Revisiting the Decision to Arrest: Comparing Beat and Community Officers

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During the past 30 years, an expanding body of literature has evolved that examines the correlates of officers’ decisions to arrest. This study extends this line of inquiry by investigating the influence of situational- and community-level variables on the arrest decisions of officers in an agency that has implemented community policing. Using data collected through systematic social observations of the police, the authors examine the direct effects of officers’ assignment on the decision to arrest. In addition, the authors explore whether conventional arrest predictors vary between community and beat officers and, if so, the extent and nature of the variance. The findings generally suggest that there is no significant direct influence of assignment on arrest decisions. However, substantive differences in the decision-making process are revealed among predictors of arrest across assignments.

Since the American Bar Foundation sponsored a series of studies spanning the criminal justice system in the 1950s, academics and criminal justice practitioners have generally recognized that criminal justice officials exercise a considerable amount of discretion in the activities they perform, the manner in which they interact with citizens, and the processes by which they invoke and uphold the law (Bernard & Engel, 2001; Remmington, 1990; Walker, 1992). This “discovery” of discretion was particularly important in...
the field of policing, where it is generally acknowledged that the lowest level workers within police departments’ organizational hierarchies have the greatest amounts of discretion over critical decisions. Evidence concerning the existence of discretion was initially demonstrated by the relatively infrequent use of arrest powers during encounters with citizens. For example, Reiss (1971) reported that officers only rarely made arrests of citizens, even when there were legal grounds to do so. Operating as street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980; Prottas, 1978), patrol officers are the gatekeepers of the criminal justice system. That is, the quantity of law (Black, 1980) that citizens receive is decided nearly exclusively by patrol officers at the street level.

Officers’ frequent use of discretion, coupled with the importance of their decisions to invoke the criminal justice system, have led police researchers to examine extensively the use of arrest by officers. During the past 40 years, a large body of research has developed that contributes significantly to the understanding of police officers’ decisions to invoke the criminal justice system (see Brooks, 1997; Riksheim & Chermak, 1993; and Sherman, 1980, for extensive literature reviews of police behavior). Nevertheless, recent changes in policing strategies and philosophies have challenged our understanding of and ability to predict officers’ decision making. Departments across the country have adopted changes in their missions, strategies, and tactics during a time generally recognized as the community era in policing (Kelling & Moore, 1988). Indeed, administrators have hailed community-oriented policing as the preferred policing strategy (Rosenbaum & Lurigio, 1994) and subsequently report widespread implementation of this new model of policing. Despite this assertion, exactly how community policing has affected the day-to-day activities of police officers and whether it affects the way officers and citizens interact remains largely unknown.

Furthermore, officers’ decision making in the era of community policing is particularly important for the police policy maker. Liability attached to police officers’ behavior is enormous, and the potential liability involving improper police activities is estimated to be more than $780 billion (Kappeler, 1993). Community policing is designed to increase the level of discretion of the line officer, increase the frequency of officer-citizen encounters, decrease officer accountability, and thus increase organizational exposure to civil liability (Worrall & Marenin, 1998). Police policy makers should understand police officer behavior to ensure officers are not systematically engaging in unfair, immoral, or illegal types of behavior. Understanding officer-citizen interactions can assist administrators in monitoring and reducing organizational liability.
Various police behaviors have been empirically studied (e.g., traffic stops, use of force, gaining citizen compliance), which provides useful information to guide the present inquiry. This study, however, focuses specifically on decisions by police officers to take suspects into custody via arrest, thus depriving them (at least temporarily) of their freedom. Examining individual arrest decision making is not particularly innovative, as prior researchers have extensively addressed this issue. With the exception of research conducted by Mastrofski, Worden, and Snipes (1995), prior research has been unable to examine empirically possible changes in arrest practices during the community policing era.

This study attempts to fill this void by examining the influences of police arrest practices in the Cincinnati Police Division (CPD), a large, urban department that has implemented community policing. Using contemporary data collected through systematic social observations of police officers, situational- and community-level correlates of officer arrest decisions are examined. If community policing indeed affects the way police officers and citizens interact at the street level, it is reasonable to believe these changes will manifest themselves when comparing the correlates of arrest between officers actively engaging in community policing to those engaging in more traditional reactive/beat styles of policing. The context of this research differs from prior research in that we compare officers with different ascribed roles within the police organization rather than comparing officers with different attitudes toward community policing. We speculate that these roles manifest themselves in officers’ decision making and affect how officers interact with citizens. Differences in police-citizen interactions, we believe, will lead to direct differences in officers’ decisions to formally invoke the criminal justice system through the use of arrest.

COMMUNITY POLICING AND THE DECISION TO ARREST

Regardless of how community policing is implemented, administrators have made several broad and sweeping generalizations regarding its anticipated effect. One claim is that community policing will lead to crime prevention and a reduction in overall crime. Another claim is that it builds more confidence and trust between citizens and the police. Still another claim is that it potentially affects the way in which police exercise discretion and social control, including the use of arrest. If community policing does not in reality achieve these outcomes, one might legitimately question whether it should be
continued as the preferred method of service delivery. In other words, without realizing these outcomes, community policing is merely symbolic and represents more “rhetoric than reality” (Bayley, 1988).

Discussing its central philosophical themes, Cordner (1995) remarked that under community policing, the general goals of policing broaden to include more non–law enforcement tasks. It also encourages differential enforcement contingent on community values and norms. This differential policing will primarily affect the manner in which officers address minor offenses, local ordinances, and disorders. The types of interactions and encounters in which officers and citizens engage would also most likely change. Furthermore, police should use community residents to set priorities and reinforce neighborhood values. As such, it is plausible to infer that there will be an increase in the quantity and quality of police-citizen interactions and thus a change in the relationship between the police and the public (Eck & Rosenbaum, 1994; Goldstein, 1987; Skolnick & Bayley, 1987).

What remains largely unknown, however, is how community policing is translated into practice, how it has affected policing at the street level, whether it has changed the way police officers and members of the public interact, and whether arrest decisions by community policing and beat officers are premised on the same factors.

Can researchers and administrators expect the arrest practices of officers to change under the implementation of community policing? Admittedly, this is a difficult question. One possible assertion is that the decision to arrest will not differ between officers practicing traditional policing and those practicing community policing. This may be due to the fact that community policing does not change the basic nature of policing, and officers’ discretion is constrained by the nature of crime, the law, and occupational socialization. In contrast, a number of theoretical assertions have been offered that suggest community policing may influence arrest decisions. For example, assignment as a community policing officer might encourage underenforcement of the law in an effort to build community partnerships that might be compromised by more aggressive policing tactics (Bayley, 1988). Alternatively, officers practicing community policing may make more arrests for relatively minor infractions (Bratton & Knobler, 1998; Wilson & Kelling, 1982). Central to the discussion of these hypotheses is how community policing is defined and implemented within departments.

