RECLAIM Ohio: A Politically Viable Alternative to Treating Youthful Felony Offenders

Melissa M. Moon
Brandon K. Applegate
Edward J. Latessa

In recent decades, juvenile justice policy has become more conservative. The implementation of new, tougher "get tough" laws has contributed to an increasing juvenile correctional population. Despite this nationwide trend, however, this movement is not completely dominant. This article examines the pilot phase of a new program, RECLAIM Ohio (Reassess and Equitable Community and Local Alternatives to the Incarceration of Minors), which seeks to reduce juvenile commitments to institutions and to increase the use of community-based alternatives. The results indicate some initial success in meeting these goals. The program's ability to address both liberal and conservative ideology may be the key to its long-term success.

Over the past two decades, juvenile justice policy has become decidedly more conservative (Cullen 1995; Cullen and Gilbert 1982). Conservatives have sought to reduce crime, protect society, and hold offenders accountable for their actions. Under the philosophies of deterrence and incapacitation, offenders are to be punished for the crimes they have committed. Thus, the essence of the conservative agenda is to "get tough" on crime and criminals by advocating policies that would increase the number of offenders incarcerated (Besenkos and Merlo 1995; Langin 1991). This "get tough" movement has been extended to juvenile justice.

In this article, we report the results of a unique juvenile justice policy, RECLAIM Ohio (Reassess and Equitable Community and Local Alternatives to the Incarceration of Minors), implemented in Ohio in 1994 as a pilot program. RECLAIM meets both liberal and conservative ideals by encouraging counties to treat delinquents adjudicated for less serious felonies.

Historically, juvenile court dispositions were based on children's "best interests" (Plant 1977; Rothman 1980; Ryerson 1979). Thus, sentences were indeterminate because the length of time required for rehabilitation varied with each youth. Within the past two decades, however, a number of states have adopted determinate and mandatory sentencing schemes or have developed sentencing guidelines for juvenile crimes (Feld 1988). Although indeterminate sentence codes have not been eliminated completely, one third of all juvenile court sentencing statutes now include determinate or mandatory sentences for sentencing guidelines. Nearly all of the states that have adopted these offense-based sentencing schemes did so in the late 1970s and the 1980s during the rise of the conservative agenda.

Juvenile courts also have begun to change their purpose clauses or mission statements (Feld 1988, 1991, 1992). Originally, many juvenile court purpose clauses focused on juveniles' emotional and physical well-being, on maintaining their ties with the community, and, if they were removed from their homes, on giving care and discipline equivalent to that of the parents. Of the 24 states that employ purpose clauses, 10 have changed the focus from the children's best interests to public safety, punishment, and accountability. These differences represent a marked departure from earlier purpose clauses.

In addition to changes in sentencing statutes, the conservative agenda fostered modifications to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (JUDP) Act of 1974 (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 1993). In 1980, the Ashbrook Amendment was added to the JUDP Act; this amendment allows for the institutionalization of status offenders who have violated court orders (Sweet 1991). Thus, a misdemean as minor as skipping school can result in institutionalization if the court has ordered a youth to attend classes.

Another change advanced by conservatives has been the transfer of juveniles to adult court. Since the 1970s, courts have transferred juveniles on the basis of their age and the offense committed rather than their individual circumstances (Seyfer and Sickmund 1995). In 11 states, the upper age limit for processing as a juvenile is either 15 or 16 years (Sickmund 1994). The National Center for Juvenile Justice estimates that approximately 176,000
juveniles under age 18 years were transferred to adult court in 1991 (Snyder and Sickmund 1995). Youths also may be excluded from juvenile court processing for certain offenses, such as murder or other crimes against the person, or if they have prior felony convictions.

The effects of these "get tough" policies are revealed in the number of juveniles incarcerated in public institutions (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1989; DeCooman, Tuna, Kribsch, Herrera, Radoutine, and Del Rosario 1995; Kribsch, DeCooman, and Herrera 1992). From 1984 to 1990, admissions to public juvenile facilities increased by 30% (from 527,759 to 683,634).

Admissions to detention centers also reflect the trend toward incarcerating more juveniles; these admissions increased 38% between 1984 and 1990 (from 404,171 to 558,563). Changes in state sentencing statutes in the 1980s, from indeterminate to determinate, have played a role in this increasing trend to incarcerate more juveniles. The increase in detention centers also may be a result of the modifications to the JDPD Act.

