THE STATUS OF
COLLABORATIVE PROBLEM SOLVING AND
COMMUNITY PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING
IN CINCINNATI

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In 2002, the City of Cincinnati signed the Collaborative Agreement, thus declaring the Community Problem-Oriented Policing would be the strategy for police services in the city. This report describes the status of Community Problem-Oriented Policing in Cincinnati and makes recommendations for strengthening this strategy.

This strategy, originally developed in 1979 and extensively used by police services in North America, Europe, Great Britain, New Zealand, and Australia, shifts the focus of police work from reacting to individual calls to prevention. Rather than merely responding to the public’s requests for assistance, the police look for patterns in these requests, determine what is giving rise to these patterns, and then crafts solutions. Most of these patterns – problems – occur due to failures of public and private institutions to carry out their activities in ways that do not facilitate crime, disorder, and other harmful behaviors.

For problem-solving efforts to work, the police must enlist the active collaboration of the community groups and individuals, other government agencies, and non-governmental organizations. Evaluations of problem solving efforts by police agencies consistently show that police can have a major impact on a wide variety of problems. Problem-oriented policing is rated highly effective by researchers who have reviewed the evidence.

The Cincinnati Police Department has undergone a series of leadership changes in the last five years. In most police agencies that have applied problem-oriented policing, such changes have severely undermined the strategy. Police agencies abandon a problem-oriented
approach, despite its effectiveness, because new mayors, city managers, and police chiefs pursue other agendas.

Interviews with police officials and community members, and a review of problem solving efforts show that police have addressed a wide variety of problems, collaborated with numerous non-police organizations, and have done so successfully. Problem solving appears to have declined significantly, despite the fact that the Cincinnati Police Department has a substantial infrastructure to support CPOP, and there is considerable support for problem solving among police and community members. The most likely reason for this decline is the change in leadership the police department has undergone since March 2011.

To strengthen problem solving, this report makes recommendations in six areas.

**Make CPOP more visible** – Problem solving with community members needs to be made more visible in Cincinnati by publicizing problem solving activities and creating an annual report on problem solving. If the public does not see problem solving, they will not value it.

**Make CPOP more accountable** – Reconnecting problem solving to the police department’s STARS system, improving the Problem-Solving Tracking System, and developing problem solving effectiveness audits would help increase the quality and quantity of problem solving. Absent consistent measurement, no police strategy can be effective.

**Make partnerships a critical element** – CPOP’s success is contingent on working with non-police government and community agencies. Cincinnati has had considerable success in this area. Improving community involvement, nevertheless, would be useful, as would more systematic engagement of non-resident neighborhood stakeholders in problems. Without such partnerships, crime and disorder control become more expensive and brutal.

**Educate with CPOP** – The community can better engage with police if its members are knowledgeable about problem solving and evidence-based theories of crime and prevention. This should not just be reserved for adults. Students can learn a great deal by engaging in problem solving, while also giving back to their communities. If the community is ignorant about how problem solving is conducted, it will be less helpful in reducing crime and disorder and more reliant on police.
Learn from experience – Police and community members constantly learn how to improve problem solving, both from their successes and failures. More efforts need to be made to systematically review past problem-solving efforts and draw concrete lessons for police and community members. If learning is not built into CPOP, police and community members will repeatedly use outdated and less effective approaches to crime and disorder.

Sustain CPOP leadership – The difficulties faced by CPOP over the last three and a half years points to the critical need to bolster CPOP leadership. The ongoing Chief’s Scholars Program with the University of Cincinnati’s School of Criminal Justice should be strengthened. This program helps assure new leaders of the department are able to effectively apply the latest research and evidence-based practices. Continuing to assure new police officers know the importance of CPOP and can work on problem solving projects is also critical. The most critical element for assuring the long term effectiveness of CPOP is for the city administration to make CPOP expertise and commitment an important part of the hiring process of new police executives. Absent consistent attention to CPOP leadership, CPOP will become a hollow shell of buzz words.