Mastrofski and his colleagues (1995) have suggested that community policing may be generally defined and implemented as three different models: broken windows, community-building, and problem-oriented policing. They described the broken windows model as stressing aggressive enforce-
ment of minor crimes and disorders and suggested that this approach “might increase the total number of arrests” but also might “decrease the probability of arrest in some situations because officers are to intervene at lower thresholds of disorder and to use intrusions short of arrest” (p. 540; also see Crank, 1994). In contrast, they described the community-building model as focusing on crime prevention, victim assistance, and the building of rapport with citizens, while it “deemphasizes law enforcement activities” (Mastrofski et al., 1995, p. 540). Last, they described the problem-oriented policing model as using a number of tactics to address the underlying causes of problems. Accordingly, advocates of this model “urge police to invoke the criminal sanction more sparingly and to give greater play to other methods” (Mastrofski et al., 1995, p. 541). Collectively, these hypotheses suggest that police departments implementing aggressive order maintenance models of community policing should expect increases in the use of arrest, whereas those departments implementing community-building and/or problem-solving models should expect decreases in the use of arrest.

Although none of these assertions have been thoroughly subjected to empirical scrutiny, there exists some evidence that suggests community policing policies do influence officers’ arrest decisions. Mastrofski and colleagues (1995) examined the arrest decisions of officers who reported both favorable and unfavorable attitudes toward community policing within a department that had implemented the community building model of community policing (Richmond, Virginia, police department). They found that officers with more favorable attitudes toward community policing were “more selective in making arrests” compared to those officers with less favorable attitudes. Moreover, they reported that arrest decisions for officers with less favorable views toward community policing were more strongly influenced by legal characteristics compared to those with positive views. Neither group, however, was strongly influenced by extralegal factors. They concluded that “in a time of community policing, officers who support it do manifest some arrest decision patterns distinguishable from those of colleagues who adhere to a more traditional view of law enforcement” (p. 539). These researchers, however, were unable to thoroughly describe the arrest patterns for officers with positive views of community policing, commenting, “community-oriented officers ‘march to the beat of a different drummer’ . . . but our model gives a poor account of that ‘beat’” (p. 556). Their results indicate that although we know much about officers’ decision making prior to the implementation of community policing initiatives, factors influencing officers’ discretion in the era of community policing are open for debate.
CORRELATES OF ARREST IN THE COMMUNITY POLICING ERA

A great deal of prior research has examined the factors that influence officers’ decision making, particularly officers’ decisions to arrest. Directly related to the present inquiry is the influence of organizational assignments (as community or beat officers) on officer behavior. We expect that organizational assignment as community policing officers will result in behavioral differences when compared to beat officers. Indeed, recent research examining the time officers spent conducting community policing activities, problem-solving activities, and encounters with citizens suggested that officers with community policing assignments spent “less ‘face time’ with the public and more time ‘behind the scenes’” (Parks, Mastrofski, DeJong, & Gray, 1999, p. 514) when compared to 911 responders. We further expect that differences in assignments will influence officers’ decisions to arrest directly and indirectly through other correlates of police behavior, including legal factors, situational factors, and community context.

Situational Factors

Reviews of police research generally suggest that legal variables (e.g., seriousness of the offense, amount of evidence, the presence of a weapon, etc.) have a relatively strong and consistent influence over officer decision making vis-à-vis suspects (Black, 1971; Black & Reiss, 1970; Smith, 1984; Smith & Klein, 1983; Smith & Visher, 1981; Smith, Visher, & Davidson, 1984; Sykes, Fox, & Clark, 1985; Worden, 1989). One might speculate that legal variables will have a significant influence over officers’ behavior regardless of community policing. Ultimately, community policing officers are still police officers who have been socialized within the same organization, with similar constraints, expectations, rewards, and so forth as their counterparts. Thus, legal factors may have equal influence regardless of assignment. Mastrofski et al. (1995), however, found that offense seriousness was not significantly related to arrest decisions for officers with positive attitudes toward community policing. They argued that the behavior of officers who embrace community policing may be influenced by information beyond legal factors.

The research available on the influence of other situational variables (i.e., characteristics of the suspect, characteristics of the victim, characteristics of the situation) over police behavior has been somewhat mixed. Particularly controversial is the potential effect that suspects’ characteristics have over
police behavior. Whereas some researchers have reported that citizens encountered by police who were racial minorities (Lundman, 1979, 1998; Smith et al., 1984; Smith & Klein, 1984; Smith & Visher, 1981), male (Visher, 1983; Worden & Shepard, 1996), juvenile (Black, 1976; Mastrofski et al., 1995), disrespectful (Engel, Sobol, & Worden, 2000; Lundman, 1994, 1996a, 1996b, 1998; Worden & Shepard, 1996), and intoxicated (Engel et al., 2000; Mastrofski et al., 1995) were significantly more likely to be arrested, other research suggests that these extralegal factors do not have a strong influence over officers’ behaviors (Klinger, 1994, 1996a, 1996b).

One of the concerns surrounding the implementation of community policing is the influence that suspects’ characteristics might have over officers’ behavior as discretion is increased through innovative strategies and organizational changes associated with community policing. As Bayley (1988) warned, “community policing may weaken the rule of law in the sense of equal protection and evenhanded enforcement” (p. 231). As a result, one might speculate that suspects’ characteristics would have a stronger influence over officers’ behavior in the community policing era. Alternatively, because of their closer and consultive relationship with citizens, community officers may look beyond certain discriminatory factors. These factors may matter less in predicting encounter outcomes for community officers due to higher levels of tolerance toward unconventional citizens or those citizens generally considered by police to be less respectable (e.g., juveniles, minorities, lower income and homeless persons, mentally disordered persons, etc.). In addition, due to the relationship community officers enjoy with citizens, they may be more predisposed to follow citizens’ requests and preferences, which have been shown in past research to influence officers’ behavior (Mastrofski, Snipes, Parks, & Maxwell, 2000; Smith & Klein, 1983, 1984; Smith & Visher, 1981; Worden, 1989; Worden & Pollitz, 1984).