The Case of Ohio

The state of Ohio apparently is following national trends in sentencing statutes, the number of transfers to adult court, and incarceration. Juvenile transfers to adult court increased from 196 cases in 1998 to 402 cases in 1992 (Office of Criminal Justice Services 1995). In regard to sentencing statutes, once a youth has been convicted of a felony, the judge has the option of committing him or her to the Department of Youth Services (DYS), that is, incarcerating the youth. If the judge decides to commit the juvenile, however, the law prescribes the minimum time the juvenile must serve in the institution. For example, a youth convicted of a first- or second-degree felony offense in Ohio must serve a required minimum term of one year in an institution. In addition, a youth may be transferred to adult court in Ohio if his or her current offense is a felony and if the youth has a prior adjudication for a felony offense. Finally, one-day counts of juveniles in public and private facilities have increased by 406% from 3,770 in 1979 to 5,280 in 1991 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1989; DeCooman et al. 1995; Kribsch et al. 1992).

As a result of the conservative agenda in Ohio, the state's institutions are severely overcrowded. In 1991, Ohio's institutions operated at 150% of capacity (Hamparian 1993); the number of youths housed in institutions in the state was second only to that in California.

These trends in Ohio and nationwide may convey the impression that the "get tough" movement dominates juvenile justice policy. Recent developments in Ohio challenge this notion, however. The Ohio DYS has implemented a new policy that seeks to treat certain types of juveniles in the community rather than incarcerate them. Simultaneously, the policy still supports the incarceration of some delinquents. The counties in Ohio receive a monthly allocation of funds; using these funds, they may choose either a community or an institutional placement for each adjudicated felony delinquent. The program is designed to address overcrowding in Ohio's juvenile institutions. This initiative has resulted in a discussion among policy makers as to whether incarceration is appropriate for all delinquents.

This policy is a visible one because of its appeal at both ends of the political spectrum. It is not a pure "get tough" approach, nor is it a movement to deinstitutionalize all offenders; rather, it incorporates elements from both political ideologies. Liberals are satisfied because the program allows less serious offenders to be treated in their local communities. To accommodate conservatives, the program protects the public by allowing for the incarceration of serious, chronic, violent juvenile offenders. The program is called RECLAIM Ohio. The program was implemented experimentally in nine pilot counties during 1994. Here we discuss the goals of the RECLAIM program, how it operates, and some key findings from the pilot year.

The RECLAIM Ohio Program

Because of severe overcrowding in its institutions, Ohio had to devise a way of motivating counties not to send juveniles to state facilities. Before RECLAIM Ohio was implemented, counties were able to send an unlimited number of juveniles to institutions without any fiscal repercussions; the state, not the individual counties, paid all incarceration costs. The challenge lay in reversing this trend.

One creator of RECLAIM Ohio reasoned that if counties were made financially responsible for each incarceration, then they might be forced to consider more carefully their decisions to incarcerate. One proposed solution was to have counties pay for each incarceration. Finally, one-day count of juveniles in public and private facilities have increased by 406% from 3,770 in 1979 to 5,280 in 1991 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1989; DeCooman et al. 1995; Kribsch et al. 1992). As a result of the conservative agenda in Ohio, the state's institutions are severely overcrowded. In 1991, Ohio's institutions operated at 150% of capacity (Hamparian 1993); the number of youths housed in institutions in the state was second only to that in California.

These trends in Ohio and nationwide may convey the impression that the "get tough" movement dominates juvenile justice policy. Recent developments in Ohio challenge this notion, however. The Ohio DYS has implemented a new policy that seeks to treat certain types of juveniles in the community rather than incarcerate them. Simultaneously, the policy still supports the incarceration of some delinquents. The counties in Ohio receive a monthly allocation of funds; using these funds, they may choose either a community or an institutional placement for each adjudicated felony delinquent. The program is designed to address overcrowding in Ohio's juvenile institutions. This initiative has resulted in a discussion among policy makers as to whether incarceration is appropriate for all delinquents.

This policy is a visible one because of its appeal at both ends of the political spectrum. It is not a pure "get tough" approach, nor is it a movement to deinstitutionalize all offenders; rather, it incorporates elements from both political ideologies. Liberals are satisfied because the program allows less serious offenders to be treated in their local communities. To accommodate conservatives, the program protects the public by allowing for the incarceration of serious, chronic, violent juvenile offenders. The program is called RECLAIM Ohio. The program was implemented experimentally in nine pilot counties during 1994. Here we discuss the goals of the RECLAIM program, how it operates, and some key findings from the pilot year.

