Madison and its surroundings, such as the nearby Horicon Wildlife Marsh where large migratory birds stopped on their

flight from Canada and back. We followed his advice, visiting not only Horicon, but also several small communities near Madison and attending a major league baseball game in Milwaukee. Leon and Shirley also hosted the seminar group at the Epstein house.

One learned lots from Leon, much of it not political science. His undergraduate roommate at Madison was Edwin Newman, who would become known for his reporting and commentaries on NBC-TV. Newman was four months older than Epstein, Both would serve in WWII, Newman in the Navy, Leon in the Army where he rose from private to captain. They stayed in touch. Leon mentioned that Newman, in doing research for one of his books (Whether it was *Strictly Speaking: Will America be the Death of English?* or *A Civil Tongue*, I have forgotten.), found that the names of several presidents of American universities could be read forward or backward and still be an acceptable name. “Clark Kerr” was an example since “Kerr” could also be a first name.

Leon and Shirley had no children, but Leon offered me parental advice that I still recall. In conversation about my family, I mentioned that our son, then in middle school, had ‘social behavior’ problems. Leon assured me that Lance would outgrow that and I sensed that Leon might have had experience with such matters, perhaps in his childhood. His advice proved to be correct.

On the informal side of his career, Leon was a devoted tennis player until late in life when his legs could no longer stand the strain of that game. He and Shirley traveled widely, both in North America and abroad. In the period prior to our seminar, they had spent several months in Australia where Leon lectured. He subsequently published a piece on Australian politics. He had an amazing knowledge about members of our discipline. Although he and my dissertation advisor, Heinz Eulau, were specialists in fields widely separated, they knew each other – well enough for Leon to compliment me on the strong letter of reference that Heinz sent in support of my application for the seminar, adding Heinz was always candid and never offered praise lightly.

As did Leon, I served several years in university administration. Until my months in Madison, I was

unaware of that side of his career. He wrote a book about this role: *Governing the University: The Campus and the Public Interest* (1974). He was outspokenly critical about some writing on university administration. We shared the view that administration was something that had to be done, but we were faculty first.

Twenty years after the seminar, several members dined with Leon at a restaurant in New York City during an APSA annual meeting. It was great fun, especially when Leon told us how much he enjoyed our seminar.

Jim Christoph and Leon were good friends. I have forgotten how they first met, but they and their wives stayed in touch over the years and one would often see Jim and Leon chatting at the Midwest or APSA annual meetings. In the 1980s, Christoph and I proposed that Leon be a fellow at the Indiana University Institute for Advanced Study. I was on the Institute Board at the time and our nomination of Leon was easily approved. He and Shirley spent most of their time at our Bloomington campus, but they also visited others including mine where I served as host. Leon spoke to our faculty and students about Margaret Thatcher's role as prime minister. Shirley recommended some novels about Britain that I, and our older daughter, soon read. Shirley was a splendid partner to Leon. After Jim's death and Shirley's incapacitation, Leon followed a different routine at professional meetings.

The British Politics Group was a source of pleasure and amazement to Leon. Pleasure in that he genuinely enjoyed its activities and members. Amazement that it had done so well. Of course, his support of the organization was a factor in its success. He was pleased with the *Newsletter*. I recall his commenting positively on the material that Jorgen found for it during his tenure as Executive Secretary, which also included putting the *BPGN* together. Later, when I assumed the editorship, Leon thanked me for not dissecting survey data in the detail that Jorgen had. (Sorry about that Jorgen.)

Some of you will have read Leon's obituary for Bill Young in the recent *PS*. It was typical Leon, presenting the facts about Young and the significance of what he did.

In his remarks about Leon (below), Jorgen Rasmussen recalls that at retirement, Leon said he really never liked publication. Later at the meeting, Jorgen passed that observation along to me. I, too, was stunned by it. Yet, as with much about Epstein, one couldn't pigeon hole him. He did publish after retirement, including an article that I had students in my political parties class read.

The last chat I recall having with him was at the 2005 "British Political Year in Review" panel where in his usual candid, no nonsense manner, he advised me that British political parties had been fudging for years on the campaign expenditure rules.

Leon continued to share his knowledge of British politics. Early this year he emailed me to ask whether the books on the 2005 British general election were available. He was to speak to a community group about the British scene and wanted up-to-date background material. He didn't get those books for the speech but emailed me that he subsequently read them.

The last communication I had with him was at the end of March when I sent an email about Herb McClosky's death. Of course, Leon knew Herb. As he said, they were of the same generation.

Leon, you will be missed.