Most of the recommendations made in this report build on a sound foundation. Some of the recommendations are already being implemented. Other recommendations are designed to extend the extraordinary progress Cincinnati, its police and its communities have made.
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THE COLLABORATIVE AGREEMENT

The City of Cincinnati, the plaintiffs and the FOP, shall adopt problem solving as the principal strategy for addressing crime and disorder problems. Initiatives to address crime and disorder will be preceded by careful problem definition, analysis and an examination of a broad range of solutions. The City of Cincinnati will routinely evaluate implemented solutions to crime and disorder problems, regardless of the agency leading the problem-solving effort. The City will develop and implement a plan to coordinate the City’s activities so that multi-agency problem solving with community members becomes a standard practice. Such an approach does not preclude law enforcement and prosecution. (Collaborative Agreement, pages 4-5.)

Twelve years have passed since this agreement has been signed. The city has had three different mayors, three city managers, and three police chiefs. The police department expanded after 2002, but then contracted following the 2008 recession. Despite these changes the parties involved adhered to the Collaborative Agreement. Cincinnati, once stigmatized nationally by accusations of race-based policing, has changed for the better. Today, the Collaborative Agreement is held up as a model for other cities facing similar difficulties. Participants in the development of the Collaborative Agreement are invited to other cities to describe how Cincinnati made the agreement work. People from other cities, currently facing difficulties similar to 2001 Cincinnati, visit here to see the Collaborative Agreement in action (see Appendix B). The police deserve considerable credit for making important deep changes; the types of changes that do not come easy to any large organization.

As the troubles of the late 1990s and early 2000s fade, it is critical that we review the status of the Collaborative Agreement’s core principle: that the police department engage with members of the community in addressing problems to prevent crime and disorder. That is a purpose of this report. However, the most important purpose of this report is to point to ways the city and the city’s police can improve its application of Community Problem-Oriented Policing.

This report is for citizens of Cincinnati, those who participated in the negotiations of the Collaborative Agreement, the Cincinnati Police Department, City Manager, and city elected officials. With such a
diverse audience, it is likely that some will be very familiar with policing and the Collaborative Agreement and many others will not. Consequently, the first two sections describe that background of policing strategies in general and Community Problem-Oriented Policing specifically. Appendix A gives an overview of common policing strategies. The third section describes the current status of problem solving within the CPD and Cincinnati communities. It is based on interviews of police officials and community members, as well as a review of the police problem-solving data base. The final section makes recommendations for strengthening and advancing Community Problem-Oriented Policing in Cincinnati. These recommendations are focus on making police more effective at addressing community concerns, particularly crime; improving police-community relations, reducing the need for enforcement, and improving fair treatment; and reducing the costs of policing through prevention and partnerships.

WHAT IS COMMUNITY PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING?

BASIC PRINCIPLES

Community Problem-Oriented Policing (CPOP) is the strategy that the City of Cincinnati agreed to adopt when it signed the Collaborative Agreement. This is a strategy by which the police, acting in partnership with members of the Cincinnati community, other governmental organizations, and non-governmental institutions, identify very specific harmful situations, analyze these situations to determine when, where, and how they arise, and then craft specific solutions to these problems. To assure problems are reduced, the police evaluate the effectiveness of the solutions. If it has not been effective, police revise their approach.

Problem-oriented policing was designed, in part, to overcome the severe deficiencies in standard police identified by research. From 1970 to the present, researchers have found that:

- Police patrols of neighborhoods do not reduce crime;
- Response time is irrelevant to crime reduction;
- Investigations of common crimes does not reduce crime;
- Increasing arrests does not reduce crime, increase costs, and can impede police effectiveness by eroding public support;
- Adding additional police is unlikely to reduce much crime.
Despite the consensus among researchers on these points, many of these practices remain entrenched in the public imagination as necessary to curb crime and disorder. The result is higher expenditures on policing than is necessary and greater use of arrests than is required. Problem-oriented policing provides an evidence-based alternative to these practices.

Problem-Oriented Policing is a policing strategy developed by Herman Goldstein (University of Wisconsin Law School) in 1979 after 20 years of working with police. Goldstein noted that the scientific evidence showed that police were ineffective at reducing crime in part because they spent far more attention on the way they conducted their business, than on the outcomes they were trying to achieve. He pointed out that police had confused law enforcement – a tool for helping the community – with the goal. Counting arrests, tickets, and other legal sanctions as indicators of success is like assessing the work of a carpenter based on the number of hammer blows rather than the quality of his final product. Broad enforcement tactics are problematic, not only because there is scant evidence of their effectiveness, but because they are extremely costly to tax payers. As important, such tactics undermine the legitimacy of the police within the communities the police most need to fight crime.