The RECLAIM Ohio Program

Because of severe overcrowding in its institutions, Ohio had to devise a way of motivating counties not to send juveniles to state facilities. Before RECLAIM Ohio was implemented, counties were able to send an unlimited number of juveniles to institutions without any fiscal repercussions; the state, not the individual counties, paid all incarceration costs. The challenge lay in reversing this trend.

One creator of RECLAIM Ohio reasoned that if counties were made financially responsible for each incarceration, then they might be forced to consider more carefully their decisions to incarcerate. One proposed solution was to have counties pay for each incarceration. Finally, one-day count of juveniles in public and private facilities have increased by 406% from 3,770 in 1979 to 5,280 in 1991 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1989; DeCooman et al. 1995; Kribsch et al. 1992). As a result of the conservative agenda in Ohio, the state's institutions are severely overcrowded. In 1991, Ohio's institutions operated at 150% of capacity (Hamparian 1993); the number of youths housed in institutions in the state was second only to that in California.

These trends in Ohio and nationwide may convey the impression that the "get tough" movement dominates juvenile justice policy. Recent developments in Ohio challenge this notion, however. The Ohio DYS has implemented a new policy that seeks to treat certain types of juveniles in the community rather than incarcerate them. Simultaneously, the policy still supports the incarceration of some delinquents. The counties in Ohio receive a monthly allocation of funds; using these funds, they may choose either a community or an institutional placement for each adjudicated felony delinquent. The program is designed to address overcrowding in Ohio's juvenile institutions. This initiative has resulted in a discussion among policy makers as to whether incarceration is appropriate for all delinquents.

This policy is a visible one because of its appeal at both ends of the political spectrum. It is not a pure "get tough" approach, nor is it a movement to deinstitutionalize all offenders; rather, it incorporates elements from both political ideologies. Liberals are satisfied because the program allows less serious offenders to be treated in their local communities. To accommodate conservatives, the program protects the public by allowing for the incarceration of serious, chronic, violent juvenile offenders. The program is called RECLAIM Ohio. The program was implemented experimentally in nine pilot counties during 1994. Here we discuss the goals of the RECLAIM program, how it operates, and some key findings from the pilot year.

The RECLAIM Ohio Program

Because of severe overcrowding in its institutions, Ohio had to devise a way of motivating counties not to send juveniles to state facilities. Before RECLAIM Ohio was implemented, counties were able to send an unlimited number of juveniles to institutions without any fiscal repercussions; the state, not the individual counties, paid all incarceration costs. The challenge lay in reversing this trend.

One creator of RECLAIM Ohio reasoned that if counties were made financially responsible for each incarceration, then they might be forced to consider more carefully their decisions to incarcerate. One proposed solution was to have counties pay for each incarceration. Finally, one-day count of juveniles in public and private facilities have increased by 406% from 3,770 in 1979 to 5,280 in 1991 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1989; DeCooman et al. 1995; Kribsch et al. 1992). As a result of the conservative agenda in Ohio, the state's institutions are severely overcrowded. In 1991, Ohio's institutions operated at 150% of capacity (Hamparian 1993); the number of youths housed in institutions in the state was second only to that in California.

These trends in Ohio and nationwide may convey the impression that the "get tough" movement dominates juvenile justice policy. Recent developments in Ohio challenge this notion, however. The Ohio DYS has implemented a new policy that seeks to treat certain types of juveniles in the community rather than incarcerate them. Simultaneously, the policy still supports the incarceration of some delinquents. The counties in Ohio receive a monthly allocation of funds; using these funds, they may choose either a community or an institutional placement for each adjudicated felony delinquent. The program is designed to address overcrowding in Ohio's juvenile institutions. This initiative has resulted in a discussion among policy makers as to whether incarceration is appropriate for all delinquents.