Tom Wolf, Indiana University Southeast

"Longtime political scientist, former Letters and Science Dean Leon Epstein dies at 86,"

August 2, 2006 by Brian Mattmiller

Leon Epstein, a political science professor for 40 years for the University of Wisconsin-Madison and dean of the College of Letters and Science in the tumultuous 1960s, died on Aug. 1 in Madison, following a recent injury. He was 86.

Colleagues of Epstein, a native of Beaver Dam, say he was an influential figure in the political science department, where he was a faculty member from 1948-88 and a department chair from 1960-63. His research expertise was in comparative politics and British Politics, and he conducted a great deal of influential work on the political party system in America and other Western democracies. He also wrote books on governing the university and on Wisconsin politics.

Longtime colleague and friend of Bernard Cohen, a professor emeritus of political science, notes that Epstein first came to Madison in 1936 as an undergraduate, earning his bachelor's degree in 1940. He fought in World War II, and upon returning completed his Ph.D. in 1948 at the University of Chicago.

Cohen says that Epstein handled the deanship well during the rise of student activism. The early 1960s expansion of the university was drawing to a close as well, leading to a financial crunch

"He handled it well, but didn't really enjoy it," says Cohen, who notes that the South Hall Letters and Sciences dean's office placed him in the middle of the Vietnam War protest fray on Bascom Hill. "He had more than a few meetings drowned out by shouting protesters on the hill."

Cohen describes Epstein as an "outstanding person" who was well-respected in the department and had a strong rapport with people. "He kept up with absolutely everybody and everything right up to his last days," Cohen says, adding that the two of them met for lunch every Monday for years at University Club.

No funeral will be held, following Epstein's wishes, Cohen says.

Epstein's academic contributions figure prominently in a 2006 book about the centennial history of the department, written by longtime political scientist M. Crawford Young.

"Nominally a scholar of British and European politics, Epstein has been critically important in developing the American government and politics program at UW," writes Young. "His comparative studies of political parties are standard works in the field and have been influential in work on American politics."

Young adds that Epstein was highly regarded as a teacher, "(Epstein) directed dissertations of some of the most outstanding American graduate students," Young writes. "I can testify that graduate students relied heavily on him for advice, whether or not he was directing their dissertations.

"Few, if any, faculty have contributed more to the development of the department and the collegial relationships characterizing it," Young concludes.

Phillip Certain, who served as Letters and Science dean from 1993-2004, says "As a former dean, Leon was always a source of wisdom and counsel to me. He was from an era when faculty served as deans for a short time and then returned to the faculty, so as a teacher and researcher he never lost his touch."

Certain says Epstein was also a model for staying active in his retirement years. He lived at Attic Angels in Madison and frequently visited and shared time with the residents in the assisted care unit. He was a long-time member of the Madison Literary Club, a century-old reading group that recently began having meetings at Attic Angels, Certain says.

Certain says that Epstein sustained a head injury from a fall at his home during the weekend and was unable to recover. Epstein was a devoted husband and caregiver to his wife of more than 50 years, Shirley, who died a few years ago. The couple had no children.

From Jorgen Rasmussen - "Recollections of Leon Epstein"

I never could quite believe that Leon Epstein, who died at his home in Middleton, Wisconsin on August 1, really grew up in Beaver Dam, Wisconsin. Not that there were ever any airs or pomposity about Leon, but his sophistication greatly surpassed what a Beaver Dam childhood would lead one to expect. Perhaps his two years in Britain during World War II, followed by a term at Oxford, took some country out of the boy. In any event, that time greatly affected his career.

His undergraduate work, as well as a Master's degree, was in Economics. And his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago was in Public law. Nonetheless, when he joined the political science faculty at Wisconsin, it was to replace Frederic Ogg in comparative politics. Those couple of years in Britain had been influential. This produced the ironic situation when I was at Wisconsin in the late '50s and early '60s that Dave Fellman, who taught public law, had started his academic career in comparative government and Leon, who taught comparative politics, had started his in public law.

I took several courses with Leon and he super-

vised my dissertation. Over four and a half decades later, it is difficult to recall specific advice, although I know that I benefited from his guidance. I do remember asking him at one point, "How do you know what to do research on?" I confess that I no longer can quote his reply. But fortunately he didn't regard the question as evidence that I was a nit-wit not worth his time to educate. Such consideration was typical behavior for Leon.

I served as a teaching assistant for him and at the end of one semester we were deciding on grades. As was the custom then, students left postcards with their exam papers so that the professor would mail them their grade before the University eventually sent out the official report. One student wrote on his postcard that he had enjoyed the course. Leon noted on the card that he didn't offer the course for entertainment. He immediately erased this, however, saying that exams were a stressful time for students and they didn't realize what they were saying.

When I had finished my graduate work and was seeking a faculty position, I had to decide among the available offers. His advice in identifying the key elements to consider helped me reach a decision, which I always have felt to have been the right one.