In addition, other characteristics of the social setting may influence arrest. Community officers may be more successful in negotiating what Sykes and Brent (1980) described as definitional or imperative regulation. If citizens comply with officers’ requests, the escalation of control often stops. If citizens are noncompliant, however, the encounter intensifies and officers often rely on coercive control of the citizen through legal sanction, arrest, or use of force. Community policing officers may be more likely to secure compliance from citizens for a number of reasons. First, the “police and the public are encouraged to become closely acquainted so that they will be mutually accountable” (Mastrofski, Snipes, & Supina, 1996, p. 270); therefore, community police officers should have more nonthreatening interactions with citizens. Second, community officers are assigned to communities over a long period of time to build rapport, which might translate into a lesser need for the
use of coercive techniques. Beat officers, although assigned to the same district for a long period of time, are not necessarily assigned to the same community on a daily basis because their beat assignment may vary. Thus, community officers, by virtue of their assignment, are provided a greater opportunity to get to know community residents on a more intimate level, and this should in turn allow for the officer to more successful in gaining complaisance during encounters with the public. In short, citizens may grant compliance to community officers, whereas beat officers may not be able to attain this imperative regulation. The only evidence addressing this hypothesis reported that officers’ attitudes toward community-oriented policing did not have a significant effect on the likelihood of citizen compliance (McCluskey, Mastrofski, & Parks, 1999). However, this research measured officers’ attitudes but not their assignment as community policing or traditional beat officers.

Community Context

Variations in the neighborhood context of police-citizen encounters may also influence police officer behavior. There are at least two rationales for examining the effects of neighborhood-level characteristics on officer behavior. First, there is a hypothesized relationship between levels of neighborhood informal social control and the exercise of formal social control by police officers. Essentially, in communities where there is less informal social control, there is a greater need for formal social control, such as official police intervention (Bursik, 1986; Schuerman & Kobrin, 1986). Second, citizen expectations of police officer priorities have been found to differ based on racial and economic characteristics of communities (Alpert & Dunham, 1988; Alpert, Dunham, & Piquero, 1997; Skogan & Hartnett, 1997). As such, communities differ in what they desire police officers to do and the priorities police officers should promote. In short, neighborhood disorganization may have a significant and positive influence on the arrest practices of traditional officers but may not manifest itself for community policing officers.

Community context may influence officers’ behavior in one of two different ways. On one hand, police-citizen encounters occurring in neighborhoods characterized by high levels of disorganization (i.e., high residential mobility, single-parent households, poverty, racial heterogeneity, and renter-occupied households) may involve a greater use of legal dispositions because local informal social control mechanisms may be weak. On the other hand, police-citizen interactions in disorganized communities may elicit a less vigorous response from officers. Klinger (1997) hypothesized that within police districts with higher rates of crime, a low level of deviance or less serious
crimes may be met by informal police responses. In other words, crimes occurring in high-crime-rate or disorganized areas would evoke a more lenient response. In communities where there are high levels of crime, officers may be less likely to initiate an arrest for relatively minor crime because the action may not have violated a threshold for conduct in that community. Thus, officers would be less likely to arrest a citizen in this community and more likely to issue a warning, command the citizen to cease the behavior, or use some other type of order-maintenance technique. He suggested that district-level work norms influence how officers would respond to deviance with alternatives beyond arrest.

Extant research on the relationships between structural characteristics and arrest is inconsistent. For instance, racial conflict theory stated that racial minorities are seen as threats to the majority as well as local agents of formal social control (Black, 1976; Brandl, Chamlin, & Frank, 1995; Turk, 1969). Citizens encountered by police in communities with high economic distress have been found more likely to receive coercive dispositions (Smith, 1984; Smith et al., 1984; Smith & Klein, 1984). Finally, single family households represent decreased levels of guardianship and observation of persons in the community, particularly juveniles. This factor has been found to be related to increased crime rates, lower levels of informal social control, and greater opportunity for offending and victimization.

Although the above review suggests that community characteristics influence the behavior of officers engaging in traditional, incident-driven policing, it is unknown if community context influences the behavior of officers practicing community policing. Because community policing implies that officers will become closer to citizens and will better understand community norms, community factors that have in the past influenced arrest dispositions may not have the same effect in encounters involving community officers.

Limits of Existing Research

Although prior research on officer behavior has contributed significantly to our understanding of police-citizen encounters, several limitations exist. First, many of the conclusions that have been drawn and the conventional wisdom that has been established regarding the correlates of police behavior are based on data collected before the shift to community-oriented policing. As Fyfe (1996) acknowledged regarding the generalization of findings from studies conducted in the late 1970s through the mid-1980s, “all that has happened to policing since collection of the data that now form the conventional wisdom makes it unwise to generalize from them to either 1985 or the pres-
ent” (p. 339). Indeed, contemporary empirical research supports contention that officers who believe in the underlying concepts of community policing use different decision-making structures than their counterparts when deciding whether to arrest citizens (Mastrofski et al., 1995); therefore, correlates that previously were found to predict behavior may differ between officers practicing community-oriented policing and officers performing more traditional reactive policing.

Second, because community-oriented policing suggests that a closer relationship exists between the police and citizens, police may be interacting with their constituents on a more intimate level than before. This, coupled with the long-term orientation of patrols in neighborhoods, may minimize the importance of citizen characteristics in arrest decisions and encounters more generally because community officers are likely to have more information about the citizens they encounter and may be less likely to rely on ascribed traits. Alternatively, as some critics of community policing have speculated, this intimate connection with the community might serve to enhance officers’ decision making based on suspects’ characteristics. The current research available has not adequately tested these hypotheses.

Third, prior operationalizations of neighborhood may have been imperfect (Klinger, 1997). Research stated that the neighborhood should serve a locally relevant function and that the members should share common interests and beliefs (Duffee, 1990; Flynn, 1998; Hillery, 1955). Extant research has operationalized neighborhood as larger, arbitrary, macrogeographic units, such as police beats, census block groups, or enumeration districts (see Smith, 1986). The use of neighborhoods, which exert their own political influence on local government, may yield differing results when examining the influence of community-level variables on police officer behavior.

Finally, the findings reported from the only empirical study available that has addressed some of these issues during the community policing era—Mastrofski et al. (1995)—are somewhat limited. This research did not examine the differing influences of community factors on officers’ behavior. For reasons articulated above, we believe this to be an important omission.

Furthermore, the research conducted by Mastrofski and his colleagues (1995) explored variations in arrest practices between officers who expressed favorable or unfavorable attitudes toward community policing. Prior to this research, however, police research has been unable to establish a strong relationship between police officer attitudes and behavior (Meyers, Heeren, & Hingston, 1989; Smith & Klein, 1983; Snipes & Mastrofski, 1990; Stith, 1990; Worden, 1989). Indeed, the influence between officers’ attitudes and behavior has been continually questioned. Therefore, one might expect that
organizational assignments as community policing officers (although certainly correlated with officers’ attitudes toward community policing) might be a stronger measure of officers’ behavior.

These limitations are addressed in the present inquiry. Using contemporary data collected from a department actively engaged in community policing, this article examines the correlates of arrest, including situational and community characteristics. The logistical regression analyses examine the factors related to the arrest decision between officers assigned as community police officers and those engaged in traditional beat style of policing.