Goldstein also argued that the police do far more than address crime: they make sure that traffic flows smoothly, that people who are lost get directions, that order is maintained, that civil liberties are protected, and that vulnerable people are provided security. Police and public confusion over means and ends not only made police ineffective, it resulted in unfair treatment of some citizens, and excessive costs to tax payers.

Goldstein’s solution was to point out that police work is about problems faced by members of the community, and the goals of the police were to reduce these problems. Problems arise, mostly, because some people or some institutions (businesses, government agencies, and non-profits) in the community fail to do what they should have been doing. The police department is the only general purpose agency of government with a twenty-four hour seven day a week responsibility, with a strong command and control structure. Consequently, when people or institutions fail, the police end up handling the resulting problem.

Problem-oriented policing is a strategy for the police to routinely and systematically identify problems, assemble facts that describe how and
why the problems arise, craft tailor-made solutions, and measure whether the solutions worked to reduce the problems. Since its inception, police in western democracies have used it to address a wide variety of problems, ranging from mundane disagreements to acts of violence and terrorism. There is not a single problem that citizens bring to the police that has not been addressed with problem solving by some police agency somewhere. The Center for Problem-Oriented Policing website (www.popcenter.org) provides a set of practical guides for addressing over 70 different classes of problems common to police agencies.

**Figure 1: THE SARA PROBLEM-SOLVING PROCESS**

![The SARA Problem-Solving Process Diagram](image)

**THE BASIC PROBLEM SOLVING PROCESS**

The standard process for addressing problems was developed in the Newport News Police Department in the late 1980s. Known as the SARA process (Figure 1), it has been adopted by police agencies around the world. It is also the core process used in Cincinnati. The first stage is detecting a problem, verifying it is something the police need to attend to, and giving it a preliminary definition. This is scanning. Community members play an important role here. The
second stage is the analysis of the problem. Here the problem solvers determine why it occurs in some places and not others, at particular times, how offenders operate, the roles played by possible victims, and the reasons the problem is not prevented. Community members closest to the problem, including offenders, often have useful insights.

The response stage involves using the analysis information to craft a tailor-made solution that has high potential for reducing the problem. The goal is not to arrest “the bad guys”, though this sometimes is very useful. Rather the goal is to reduce the problem, whether or not anyone is arrested. This often requires the assistance of people in the community, other government agencies, and non-governmental organizations. The final stage is assessment. Here, problem solvers determine if they met their goals by substantially reducing the problem. If they have, they can move on to other problems. If they have not, then they need to rethink decisions at earlier stages of SARA. That is why SARA has multiple feedback loops, and is arranged in a circle.

**SCALE OF PROBLEM SOLVING**

Since it was first envisioned, police agencies have experimented with various approaches to implementing problem-oriented policing. Some have used special units, operating out of headquarters or large area commands. Others have delegated problem solving to teams serving districts or precincts. And others have pushed problem solving down to generalist patrol officers and investigators, as part of their normal duties. Each approach has its advantages and disadvantages.

Beat level problem solving – activities by patrol officers and investigators – maximizes the number of police involved and assures that small scale problems that directly impact neighborhoods get resolved. This form of problem solving usually comes in two forms (though they overlap considerably). The simplest form of beat problem solving involves an officer calling a local government agency, talking to a local business owner, or contacting a non-profit service provider to handle a situation they were unaware of, but are prepared to handle. Examples include, helping a mother find an agency to help a mentally ill son, or talking to a landlord to have lighting improved to reduce thefts. Such efforts typically rely on the police agency having strong partners, and on officers’ creativity and negotiating abilities.

At the district level, problems that are high priority to district commanders and their communities get addressed. An example of this might be looking into how to address a very high crime motel, or
prevent prostitution and human trafficking along a set of blocks. A district wide initiative to reduce pedestrian-vehicle accidents is another example. These efforts usually take longer to resolve than beat level efforts, involve more partners, are can be more serious. However, the distinction between beat and district level problem solving is vague. Sometimes a beat level problem solving effort gets promoted to the district when initial efforts are insufficient and it becomes apparent to the district captain that more assistance is necessary. Other times a problem might be identified by the district commander and assigned to beat level officers.