This policy is a visible one because of its appeal at both ends of the political spectrum. It is not a pure "get tough" approach, nor is it a movement to deinstitutionalize all offenders; rather, it incorporates elements from both political ideologies. Liberals are satisfied because the program allows less serious offenders to be treated in their local communities. To accommodate conservatives, the program protects the public by allowing for the incarceration of serious, chronic, violent juvenile offenders. The program is called RECLAIM Ohio. The program was implemented experimentally in nine pilot counties during 1994. Here we discuss the goals of the RECLAIM program, how it operates, and some key findings from the pilot year.
more resources (e.g., financial incentives), then they might decide to "recy-
cle" in their local communities (e.g., by using local resources) rather than pay
to send juveniles to "central recycling" (i.e., a DYS institution). The product
of this reasoning was RECLAIM Ohio, which allocates money to each county
and allows that county to choose whether youths should be treated locally or
sent to institutions. Unlike the situation in past years, however, the county is
required to pay for that incarceration from the allocation it receives from the
state. Before we describe how the allocations are made, we discuss the goals
of the RECLAIM program.

The first goal of RECLAIM Ohio is to enable DYS to provide better care
for incarcerated juveniles. Because of crowding in the state's institutions, this
goal can be achieved only if commitments to DYS are decreased; thus,
commitments to DYS institutions must be reduced so that better treatment
may be provided for those youths under its care.

The second goal of the program is to help counties increase the number of
community-based options available in their areas. These options can be
created by developing new programs, expanding existing programs, or
purchasing services from private providers in their communities.

The RECLAIM Ohio program allocates funds to local counties so that
their courts may provide services most suited to the needs of each juvenile
offender. Although a number of sentencing options typically are available to
judges, the main decision in each case centers around whether a juvenile
requires secure custody (incarceration) or can be treated on the local level (in
a community-based program). In the past, however, many counties did not
have the funding available to treat juveniles locally. The RECLAIM program
sought to change this situation. Under this program, counties received a
yearly allocation (distributed monthly) to treat youths under their care and
custody.

DYS pooled the funds normally allocated for operating institutions and
programs, community corrections facilities, and private facilities. In deter-
mining the allotment for each county, DYS averaged the number of felony
adjudications1 for a two-year period (fiscal years 1990 and 1991) for each
county and for the state as a whole. Each county's proportion of the state
average was calculated. This proportion was multiplied by the amount of
money pooled for RECLAIM Ohio. The result was the yearly allocation for
each county. For example, if a county had an average of 1,200 adjudications
(or 8% of the state average) and then that county received $4 million (or 8%)
of the total $50 million budget.

Before RECLAIM Ohio began, counties were not required to pay for
committing youths to institutions. Yet, because RECLAIM pools all DYS
funds, counties are now charged for each juvenile they commit to an institu-
tion. For each day a youth is kept in the secure care of a DYS institution, the
county is charged 75% ($73.98) of the total per diem cost ($98.64). Each
month, the counties' total incarceration costs are subtracted from their
monthly allotments. The counties then can use the remaining funds for
community-based programs.

In certain situations, however, the counties are not charged for commit-
ments to DYS. First, any juvenile who is adjudicated for murder, aggravated
murder, or rape is viewed as an exceptional threat to public safety and can be
committed free of charge. Second, no charge is made for commitments
resulting from offenses that occur in a DYS institution. Finally, counties that
account for less than 0.1% of all felony adjudications are not charged for
commitments.2

If counties commit more youths than their allotments allow, they will not
be charged for the excess at the end of the year. A contingency fund has been
established to cover additional commitment costs incurred by the counties.
In other words, the state, not the individual counties, pays for the extra
incarceration costs at the end of the year. Counties with funds left over at the
end of the year, however, are not required to return the remaining money to
DYS.

The state of Ohio took a radical step when it decided to attempt to reverse
the trend of incarcerating juveniles by reconsidering the interests of the
people involved. This program offers counties fiscal incentives to allow them
to choose the best correctional option for each youth. Counties still can
incarcerate, but now they must give some money back to the state whenever
they choose this option. Conversely, counties can circulate the money within
their local communities if they select community-based options.

Nine counties were selected to participate in the pilot phase of this program to
determine whether juvenile correctional populations could be reduced and
community-based alternatives increased. In the remainder of this article, we report
our evaluation of RECLAIM Ohio in these pilot counties.

SAMPLE AND METHOD

In 1993, DYS sent requests for proposals to Ohio counties to solicit
participation in the pilot phase of RECLAIM Ohio. The pilot phase would
allow the selected counties to begin the RECLAIM program one year before
it was implemented statewide in January 1995. DYS selected nine counties
for the pilot program: three rural counties (populations less than 35,000),
three small counties (populations greater than 35,000 but less than 54,930),
two medium-size counties (populations greater than 54,930 and fewer than

---

Moon et al. / YOUTHFUL FELONY OFFENDERS 443
500 persons per square mile, and one urban county (consisting of one or more urban centers and more than 500 persons per square mile). We address the following research questions here. First, were the pilot counties able to reduce commitments to institutions in comparison to those for a group of nonpilot counties? Second, were the pilot counties able to provide community-based programs for their youths?