**METHOD**

**Research Site**

Data for this study were collected from systematic observations of officers from the CPD. The CPD is the largest police agency within Hamilton County, Ohio, with 996 sworn officers. It is a full-service police department serving a city of approximately 364,000 citizens, including an African American population of 37.9%. In 1991, the department began implementing community policing on a limited scale and was expanded to every community in the city by 1994 (for more information, see Frank, Brandl, & Watkins, 1997).

All officers who participated in this study were assigned to the Patrol Bureau at the time of observation. The first type of officers observed was beat officers. These officers typically performed all duties associated with traditional line-level police officers, particularly responding to calls for service. The second type of officers observed was community-oriented policing (COP) officers. These officers were assigned to a specific community (or in some cases, several communities) and were expected to perform community policing functions, including becoming acquainted with citizens in their assigned neighborhood, identifying neighborhood problems, forging partnerships with citizens to develop solutions to neighborhood problems, networking with local service agencies to assist in problem solving, representing the division at community meetings, preparing and sharing crime statistics with citizens, conducting security surveys, and developing initiatives to improve opportunities for youth, along with some of the general duties common to all officers in the Patrol Bureau. To facilitate the performance of these duties, community officers did not rotate shifts or neighborhoods and were largely freed from responding to calls for service. Administrators described community policing in Cincinnati as focusing on community building; however, in practice, community policing could be
more accurately described as a hybrid between community building and problem solving. Incidentally, these two ingredients (community building and problem solving) are the same two factors identified by the Community Policing Consortium (1994) required to institute community policing. Officers were largely left to their own devices regarding the delivery of services and the modification of tactics according to community conditions and the demands of residents.

Data

Data used in this study came from two different sources: social observations of police officers and the U.S. Census. Between April 1997 and April 1998, trained observers conducted observations during 442 shifts with CPD officers. The division’s organizational arrangement could be considered as specialist in nature in that officers were assigned as either community policing officers or beat officers in each neighborhood in the city. Observations were conducted with both COP and beat officers.

Because extant literature suggests that officers’ routines and behavior may vary by neighborhood characteristics, we sought to observe COP and beat officers in similar environmental contexts to make direct comparisons. COP officers and beat officers worked in the same beats and neighborhoods, so both COP officers and their complementary beat officer were observed. COP and beat officers observed in this study had similar demographic characteristics, including gender (COP: 80% male; beat: 83% male), race (COP: 52% White; beat: 65% White), and length of service (COP: $\bar{x} = 7.65$; beat: $\bar{x} = 6.42$). Cincinnati contains 52 designated neighborhoods that are well defined both politically and geographically. A random sample of 32 COP officers was selected for inclusion in the study. Because COP officers work either first shift (7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.) or second shift (3:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.), observations of beat officers were also constrained to these time periods. Trained researchers accompanied COP officers during 206 shifts and beat officers during 236 shifts, observing 1,103 and 1,568 police-citizen encounters, respectively.

To identify structural differences in communities, block group–level data were collected from the 1990 census. Community boundaries were obtained from the CPD, whose officers realigned assignments, beats, and districts to conform to the neighborhood parameters designated by the city planning commission. Maps obtained from the police division were compared with block group census maps to determine block groups that corresponded with neighborhoods in Cincinnati. These group data were aggregated to the neighborhood level.
The unit of analysis for this study was the interaction between the police and a member of the public. Certainly, not all interactions between the police and the public end in arrest, and in fact, not all encounters could be reasonably expected to end in arrest. This sample consists of encounters where probable cause to believe the citizen committed a criminal offense was present during the encounter. Of the 1,103 interactions between COP officers and citizens, there were 104 interactions where probable cause was present. Of the 1,568 interactions between beat officers and citizens, there were 230 involving probable cause.

Variables

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in this analysis. The dichotomous dependent variable indicates whether the officer arrested any citizen involved in the encounter. The officer’s assignment is measured as a dichotomous variable, where 0 = community policing officer and 1 = beat officer. Situational-level correlates include two legal variables, offense seriousness and evidence criteria. Offense seriousness is measured on a 2-point scale, in which 0 = minor offenses or misdemeanors and 1 = serious offenses or felonies. The evidence variable is measured as an additive scale ranging from 0 to 4 based on the amount of evidence present at the encounter. Four different types of evidence are included: (a) whether the officer observed the citizen engage in an illegal act or viewed circumstantial evidence of an illegal act, (b) whether the officer observed physical evidence that implicated the citizen to an offense, (c) whether the officer heard claims from others that implicated the citizen in an offense, and (d) whether the officer heard the citizen confess to the offense.

Citizens’ demographic characteristics are measured as dichotomous variables, including gender (0 = male, 1 = female), race (0 = White, 1 = non-White), and age (0 = nonjuvenile, 1 = juvenile). Demeanor is also measured as a dichotomous variable, whereby 0 = deferential or civil and 1 = moderately or highly disrespectful. Interaction-phase crime (Klinger, 1994) is measured as whether the citizen engaged in criminal activity during the encounter, such as assaulting another citizen, assaulting the officer, fleeing from the officer, or resisting arrest (0 = no interaction-phase crime, 1 = interaction-phase crime). In addition, whether the officer exercised order maintenance techniques during the encounter (0 = no order maintenance techniques used, 1 = officer attempted order maintenance) as well as whether the citizen complied with these directives (0 = citizen complied with directives, 1 = citizen did not comply with directives) are also included in the analysis. The rationale is if the officer attempted to direct the citizen to do some act, the officer...
TABLE 1: Description and Frequency of Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Community-Oriented Policing Officers (0)</th>
<th>Beat Officers (1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent variable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrest</td>
<td>1 = Yes</td>
<td>77 (74.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 = No</td>
<td>150 (65.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situational level</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offense</td>
<td>1 = Serious offense/felony</td>
<td>8 (7.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 = Minor offense/misdemeanor</td>
<td>96 (92.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>1 = One evidence criterion</td>
<td>45 (43.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2 = Two evidence criteria</td>
<td>30 (28.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3 = Three evidence criteria</td>
<td>20 (19.2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4 = Four evidence criteria</td>
<td>5 (4.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>0 = No evidence observed</td>
<td>20 (8.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 = Evidence observed</td>
<td>4 (3.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen gender</td>
<td>1 = Female</td>
<td>19 (18.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 = Male</td>
<td>85 (81.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen race</td>
<td>1 = Non-White</td>
<td>64 (61.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 = White</td>
<td>40 (38.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen age</td>
<td>1 = Preschool to age 17</td>
<td>41 (39.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 = Age 18 and older</td>
<td>63 (60.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen demeanor</td>
<td>1 = Not deferential</td>
<td>20 (19.2)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0 = Deferential</td>
<td>84 (80.8)</td>
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<td>Interaction-phase crime</td>
<td>1 = Nonviolent crime</td>
<td>13 (12.5)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>0 = No crime</td>
<td>91 (87.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen intoxication</td>
<td>1 = Yes</td>
<td>12 (11.5)</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>0 = No</td>
<td>39 (17.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preference for arrest</td>
<td>1 = Yes</td>
<td>9 (8.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 = No</td>
<td>95 (91.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order maintenance</td>
<td>1 = Order maintenance</td>
<td>65 (62.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 = No order maintenance</td>
<td>39 (37.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncompliance</td>
<td>1 = Citizen did not comply</td>
<td>8 (7.7)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0 = Citizen complied</td>
<td>96 (92.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 = Citizen complied</td>
<td>193 (83.9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community level</td>
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<td>Residential Percentage</td>
<td>$\bar{x} = .52$, $\bar{x} = .51$,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobility</td>
<td>$SD = .08$</td>
<td>$SD = .08$</td>
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<tr>
<td>Community Factor</td>
<td>$\bar{x} = .72$, $\bar{x} = 1.44$,</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factor</td>
<td>$SD = .74$</td>
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<tr>
<td>$n$</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