Strategic problem solving operates across districts and may be city wide. These are usually handled by either a special unit or by a temporary task force operating out of police headquarters. Such efforts can take many months or years, require detailed negotiations with other government agencies, drafting of ordinances for consideration by city council, and many other activities. Sometimes such efforts go beyond city limits and involve other police agencies and government agencies. Several years ago, for example, the Cincinnati Police Department’s traffic unit carefully analyzed the pattern of motor vehicle accidents, particularly those resulting in deaths. From this analysis, the unit developed a city wide strategy that resulted in notable reductions in traffic related injuries and death. An independent evaluation by the University of Cincinnati demonstrated that Cincinnati’s reduction in traffic related injuries and deaths were greater than Hamilton County or Ohio over the same time period as a result of this city wide problem-solving effort.

**SUPPORTING COMMUNITY PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING**

There are seven support activities necessary to assure problem solving works effectively.

1. **Accountability and quality assurance** – police leaders and the community must set expectations for problem solving and demand evidence that it is being accomplished at a high quality. District commanders need to set expectations for beat level problem solving. Department leaders need to hold district commanders accountable for addressing problems. The community must hold the police accountable to taking on problems. And equally important, the police must have ways to hold community members and other government agencies accountable for assisting in problem solving efforts.
2. **External support** – the community and political leaders must champion problem solving by their police. Community Problem-Oriented Policing requires the participation of community members and government agencies to be effective. Additionally, community and political support is necessary to keep the police from drifting back to traditional modes of policing, or embracing untested new fads in policing.

3. **Training and education** – officers and supervisors need to know how to address problems. This is not simply a matter of a single training session, but of continued education in best practices and the latest research into problems police confront.

4. **Incentive structures** -- Access to promotions and highly desirable assignments should be made contingent on demonstrated competence at addressing problems. Problem-competence is not the only thing that needs to be demonstrated, but it must be one of the important things.

5. **Analytical support** – Community Problem-Oriented Policing relies on the effective use of data. Accessing and processing data requires special skills. Virtually every problem solving effort, except the simplest, requires some statistical analysis (charts, maps, and tables). Consequently, a police agency engaged in Community Problem-Oriented Policing must have a robust crime analysis capacity that all problem solvers can draw upon. If community engagement is expected, then there must be ways for community groups to access this support on a timely basis.

6. **Technical support** – Officers trying to resolve problems sometimes need to draw on other police expertise or specialized knowledge from other agencies. A problem solving effort dealing with a nuisance property might require legal help, for example. Problem solvers addressing drug dealing might require some assistance from drug investigators. When some types of problems are common, and there is a regular need for specialized advice, then the police agency should create clear avenues for obtaining this support.

7. **Institutional learning** – Every problem addressed, successful or not, is a lesson. Police and community members need to be able to draw lessons from the many problems they address so they can improve their effectiveness and avoid earlier difficulties.
CPOP AND OTHER POLICING STRATEGIES

Community Problem-Oriented Policing overlaps with a number of other policing strategies that have been advocated over the last two decades: community policing, COMPSTAT, hot-spots policing, Broken-Windows policing, intelligence-led policing, predictive policing and evidence based policing (see Appendix A for descriptions of these strategies). Most of these strategies are so poorly defined that two agencies claiming to use the same strategy can be doing very different things. Nevertheless, there is broad agreement over some basic similarities and differences. These are summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: COMPARISON OF COMMON POLICING STRATEGIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CPOP</th>
<th>COP</th>
<th>COMPSTAT</th>
<th>Hot-spots</th>
<th>Broken Windows</th>
<th>Intelligence-Led</th>
<th>Predictive</th>
<th>Evidence-based</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Addresses full range of community demands</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>Crime only</td>
<td>Crime &amp; disorder</td>
<td>Crime only</td>
<td>Crime only</td>
<td>possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relies heavily on law enforcement</td>
<td>limited</td>
<td>limited</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>variable</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relies heavily on partnerships</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>variable</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uses an analytical approach</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relies on officer expertise</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evidence for effectiveness</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>limited</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>yes</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>unclear</td>
<td>unclear</td>
<td>unclear</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Principle value

- An approach for the full range of police problems
- Builds sound community support
- Builds internal accountability
- Focuses on the root causes
- Attracts to disorder
- Highlights the use of criminal intelligence
- Values new analytical techniques
- Demands strong scientific support for actions

Principle risk

- Difficult to implement
- Becomes a feel good approach
- Supports a quick-win approach and staves innovation
- Justifies excessive stopping of youth and profiling
- Does not look beyond a law enforcement approach
- Supports a quick-win approach
- Stifles innovation

For descriptions of these general policing strategies, see Appendix A.