To address the first research question, the state matched the pilot counties to nine nonpilot counties on population density, proportion African American, crime rate, and geographical proximity to one another. The effects of RECLAIM Ohio can be isolated clearly through matching because the pilot and nonpilot counties are similar on a number of key factors that could influence commitments to DYS. Although commitment data were available from 1990 to 1994, adjudication data were available only for 1993 and 1994. Both adjudications and commitments were needed to calculate commitment rates; therefore, the statistical analysis covered the year preceding implementation of the RECLAIM program (1993) and the pilot year (1994). We examined the data by looking at overall commitment rates and commitment rates by felony level. We considered an examination by felony level necessary to determine what types of offenders (less serious or more serious) are committed to juvenile institutions.

To address the second research question, we examined data on (1) the amount of money kept by each county for community-based alternatives and (2) the types of programs used by each county to treat youths in its communities. The data for all analyses were provided by the Subsidy Unit at DYS.

FINDINGS

Commitments to Institutions

Figure 1 presents the number of commitments to DYS for the matched pilot and nonpilot counties from 1990 to 1994. The pilots and nonpilots follow similar trends from 1990 to 1993. However, in 1994, when RECLAIM Ohio was implemented, the number of commitments increased by 23% in the nonpilot counties and decreased by 42% in the pilot counties. A county’s commitments may increase simply because of an increase in the number of felony adjudications. Therefore, we also examined commitment rates for pilot and nonpilot counties. These were calculated by dividing the number of felony commitments by the number of adjudications to DYS for each year. For the pilot counties, the proportion of commitments to DYS decreased from .2344 in 1993 to .1340 in 1994. The nonpilot counties,
However, remained relatively unchanged from 2612 in 1993 to 2766 in 1994. To determine whether these differences in the proportion of commitments were significant, we conducted a difference of differences of proportions test. In this test, we first examined the differences between pilot and nonpilot counties in the proportion of commitments in 1993 and then in 1994. We then subtracted the smaller result from the larger to learn whether the differences in the proportion of commitments between pilot and nonpilot counties were greater in 1994 (under RECLAIM) than in 1993. We found that in comparison to the nonpilot counties, the pilot counties did not significantly reduce their rate of commitments between 1993 and 1994 ($z = 0.4189, p > .05$).

Because less serious offenders would be the most likely candidates for an alternative to incarceration, we further analyzed commitments to DYS by felony level. In Ohio, there are four levels of felony offenses ranging from first degree (most serious) to fourth degree (least serious). Although specific aspects of seriousness, such as harm or moral wrongfulness (see Warf 1989), may vary within each felony level, this measure provides a general indication of seriousness.

Figure 2 presents commitments to DYS by felony level from 1990 to 1994 for the pilot counties. Commitments for first- and second-degree felonies remained relatively stable for all of these years. Commitments for third- and fourth-degree felonies changed somewhat between 1990 and 1993. In 1994, however, the change was dramatic. Juveniles' sentences to DYS for third-degree felonies decreased by 48% between 1993 and 1994, whereas commitments for fourth-degree felonies decreased by 59%. These data suggest that the pilot counties were diverting less serious felony offenders from juvenile institutions.

Figure 3 presents the number of admissions to DYS by felony level for the nonpilot counties. As in the pilot counties, the number of admissions for Felony 1 offenses remained relatively stable from 1990 to 1994. Admissions for Felony 2 offenses were largely stable between 1990 and 1993 but increased markedly in 1994. Admissions for Felony 4 offenses also increased in 1993 and in the pilot year. Only Felony 3 admissions declined between 1993 and 1994, and this reduction was rather small (from 38 to 13). To determine the significance of the changes in the number of felony offenders sentenced to DYS between pilot and matched nonpilot counties, we conducted a difference of differences of proportions tests. In these tests, we first examined the differences in the proportion of commitments for each felony level between pilot and nonpilot counties. Then we subtracted from one another the results for each difference in felony level to reveal whether the differences in the proportion of commitments between pilot and
nnonpilot counties were greater in 1994 (under RECLAIM Ohio) than in 1993. From 1993 to 1994, the proportion of commitments for Felony 1 offenses in the pilot counties increased significantly in comparison to that in the nonpilot counties ($z = 3.008, p < .05$).