was giving the citizen an opportunity to avoid arrest. Furthermore, if the citizen acquiesced with these commands, there was a diminished necessity for arrest. Successful attainment of imperative regulation should decrease the
likelihood of arrest. Variables also indicated whether citizens displayed any visible signs of intoxication (0 = not intoxicated, 1 = intoxicated) and whether a victim/witness preferred arrest (0 = no preference, 1 = preference for arrest).

Community-level correlates are also described in Table 1. Data were collected on residential stability, economic distress, racial composition, proportion of single family households, proportion of renter-occupied households, and the poverty level of communities. To avoid problems associated with multicollinearity, these community-level variables were factor analyzed. One of these variables, the percentage of the population living in the community for less than 5 years (i.e., residential mobility), did not load onto the main factor and therefore is analyzed as a separate variable. The remaining variables were combined into one factor score. Principal components factor analysis indicated that these variables tap the same dimension, with the eigenvalue equal to 3.014. The remaining factors all had eigenvalues of less than 0.668. The total item intercorrelation suggests there is internal consistency with these four items and that they tap the same underlying construct (Cronbach’s standardized alpha = 0.864). The items addressing community disorganization loaded on the factor between 0.787 and 0.948.

Analyses

In the analyses that follow, a series of logistical regression models are estimated that include situational- and community-level variables. Due to the multilevel nature of the data, hierarchical linear models (HLM) were initially estimated. After estimating an unconditional HLM model in which no predictors were included, we were able to estimate the conditional models, which included only unmanipulated situational-level predictors. However, upon examination of the chi-square statistic for the $y$ intercept, we observed a nonsignificant value (direct-effects model: $\chi^2 = 1.76491, p > .05$; beat officer model: $\chi^2 = 0.12452, p > .05$; COP officer model: $\chi^2 = 0.555, p > .05$). This indicates that after accounting for the variation explained by the situational variables, there is no significant amount of variation in the outcome variable left to be explained by the aggregate predictors. Stated differently, conducting a HLM analysis while including both levels of data would not significantly contribute to the prediction in arrest decision making, and therefore, multilevel modeling was not necessary.

Using logistical regression, a direct-effects model was first estimated for the correlates to examine the direct effects of assignment on decisions to arrest. Thereafter, conditional-effects models are estimated for encounters
involving beat and COP officers separately to examine the interaction effect of assignment on the different correlates of arrest. Finally, comparisons of the coefficients for COP and beat officers were made using an equation derived by Clogg, Petkova, and Haritou (1995) to test for significant differences in the correlates of behavior between officers. The log odds of the coefficients are also presented. This value, \( \text{Exp}(b) \), indicates the odds of experiencing a change in \( y \) (arrest) for every unit change in \( x \) (independent variable). These statistics reveal whether the individual correlate exerts a different substantive influence on officers’ arrest decisions.

**RESULTS**

Table 2 presents the direct effects logistical regression analysis for situational- and community-level correlates. Of particular importance is the insignificant relationship between officer assignment and decisions to arrest. Several situational-level variables, however, are significant predictors of decisions to arrest. Evidence is positively related to arrest (\( b = .472, p < .05 \)), whereas male citizens (\( b = -1.340, p < .01 \)) and juveniles (\( b = 1.300, p < .01 \)) are significantly more likely to be arrested than females or adults. In addition, citizens who display signs of intoxication are significantly more likely to be arrested (\( b = 2.195, p < .01 \)) as are citizens who display a hostile demeanor (\( b = .846, p < .05 \)) and citizens who are noncompliant with requests made by officers (\( b = 2.204, p < .01 \)). During encounters where officers do not attempt order maintenance techniques, citizens are significantly more likely to be arrested than citizens confronted during other encounters (\( b = -1.577, p < .01 \)). Finally, officers are more likely to arrest citizens during encounters where a victim or witness specifically requests such action (\( b = 2.885, p < .01 \)). Although several situational-level correlates are related to decision making in the direct-effects model, arrest decisions do not vary significantly due to the community-level characteristics.

To examine the interaction effects of assignment on arrest decisions, separate models were estimated for COP and beat officers. These subsequent analyses allow for a comparison of independent variables on decisions to arrest across organizational assignment. The estimates for the conditional effects models are displayed in Table 3.
display a hostile demeanor ($b = 1.108, p < .05$). Beat officers who do not attempt order maintenance techniques during encounters are more likely to ultimately arrest the citizen involved in the encounter ($b = -2.157, p < .01$); likewise, citizens who, when given a directive, remain noncompliant ($b = 2.608, p < .01$) are significantly more likely to be arrested.