With community policing, community problem-oriented policing shares a strong commitment to listen to and involve citizens in improving their communities across a wide variety of community concerns, beyond addressing crime and disorder. Officer expertise is highly valued in both approaches. These two strategies differ in that a problem-oriented approach measures its success by reductions in harm within communities, where-as community policing advocates often focus on citizen satisfaction with police services. Though satisfaction is
important, it is far more important for people to suffer less harm and be satisfied. There is a strong commitment to careful analysis with CPOP that is often lacking in COP. It is unclear how to apply COP to problems without resident communities, such as vehicle accidents. There is also little evidence of the crime reduction effectiveness of COP, whereas there is strong evidence for the effectiveness of CPOP. Probably the biggest value of COP is that it promotes an orientation toward listening to, collaborating with, and being responsive to public concerns.

Like Broken-Windows policing, CPOP is concerned with disorder and quality of life issues. Where these strategies differ is that Broken-Windows policing is often associated with strong enforcement activities and so called “zero-tolerance policies.” Zero tolerance policies drive up arrests, which increases costs to tax payers, but has little impact on crime. This is because strategies that rely on arrests do not address the crime facilitating features in the local environment. CPOP is far more focused on the few offenders and very small places where disorder arises, and with crafting the least intrusive effective intervention to prevent disorder, using officer expertise and community partnerships. In this way it produces less collateral harm than Broken-Windows approaches. There is very little evidence for Broken-Windows policing effectiveness, and the limited evidence is highly controversial. Typically, “broken windows” is used more as a code for stepped up enforcement, contrary to what its original advocates intended.

COMPSTAT, hot-spots policing, intelligence-led policing, and predictive policing share with CPOP a strong analytical approach to identifying problems and focusing solutions. Whereas CPOP embraces the use of a wide variety of solutions to the problems based on careful analysis of the causes of the problems, the other strategies often simply involve the use of law enforcement to address crime. In principle, these approaches could be used to address a wider array of police problems, but this has not occurred. The emphasis on law enforcement reduces their use of officer expertise and community partners. Consequently, avoidable collateral damage accompanies these strategies when law enforcement is selected over more effective and more precise interventions. The evidence backing these strategies is variable – hot spots policing is very effective, but predictive policing is too new to know its effectiveness. COMPSTAT is more of a managerial approach, and it can be usefully adapted to help administer CPOP.

Evidence-based policing overlaps considerably with CPOP, as CPOP has strong evidence behind it and uses evidence in its daily operations. But
evidence-based policing relies too heavily on the very few tested policing tactics, and is not sufficiently sympathetic to the fact that there is much about policing that science has not addressed. CPOP allows for more innovation, particularly in areas where the science is weak (e.g., how to address prostitution activity effectively). Where there is strong evidence, such as with the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence, both evidence-based policing and CPOP are in agreement.

It should be clear that CPOP shares different features with other modern policing strategies. One of its strengths is that it can adapt specific features of other strategies to addressing problems. A good example of this is the use of COMPSTAT to improve the quality of problem solving. The Cincinnati police version of COMPSTAT is called STARS, and originally it was used in this way. Though STARS moved away from assuring the quality of district level problem solving, interviews with police officials indicate that it is returning to this role.

Community Problem-Oriented Policing, as envisioned for Cincinnati, draws attention to the fact that members of the community are important collaborators with police in addressing these problems, and sometimes they can address problems with minimal police assistance. The idea that the police must collaborate with other government agencies, businesses, non-governmental organizations, and community groups has been central to problem-oriented policing from the beginning. By underscoring community involvement, the Collaborative Agreement makes these partnerships prominent. It also points to the fact that problem-oriented policing is not just a police reform strategy; it is also a community reform strategy; that citizens cannot simply demand more of the police, but they must be willing to shoulder some of the responsibility for reducing problems.

There are three reasons for problem-oriented policing.