Over the years I met Leon frequently at professional meetings. Once the British Politics Group was formed and I became Executive Secretary, we often worked together, since he held various BPG offices. The congeniality and helpfulness that I had come to expect from my graduate school acquaintance never altered.

In his later years Leon bore the burden of his wife's illness. Here, again, an irony. Some years before she developed Parkinson's disease, Leon had had shingles. I remember talking with Shirley about her concern for his health. He recovered with no after effects and she later was the one with a debilitating illness. At one professional meeting, my wife and I had a relaxed conversation with Leon about Shirley's condition. Although he was bearing up, the strain was clear. The talk drifted into whether Alzheimer's or Parkinson's was worse. With some emotion he said that all he knew was that Parkinson's was a terrible way to die.

The Epsteins had owned a marvelous house in Madison, almost a Frank Lloyd Wright design, built to take advantage of a slopping, wooded lot. When Shirley's condition so declined that she needed 24 hour, professional care, she entered a nursing facility in a suburb of Madison. After making daily visits for some time to read to her, he decided to sell the house and move into a residential facility connected with the nursing care center. He continued to live there after Shirley's death and it was there that he fell and incurred the head injury, which caused his death.

I will leave to other sources summaries of Leon's achievements and publications; however, I will mention on conversation that says a great deal about Leon's view of his prominence. At an APSA meeting in San Francisco, I was staying in a hotel across the street from the convention hotel. One morning after breakfast as I was coming over to the convention hotel, Leon happened to come out of that hotel's door. He suggested that we take a short walk for conversation and exercise. He either had just retired that spring or was just entering what he had decided would be his last year. We talked of this and that and, then, he said that he didn't intend to do any more scholarly publication. "I guess I never really like it."

At which point I nearly collapsed into the gutter. Here was one of the two or three leading authorities on British politics in the second half of the twentieth century, saying that his whole life wasn't centered on publication. We all know the frustrations of publication. That conversation with Leon was the point at which I realized I didn't have to apologize for any negative feelings.

Leon was a distinguished scholar. Such achievements are not always found joined to an agreeable personality. Leon's scholarship influenced mine, for which I am indebted. What I really want to salute, however, is Leon Epstein, a fine fellow, whom I'm glad to have known.

The British Politics Group at the APSA Annual Meeting Reception

– Co-sponsored by the BPG and *British Politics*, a new journal from Palgrave Macmillan

When? - Friday, September 1, 7:00-9:00 p.m.

Where? Independence Brew Pub (Game Room) 1150 Filbert Street

What? Drinks and Hors d'oeuvres

RSVP – By August 25th to Terrence Casey at casey1@rose-hulman.edu

BPG Panels – (Listed in time sequence)

Panel 1 – *Friday, September 1, 2:00 p.m.*

The Year in Review and Business Meeting

Chair: Wyn Grant, University of Warwick

Papers: Andrew Gamble, University of Sheffield

James Mitchell, Strathclyde University

Panel 3 – *Saturday, September 2, 8:00 a.m.*

Measuring Political Effectiveness: Prime Ministers, Legislators, and Leaders of the Opposition

Chair: Richard Haesly, California State University, Long Beach

Papers: Conor McGrath, University of Ulster & Clive S. Thomas, University of Alaska Southeast,

“Poachers Turned Gamekeepers: British and American Legislators with Previous Professional Lobbying Experience.”

Kevin Theakston, University of Leeds, “What Makes for an Effective Prime Minister?”

Peter Catterall, Queen Mary, University of London, “Making the Best of a Bad Job: The Role of the Leader of the Opposition,”

Ray Barker, Erie Community College, “Michael Howard’s Effectiveness as Leader of the Opposition.”

Discussants: Richard Haesly, California State University-Long Beach & Elin Royles, University of Wales-Aberystwyth

Panel 2 – *Saturday, September 2, 4:15 p.m.*

Elections and Party Competition in the UK: Issues, Candidates & Identities

Chair: Florence Faucher-King, CEVIPOF – Sciences Po (Paris)

Papers: Jonathan Tonge, “Protestant Zealotry or Unionist Apath: The Impact of Election Turnout upon the peace and political processes in Northern Ireland”

Chip Hauss, TBA

Robert Johns, University of Strathclyde & Mark Shephard, University of Strathclyde, “Candidate and voter gender in the UK: stereotypes, evaluations and voting impact”

William A. Hazelton, Miami University, “Politics in a Vacuum: Electoral Contests and Communal Dominance in Northern Ireland”

Discussants: Florence Faucher-King, CEVIPOF-Sciences Po (Paris) & Terry Royed, University of Alabama

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