Table 3 also displays the estimates for COP officers. Unlike the model estimated for beat officers, few of the situational-level correlates are significant predictors of arrest. Only four predictor variables are significant, one of which was not significant in the beat officer model. Specifically, COP officers are more likely to take juveniles into custody ($b = 1.683, p < .05$). Similar to beat officers, when citizens comply with order maintenance requests the encounter is less likely to end in arrest ($b = 2.223, p < .05$). During encounters where a victim or witness requests arrest, COP officers are much more likely than not to follow through with the request ($b = 4.191, p < .01$) as well as make an arrest when there is a crime committed in the presence of the officer ($b = 2.805, p < .05$). The final column in Table 3 provides a comparison of coefficients between the multiplicative models for beat and COP officers. Although the models estimated for beat officers appear to be very different

### Table 2: Direct Effects of the Logistical Regression Analysis for Correlates of Arrest (N = 329)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>b</th>
<th>SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.531**</td>
<td>1.348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer assignment</td>
<td>-0.015</td>
<td>0.404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offense seriousness</td>
<td>.949</td>
<td>0.559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>.472**</td>
<td>0.167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen gender</td>
<td>-1.340**</td>
<td>0.427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen race</td>
<td>.822*</td>
<td>0.430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen age</td>
<td>1.300**</td>
<td>0.408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen intoxication</td>
<td>2.195**</td>
<td>0.548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demeanor</td>
<td>.846*</td>
<td>0.431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen noncompliance</td>
<td>2.204**</td>
<td>0.479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction-phase crime</td>
<td>2.249**</td>
<td>0.548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim preference</td>
<td>2.884**</td>
<td>0.522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order maintenance</td>
<td>-1.577**</td>
<td>0.399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential mobility</td>
<td>2.516</td>
<td>2.129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community factor</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>0.293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Model $\chi^2$</td>
<td>172.990**</td>
<td>.374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pseudo $R^2$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*p < .05. **p < .01.
from the models estimated for COP officers, only one factor exerts a significantly different affect on decision making. Specifically, citizens who displayed visible signs of intoxication are significantly more likely to be arrested by beat officers but not COP officers ($t = 2.280, p < .05$).

Table 3 also presents the log-odds coefficient change for each situational independent variable across officer assignment, $Exp(b)$. Although few of the comparisons of coefficients reveal significant differences, some substantive effects are displayed. Specifically, citizen intoxication increases the likelihood of arrest by a factor of 18.8 for beat officer encounters but only by a factor of 1.1 for COP officers. Hostile citizens are 3.0 times more likely to be arrested by beat officers but only 1.5 times more likely to be arrested by COP officers. Finally, during encounters where victims or witnesses request an arrest, beat officers are 20.8 times more likely to make an arrest. However, there is a 66.1 factor increase in arrest during encounters with COP officers.

### TABLE 3: Conditional Effects of the Logistical Regression Analysis for Correlates of Arrest

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Beat Officers</th>
<th>Community-Oriented Policing Officers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>b</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>–6.221**</td>
<td>1.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Offense seriousness</td>
<td>1.136</td>
<td>.678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence</td>
<td>.380*</td>
<td>.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen gender</td>
<td>–1.231**</td>
<td>.564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen race</td>
<td>1.123*</td>
<td>.564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen age</td>
<td>1.103*</td>
<td>.535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen intoxication</td>
<td>2.932**</td>
<td>.623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demeanor</td>
<td>1.108*</td>
<td>.547</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncompliance</td>
<td>2.608**</td>
<td>.597</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                     | Exp(b)     | t         |
| Interaction-phase  |            |           |
| crime               | 2.072**    | .762      | 7.944      | 2.805**     | 1.074      | 16.530     | –.556     |
| Victim preference   | 3.034**    | .639      | 20.780     | 4.191**     | 1.377      | 66.111     | –.762     |
| Order maintenance   | –2.157**   | .539      | .116       | –.763       | .761       | .466       | –1.495    |
| Community factor    | –.327      | .361      | .363       | .791        | .635       | .213       | –1.530    |

Model $\chi^2$ 135.084** 49.711**
Pseudo $R^2$ .546 .461
$n$ 226 103

*p < .05. **p < .01.
DISCUSSION

Similarities Between Officers

This study examines situational- and community-level factors that influence the decision-making processes of police officers during encounters with citizens. The findings suggest that assignment as a community policing officer has no direct effect on officers’ decisions to arrest. This conflicts with hypotheses that community policing officers would be less likely to make arrests and more likely to use nonlegal remedies during encounters (Bayley, 1988; Cordner, 1995). The analyses indicate that in Cincinnati, beat officers and community policing officers perform at parity when exercising this type of coercive control over citizens.

The data also show that when citizens fail to comply with officer directives, they are more likely to be arrested, regardless of officer assignment. If citizens did not comply with these orders, officers invoked coercive regulation by making an arrest. Regardless of assignment, when a victim or citizen present at the scene requested arrest of a suspect, officers were more likely to follow this request. However, it is interesting to note the difference in log-odds between officers. When victims or witnesses communicate a preference for arrest during encounters with beat officers, the officers are 10 times more likely to arrest the citizen. The influence was much greater for COP officers, in which they were 66.1 times more likely to arrest the citizen. It appears that COP officers are much more likely to comply with the requests of victims and witnesses than their counterparts, perhaps indicating that these officers are more conscious of the preferences of members of the public.

Several conclusions can be drawn from the analyses of aggregate-level predictors. Community-level crime rates do not significantly affect arrest decision making in any of the models. Neither beat officers nor COP officers are more likely to make arrests in communities with greater residential mobility. Citizens encountered in communities with greater values on the community factor are neither more nor less likely to be arrested by both beat and COP officers.

Differences Between Officers

Factors that influenced the decision to arrest appear to differ between COP and beat officers. Several of the predictors are only statistically significant for beat officer encounters. Specifically, strength of evidence, gender, race, intoxication, demeanor, interaction-phase crime, and whether the officer attempted order maintenance are all significantly related to arrest. In con-
citizen age and interaction-phase crime are only related to COP officer decisions to arrest. The data also revealed that beat officers are significantly more likely to arrest citizens when they do not first attempt to exercise order maintenance during the encounter. If citizens complied with these orders, officers were not compelled to actuate an arrest. It should be noted that only one of these differences—the influence of intoxication—is statistically significant. However, there are clearly substantive differences between officers’ assignments in the degree of influence these correlates exert on arrest decisions.

These findings both confirm and call into question results reported in the extant literature. They support prior research that has reported levels of evidence to be positively related to arrest. As the number of evidence criteria increased, beat officers were more likely to make an arrest. This was not the case for COP officers, although the influence of evidence did not differ significantly between organizational assignments. Thus, the data revealed the more important legal variable to be the amount of evidence that alleged the citizen had committed an offense versus the severity of the offense itself. The findings also provide mixed conclusions regarding the influence of citizens’ demographic characteristics. The multiplicative analyses revealed beat officers are more likely to arrest male citizens than female citizens. In contrast, COP officers are more likely to arrest juveniles than are beat officers. Therefore, it appears that COP officers are not more likely to play a role of mentor or agent of diversion than are their counterparts, as Bazemore and Senjo (1997) have suggested. This may indicate COP officers are more likely to take a “get tough” approach on juvenile crime, rather than diversion from the criminal justice system. It is plausible that COP officers, because of their different role in the community, may be placing juvenile crime and hooliganism as a priority for enforcement. These data were collected as part of a larger study. Results from a survey of Cincinnati citizens (not reported here) indicated residents may feel juvenile crime is a problem in their community. Specifically, when citizens were asked, “How big of a problem is kids hanging out on the street bothering people?” more than 47.3% indicated this was a “big problem” or “somewhat of a problem.” Thus, the COP officer may be viewed as acting more in accordance with citizens’ priorities than are beat officers (Frank, Novak, & Smith, in press).