- **Effective policing** – It reduces harmful problems of concern to the community;
- **Efficient policing** – It shifts some of the responsibility for addressing problems from the police to institutions better equipped to address the problems. This reduces the costs of policing; and,
- **Equitable service delivery** – By narrowing the application of law enforcement and trimming the use of coercive powers, CPOP reduces police-citizen conflicts. By widening community engagement beyond asking residents to be “the eyes and ears” of the police, it partners with citizens in ways that lead to longer lasting results. And by preventing crime and disorder, it assures that there are fewer negative police citizen encounters.
The Collaborative Agreement specified community problem-oriented policing so that Cincinnati would have both fair and effective policing, rather than have to choose between these two goals.

**WHY IS COMMUNITY PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING RIGHT FOR CINCINNATI?**

During the development of the Collaborative Agreement, some participants pointed out that it is common for members of the public, as well as the police, to believe they have to choose between a fair and friendly police department, and an effective but stern police department. Often, efforts to move the police closer to the public run afoul of accusations that these efforts are giving free rein to criminals. The opposite is also true. Efforts to bring the community and police closer are often pursued because hardnosed crime fighting efforts have antagonized many citizens, particularly African-American young males.

The selection of Community Problem-Oriented Policing was made to avoid this false conflict between effectiveness and fairness. Fortunately, while the participants were negotiating the agreement in 2001 the National Academy of Sciences was reviewing the scientific evidence for the effectiveness of various policing strategies. Their report highlighted the effectiveness of problem-oriented policing relative to standard policing, community policing, and focused policing (such as hot spots policing). And the National Academy’s report noted that it held promise for improving police community relations, as well.

Since 2001, a number of additional studies have systematically reviewed the scientific evidence that problem-oriented policing and related crime prevention approaches work. These reviews consistently give problem-oriented policing high marks.

So the answer to why CPOP is right for Cincinnati is very clear:
1. It is proven to be effective at addressing crime and other problems the public brings to police attention.
2. It involves the communities of Cincinnati in productive efforts to improve neighborhood safety.
3. It reduces the number of troublesome situations where police and members of the public are at high risk of serious conflict.
In the next section, we will see that there is a fourth reason. That is, the Cincinnati Police Department has a strong foundation for addressing problems with their community partners, and for improving such problem solving.

**WHAT IS THE STATUS OF COMMUNITY PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING IN CINCINNATI?**

This section was developed based on interviews with police officials of various ranks and assignments who have had experience with various facets of implementing problem-solving. Some had direct experience working on problems, and others supervised these efforts or provided other forms of support. Often those interviewed had a variety of such experiences. It was also developed based on interviews with community members who had participated in the development of the collaborative agreement, or had worked on problems with the police, or both. Additionally, the Cincinnati Police Department graciously provided access to their Problem Solving Tracking System. The summary of problem solving activities depicted in the charts that follow come from these data. To preserve anonymity, and assure frank and open discussion, those interviewed were assured that their names would not be used in this report.

It is very clear, from all the interviews, and the data, that the Cincinnati Police Department has developed a solid foundation for problem solving and has had notable successes. Considerable progress has been made since the signing of the Collaborative Agreement.

It is also clear that the progress of problem solving in Cincinnati has been rocky in the last several years. When police organizations change leaders, new initiatives often fall by the way side. This not only occurs if the new leader is indifferent to the changes begun by predecessors, it is also is due to the uncertainty accompanying changes in leadership assignments below the chief’s level. Given the experiences in other police agencies, it is remarkable that Community Problem-Oriented Policing has survived at all.

This section provides an overview of the support structure for CPOP within the police services, and within the community. It also summarizes problem solving efforts since the implementation of the problem solving tracking system, in 2007.
SUPPORT STRUCTURES

1. Accountability and Quality Assurance

Internal Support. There is considerable support for problem solving within the Cincinnati Police. This support is evident at the command level on down. Though not everyone has the exact same opinion over every detail, the consistency of interest in getting problem-oriented policing back on track is quite evident.

Problem Solving Tracking. Since 2007, the Cincinnati Police Department has an operational problem-solving tracking system. Police engaging in a problem solving project enter information about their project as they work through the four stages of the SARA process. The tracking system provides five services. First, it provides a retrievable record of each problem-solving effort. Second, the tracking system includes a series of prompts that remind problem solvers of steps and enquiries they should take. Third, it allows for supervisory review. Fourth, it allows CPD personnel to glean lessons and ideas from earlier attempts to address problems (for example, an officer beginning to look into a theft from vehicles problem can check the system to find out what has already been done to address similar problems in other districts). Finally, the tracking system allows the CPD to examine its overall efforts.