Although the proportion of Felony 1 offenders from the pilot counties increased in DYIS lminations, the number of commitments for Felony 4 offenses in the pilot counties decreased significantly in comparison to that in the nonpilot counties ($z = -2.61, p < .05$). We found no significant differences between pilot ($z = -1.075, p > .05$) and nonpilot counties ($z = 0.917, p > .05$) in the proportions of Felony 2 and Felony 3 offenders sentenced to DYIS between 1993 and 1994.

In summary, during the pilot phase of RECLAIM Ohio, the nine pilot counties showed a decrease in the number of commitments to DYIS in comparison to that of a matched sample of nonpilot counties. The pilot counties' commitment rate decreased from 2,344 in 1993 to 1,140 in 1994; the rate in the nonpilot counties remained relatively unchanged, from 2,612 in 1993 to 2,766 in 1994. These changes, however, were not statistically significant.

When we examined commitment rates by felony level, we found an explanation for the insignificance of these findings. In comparison to the nonpilot counties, the proportion of Felony 1 offenders committed to DYIS increased significantly in the pilot counties, whereas the commitment rate for Felony 4 offenders was reduced significantly.

Local Programs

The second goal of RECLAIM Ohio was to increase the number of community-based alternatives available to juveniles. Table 1 lists the total RECLAIM dollars allocated to each county (for both commitments and local programs) and the amount and percentage received by the county for local programs (after the money for commitments was subtracted). The proportions of the original allocations kept by the counties for local programs ranged from a low of 7.0% in one of the small counties to a high of 86.8% percent in one of the medium-size counties. On average, the counties were able to keep 44.2% of their original allocations for local programs.

Table 2 displays the types of options offered to youths in the nine pilot counties. Each of these counties was able to create at least one new service or program with the RECLAIM Ohio allocations. Four counties planned additional money in existing programs to expand them. The size of the county did not strongly influence the number of options offered for local programs. For example, two of the rural counties each provided only one program,
Reduction in Commitments

The pilot counties did not significantly reduce their overall number of commitments to DYS in comparison to that of the nonpilot counties. Although the differences were not statistically significant, the results were in the predicted direction. The pilot counties reduced their commitments, whereas the nonpilot counties showed little change. The results are more encouraging, however, when examined by felony level. In comparison to the nonpilot counties, the pilot counties significantly increased the number of commitments for Felony 1 offenses while significantly reducing the number of commitments for Felony 4 offenses. Thus, counties are continuing to incarcerate the most serious offenders and are targeting the less serious offenders for community-based interventions.

Some liberals may argue that the program has not been successful because the program has not significantly reduced the number of commitments overall. Others, however, may emphasize that the pilot counties have succeeded in reducing the commitment rate for less serious felony offenders. As a result, these less serious offenders now can be treated in their communities through local programs, whereas institutional space and services are reserved for more serious felons.

Conservatives, on the other hand, may agree that the program has demonstrated initial success because the most serious felony offenders still are being incarcerated. Furthermore, in comparison to the nonpilot counties, the pilot counties have significantly increased the number of commitments for juveniles convicted of Felony 1 offenses; that is, the counties are demonstrating a commitment to public safety by continuing to incarcerate serious offenders. These results suggest that the counties have not interpreted the RECLAIM Ohio program as a method of decarcerating all types of youths.

Increase in Programs

The second goal of RECLAIM Ohio was to increase community-based alternatives for youths. Nearly all of the counties were able to increase the number of services available for young people. Yet, a more increase in program options may not benefit the youths or increase community safety. Future research should examine more closely the programs used by the counties.

Paul Gendreau and his colleagues (Cullen and Gendreau 1992; Gendreau and Goggins 1996; Gendreau and Ross 1984) have conducted extensive research on the principles of effective correctional interventions. Strategies that focus on punishment or surveillance rarely reduce recidivism (see also Cullen, Wright, and Applegate 1996). On the other hand, positive influences on offenders' behavior are reported consistently when a treatment approach is taken, especially when it includes behavioral strategies such as token economies and modeling, treating high-risk offenders, targeting criminogenic risk factors, providing intensive services, employing multimodal strategies, or matching the offenders' characteristics to those of treatment counselors and to types of intervention. DYS should consider evaluating some of the county-level programs to determine their effectiveness.