Intoxicated citizens encountered by beat officers are significantly more likely to be arrested, whereas this relationship is not observed for COP officers. Intoxicated citizens are 18.8 times more likely to be arrested during encounters with beat officers, but only 1.1 times more likely to be arrested by COP officers. Furthermore, citizen intoxication exerted a significantly different influence on the decision to arrest based on officer assignment.
In addition, the influence of citizens’ demeanor is particularly noteworthy. Similar to the conclusions of most prior research, beat officers are significantly more likely to arrest hostile citizens. At the same time, hostility did not significantly influence the decision making of COP officers. When confronting a hostile citizen, beat officers are 3.0 times more likely to actuate an arrest, whereas COP officers are only 1.5 times more likely to arrest. Combined, these analyses imply that COP officers may be more tolerant of both intoxicated and hostile citizen behavior and may not simply arrest citizens who flunk the attitude test (Brown, 1981). This may be due to community officers’ desires to refrain from arresting citizens in an effort to strengthen police-citizen relationships. In any case, the findings suggest that beat officers and COP officers interact with inebriated and disrespectful citizens differently.

CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

These results present several implications. First, policy makers may use these results to understand more fully the behavior in an organization that engages in community policing by creating a separate unit or split shift within the department. Community policing officers arrested citizens at a slightly lower rate as their counterparts (26% vs. 34.8%) and engaged less frequently in encounters in which arrest was a possible disposition. Specifically, beat officers engaged in encounters that could end in arrest once every 1.05 shifts, whereas COP officers engaged in similar encounters once every 2 shifts. Although the opportunity to make an arrest may be a product of their position within the organization, explaining their reduced proclivity to exercise arrest powers is somewhat more difficult. Because COP officers volunteered for the position, differences in the arrest rate may be due to cognitive differences within the officer. It is equally plausible that variation may be explained by additional training and practice in community policing. Furthermore, multivariate analyses show that COP officers use slightly different decision-making processes than their counterparts do. Although officer assignment does not have a direct influence on arrest decision making, it appears that there is some different decision-making processes being employed by COP and beat officers. This is congruent with the hypothesized impact of community policing on the decision to arrest, and our results confirm the conclusion that perhaps some officers use different decision-making criteria during these encounters. Officers actively engaging in community policing may be interacting with citizens in a subtly different fashion and using different dimensions of the encounter as critical decision criteria.
Second, liability associated with organizational change is more complex in the community policing era. One of the chief concerns related to community policing is that officers will be freer to apply the law in a discriminatory fashion. As Bayley (1988) cautioned, such increased discretion inherent to community policing may manifest in a weakening of the equal protection of law or evenhanded enforcement. This unequal protection could lead to civil liability filings through Title 42 of the United States Code, Section 1983 (Hughes, 2000; Worrall & Marenin, 1998). Our results do not confirm these fears, because beat officers are more likely to use indicators such as minority status, gender, intoxication, and hostile demeanor when making their decision to arrest. COP officers are less likely to use discriminatory factors (such as race or gender) and signs of nonconformity (including intoxication and hostile demeanor) when making their decisions to arrest, indicating the increased discretion inherent to community policing may be exercised in an evenhanded fashion. Furthermore, COP officers are more likely to act on the preferences of the victim or a witness, indicating they are more responsive to the community that they serve. These results are surely comforting to proponents of community policing.

Third, the role of community in community-oriented policing remains uncertain. Using traditional measures of social organization, these structural correlates had no explanatory power when considering arrest decisions. It appears that using traditional measures of structural variation as a vehicle for differentiating communities has little use. Perhaps other measures of community variation or community needs such as described by Skogan and Hartnett (1997) should be developed to examine if officers do differentiate individual decisions to arrest based on neighborhood context. Factors noted by Klinger (1997), such as work group norms or district-level culture, may need to be controlled to uncover variations in arrest decisions during police-citizen interactions.

Fourth, the relationship between order maintenance, citizen compliance, and arrest decisions for beat officers is worthy of further exploration. Decisions made by both beat officers and citizens early in an encounter influence whether the encounter ends in arrests. During these encounters, there are two opportunities to avoid official state intervention. If beat officers choose to exercise order maintenance, then arrest is often avoided. Likewise, if citizens recognize these directives as an opportunity to bypass arrest, citizens are given an out, and the result is a corresponding decreased likelihood of arrest. Empirical research has begun to explore the relationship between officer directives and citizen acquiescence (McCluskey et al., 1999). Using this information, policy makers may train officers in skills to limit using arrest and official sanctioning of citizens while achieving the larger goal of social
harmony. Reducing the exercise of formal application of the law is in line with the tenets of community-oriented policing.

If community policing is the paradigm of the future, understanding and predicting the decision to take a citizen into custody becomes a paramount concern. Over the past 30 years, researchers and practitioners have more fully begun to understand the complex decision making of American police. Just as observers of the police began to understand discretion of officers as street-level bureaucrats, community policing promises to suddenly make these tasks more challenging. Given divergences of our results from prior research, perhaps the most significant conclusion we can make is that we still have a lot to learn. The impact of community policing on decision-making processes is quite complex and may vary by police department. Certainly, further exploration into these (and other) matters are warranted before researchers and policy makers can truly claim to understand community policing at the street level. Whether complexity in individual arrest decision making is a virtue or a vice remains unanswered, but certainly, future research will attempt to filter these muddy waters.

NOTES

1. Community-oriented policing (COP) officers obtained their assignment through an intradivision bid and review process. After officers applied for the position of COP officer, community policing sergeants, other division supervisors, and members of the community where the officer would be assigned interviewed them. This group selects an officer for the assignment, and then officers are provided an additional 40 hours of academy training geared toward community policing and problem solving (all officers in the Cincinnati Police Department received 8 hours of community policing and problem-solving training through in-service training).

2. At this point, it is important to discuss more fully communities in Cincinnati. Cincinnati residents, when asked where they live, are most likely to identify themselves as residents of a particular neighborhood; in other words, they cognitively identify themselves with a specific neighborhood. Communities in Cincinnati are recognized by the city as separate political entities, whereas each community has one council that exerts political and fiscal influence on the city government. The history of these communities dates back to the early 1900s, when these communities were separate villages or cities not yet incorporated by the city (Thomas, 1986). These communities have particular relevance for community policing and the current examination due to the fact that the Cincinnati Police Department assigned community-oriented policing officers to particular communities to work collectively with the community councils to identify problems and form solutions. As such, these communities do not merely represent macrogeographic units, such as police beats, census block groups, or enumeration districts, as prior operationalizations of community have suggested.

3. None of the police-citizen encounters observed included both a community-oriented policing and a beat officer at the same time. Additional officers at the encounter and time of day offered no explanatory value in predicting arrest decision making and therefore are not included in the multivariate analyses.
4. Whereas other research limited their sample to all encounters between the police and suspects, we felt there were many encounters where the citizen was defined as a suspect in a crime yet no probable cause existed that would lead to an arrest. Probable cause is required by statute to actuate an arrest, and if no probable cause existed during an encounter, it is reasonable to infer that arrest was not a viable option for the officer, and therefore, an analysis that included such events would be meaningless. Including citizens in the sample where no probable cause was present effectively eliminates the ability of the officer to make an arrest. Although a probable cause is a lucid concept that is open to debate whether it exists (such as in court), researchers were trained in techniques on how to determine whether officers had the legal right to actuate an arrest, and when researchers were unsure, they asked the officers probing questions regarding their legal right to make an arrest. Of the 289 encounters between the police and suspects where no probable cause was identified, none of the citizens were arrested.

5. In addition to situational- and community-level correlates of behavior, prior research has also explored the influence of individual officer characteristics and organizational characteristics as explanatory variables. Individual-level variables were not included for several reasons. There is less theoretical reason to believe the influence of characteristics, such as officers’ race, gender, or length of service, should differ between community-oriented policing and beat officers. Indeed, individual-level correlates offer little additional explanatory power to the present analysis. In separate analyses using these correlates, the individual-level correlates offered little significant or consistent predictive power (Novak, 1999, pp. 208-210). In the interest of parsimony, only situational- and community-level exogenous variables are used.

6. Although Klinger (1994) has criticized previous research for using dichotomous measures for crime seriousness, we use this measure for two reasons. First, because our sample excludes encounters where probable cause for arrest is not established, the “no crime” category of a scaled variable is automatically excluded. Second, other research has shown that “the ‘crude indicators’ used in previous studies capture a substantial proportion of the variation in seriousness” (Worden & Shepard, 1996, p. 100). Therefore, we believe this dichotomous measure adequately captures the seriousness of pre-intervention-phase crime.

7. In encounters where the citizen was arrested, observers coded the presence of evidence prior to the arrest. This operationalization of evidence assumes all evidence criteria are given equal explanatory value, or in other words, it measures the quantity rather than the quality of evidence. Unfortunately, the existing data did not allow for further analysis of evidence quality. This variable is similar to the evidence strength correlate used by Mastrofski, Worden, and Snipes (1995, pp. 547-549); however, our variable equally weighs all evidence criteria. Furthermore and similar to Mastrofski et al., a score of 0 does not mean there was no evidence indicating the citizen committed a crime; it simply means none of these evidence criteria were observed during the encounter. In their sample of suspects, 40.1% of the encounters had no evidence.

8. The measurement of demeanor has recently provided a source of controversy. Several other operationalizations of the variable have been used in extant research examining the influence of demeanor. Lundman (1994) argued, “There is no basis for arguing that one representation is superior to another” (p. 637), and in the current data, different measurements of the same construct revealed high levels of intercorrelation. In most of the recent research, demeanor has been operationalized as a dichotomous variable, representing either disrespect or politeness (Worden & Shepard, 1996), because the differences in citizen demeanor is a matter “of kind rather than degree, for the measurement of which an ordinal scale is inappropriate” (Worden, Shepard, & Mastrofski, 1996, p. 330). In other words, ordinal scales may fail to capture the threshold of antagonism that would most likely affect an officer’s behavior.

9. Order maintenance is distinguished as whether the officer suggested, requested, negotiated, commanded, or threatened citizens to take some action. These requests are often intended
to return a situation to a state of normality. Although normality can be reached through the application of arrest, order maintenance is a tactic available to officers to achieve this end short of taking a person into custody. Therefore, order maintenance was operationalized as whether an officer requested a citizen to (a) leave another person alone, (b) cease disorderly behavior, (c) cease illegal behavior, or (d) control another person or problem maker. These particular requests were specifically designed to return an encounter to a state of homeostasis. Variables such as demeanor, order maintenance, and compliance were included only if they were observed before arrest.

10. Whereas Klinger (1997) indicated aggregate-level crime rates would influence the vigor of officers’ responses, we included a series of structural characteristics in lieu of crime rates. When crime rates were included in the models, harmful levels of collinearity were detected. Communities with high levels of disorganization also had correspondingly high levels of Part I and Part II crimes, therefore making our structural characteristics proxies for aggregate-level crime rates.

11. For a more detailed description of hierarchical linear models building, see Bryk and Raudenbush (1992). Given the data, it normally would be necessary to estimate a hierarchical linear model for several reasons. Heteroskedasticity often exists among the aggregate-level variables. This is particularly true for aggregate-level correlates measured as proportions, because the denominator in the proportion drives the magnitude of the overall estimate. In other words, communities with greater numbers of observed encounters will include larger denominators in the proportions. Summary statistics calculated with smaller numbers are less stable. A consequence of this is an inflated standard error for the aggregate predictors, thus making it more difficult to reject the null hypotheses (Hanushek & Jackson, 1977). In addition, including individual- and aggregate-level variables in a pooled model results in biased statistical tests. The sample size of the community-level variables is artificially inflated to the sample size of the individual-level variables, making it easier to reject the null hypothesis.

12. We also estimated two-stage, weighted least squares models that included both situational- and aggregate-level predictors to address similar issues related to multilevel analyses. These models also indicate that community-level predictors provide no significant contribution to explaining variation in officers’ decisions to arrest. Also, it could be suggested that officer assignment is actually another level of analysis. However, most officers encountered less than three arrest-eligible citizens, and thus, multilevel analyses would likely provide unstable estimates.

13. The equation \( z = \frac{a_1 - a_2}{\text{se}^+} \) is most appropriate and will be used due to sample size, as described in Brame, Paternoster, Mazerolle, and Piquero (1998).

14. Under Title 42 U.S.C., Section 1983, citizens can seek relief from officials who violate their constitutional rights under the guise of their governmental positions. Section 1983 outlines a procedure that individuals can follow to seek compensation for violations of their constitutional rights. There are two essential components of Section 1983, namely, (a) the defendant must be acting under the color of law, and (b) there must be a violation of a constitutional or federally protected right. Because community policing increases the ability of the line officer to make decisions while loosening oversight by supervisors, officers are in effect implementing organizational policy in which the officer, supervisor, department, and municipality may be held liable.
REFERENCES