Our findings revealed that the counties tended to use a variety of local programs under RECLAIM Ohio, but the reasons for doing so are not so easy to determine. Discussions with court personnel, however, suggested that the courts were attracted by the broader set of options for dealing with juvenile offenders' individual needs (Laessa, Applegate, and Moon 1996). This attitude appears to contradict many of the recent policy developments in juvenile justice (e.g., minimum sentencing, mandatory sentencing, sentencing waiver to adult court) that treat youthful offenders as an undifferentiated category. As noted earlier, the "get tough" agenda has not been embraced as totally as one might think. If the use of various programs in fact is motivated by a desire for more options, then it may be that juvenile courts are willing to implement the individualized services that are likely to reduce subsequent offending (Andrews, Bonta, and Hoge 1990).

CONCLUSIONS

The state of Ohio recently embarked on an initiative with the potential to dramatically alter prevailing juvenile justice practices and policies. Whereas many states continue to implement policies that have resulted in the incarceration of more juveniles, Ohio has created a program to modify the effects of these policies. RECLAIM Ohio seeks to reduce commitments to juvenile institutions and to increase local program options. Its viability lies in its unique ability to blend elements of liberal and conservative ideologies. Furthermore, to borrow Rothman's (1980) terminology, the program has a "consensus" while simultaneously addressing the question of "convenience."

For liberals, RECLAIM Ohio supports community-based interventions for nonviolent offenders in lieu of committing them to institutions. The program also supports rehabilitating serious offenders. Indeed, by reducing juvenile correctional populations, DYS claims it can provide better care and services to those youths who remain in institutions. The RECLAIM program also reaffirms one of the original goals of the juvenile court, namely, to permit
the judges a great deal of discretion in determining what types of services would best meet each offender’s needs.

RECLAIM Ohio also incorporates some conservative philosophies. Perhaps the most important to conservatives is that the program allows judges to incarcerate serious, violent offenders. It does not support decarceration of all offenders; judges are empowered to remain tough on crime and to ensure public safety. The RECLAIM program provides commitments free of charge for three serious offenses: murder, aggravated murder, and rape. In addition, the wide judicial discretion permitted by RECLAIM appeals to conservatives because the program empowers counties by turning state funds over to local courts. Thus, the courts have more localized control rather than being controlled by large government bureaucracies. Finally, the RECLAIM program allows judges to exceed their allocations and to commit as many youths as they believe necessary with no fiscal penalty. As mentioned previously, a contingency fund has been established to support this provision.

Robinson (1988) postulates that the long-term success of programs rests on their ability to satisfy both conscience (the theories behind the programs) and convenience (the interests of those involved in the daily operation of the programs). By satisfying the interests of both liberal and conservative constituents, RECLAIM Ohio possesses a unique conscience that could be exported to other states, many of which currently face the dilemma of “getting tough” on crime and ensuring public safety while maintaining correctional expenditures. The RECLAIM program allows states to meet all of these objectives. Perhaps even more important than satisfying conscience, RECLAIM Ohio also addresses the matter of convenience. The financial incentives provided by the RECLAIM program allow it to thrive and meet its goals. These inducements allow counties to address their self-interests. It is advantageous for counties to treat less serious offenders in their communities; the fewer the youths who are sent to DYS, the more money counties have to create new local jobs such as hiring new probation officers or treatment specialists for their courts.

The careful alignment of conscience with convenience has created a “win-win” situation. The financial incentives of RECLAIM Ohio have allowed both DYS and the counties to address their goals. The distinctive compromise between liberal and conservative ideologies makes the RECLAIM program politically acceptable in this era of toughness. Counties can use the money to create new programs to treat less serious felony offenders in their communities while retaining the option of sentencing serious, violent offenders to institutions to ensure public safety. These qualities of the RECLAIM program—the ability to merge liberal ideology with conservative ideology and the provision of monetary supplements—may be the key to its success in Ohio and elsewhere.

REFERENCES

Andrews, Dan A., James Bonta, and R. D. Hoge. 1990. “Classification for Effective Rehabilita-
tion: Redesigning Psychology.” Criminal Justice and Behavior 17:19-52.


Lane, Elizabeth, Brandon K. Agnew, and Melissa M. Moon. 1996. Final Evaluation of the Ohio Department of Youth Services RECLAIM Ohio/CPJC Project. Columbus: Ohio Department of Youth Services.