Police interviewed noted several limitations to the current Tracking System. First, it is awkward and time consuming for police to enter data. This creates a perverse result: the police who work the hardest to address problems face an additional workload of record keeping that officers less engaged in problem solving do not face. Second, the system does not take advantage of the most current technology which may be able to improve its functionality. Third, the system does not facilitate the easy generation of summary reports for administration, accountability, public reporting, and lesson learning. Such reports can be developed from the system, but they require special work and extra time.

STARS. The Cincinnati police have developed a weekly effectiveness accountability system, loosely modeled on COMPSTAT, called STARS (Statistic and Tactical Analytic Review for Solutions). An important original function of STARS was to have district commanders and crime analysts report on problem solving activities, and to provide feedback to help these efforts. As leadership changed, the importance of
problem solving accountability declined in STARS meetings. Interviews of police personnel indicate that STARS meetings are now becoming more oriented toward supporting problem solving.

2. External Support

Community members interviewed are very supportive of the police efforts to address problem. There is recognition that the CPD has made substantial progress, even when community members would like to see more. They seem to share a similar frustration with members of the CPD that problem-oriented policing has ebbed in recent years.

Where community members and CPD members differ is on the consistency of support for community involvement. Not surprisingly, such support is more varied within the CPD than in the community where the demand for more community engagement is near universal. Unlike many cities, community activists understand the language of Community Problem-Oriented Policing. They are particularly attentive to the ideas that collaboration on solving problems not only can reduce those problems, it can do so with less collateral harm to communities, and puts police and community members together where they can develop useful ways to work together on other projects. Community members also highlighted the idea that routine problem solving with police made it easier to deal with high tension incidents. Community members had police they could ask questions of, knew more about police procedures, and felt someone was listening to their concerns.

Some community members noted, however, that when the police department deployed problem solving specialists – known as CPOP officers – within districts there was more engagement of community members. To some degree, community liaison officers in districts serve this purpose, and very recently plans were drawn up to create a small cadre of “quality of life” officers who can address problems.

Inevitably, there will be a tension between community’s who want to have dedicated officers who they can build a long term relationship, and the police agency’s needs to be able to reassign and promote officers.

One of the reasons the police in Cincinnati have been able to apply CPOP is that the city administration stressed the importance of collaboration among city agencies. Such collaboration needs to continue, particularly as the problems the public brings to the police, they bring to other agencies as well, though often in a different form.
This is most evident with high crime locations. These places often create trouble that other services – building inspection, fire, health, and tax, for example – must address.

3. Training and Education

Training. Problem solving has been part of the training process for new recruits and is likely to be for the latest recruit class. The state requires four hours of training on “community policing”, but the CPD adds additional course work and exercises on problem solving, taught by supervisors with extensive field experience working on community problems.

Chief Scholars Program. Since 2009, the Cincinnati Police Department has partnered with the UC School of Criminal Justice in the Chief’s Scholars Program. The program provides an educational opportunity to police leaders and future leaders, culminating in a master’s degree. The CPD selects the applicants and UC determines if they meet the standards for any incoming master’s student. The participants get a strong foundation in evidence-based policy, the use of analytical techniques to develop and test policy, and the theories and empirical facts of Crime Science and problem-oriented policing. Fourteen police officials, ranging in rank from officer to captain have completed the program, and two are currently enrolled. The UC faculty consistently states that these are some of the best graduate students in the master’s program. This partnership is unique in that it provides cutting edge knowledge that can be directly and effectively applied to further the goals of the Collaborative Agreement. The papers these police-scholars develop as part of their academic work focus on crime and disorder problems facing the citizens of Cincinnati. Most importantly, interviews with members of the CPD, including members who have not participated in the Chief’s Scholars Program, universally endorse the value of the program for developing a cadre of evidence-based police leaders who not only know the latest science of crime but know how to apply this knowledge.

4. Incentive Structures

Problem solving knowledge is built into promotion processes for all ranks. Those seeking promotion are examined on readings dealing with problem solving and community engagement.

Police officials are graded on their problem solving performance in their personnel assessments. It is one of 10 “core performance anchors”
common to all annual performance reports from police officer through assistant chief. To achieve an “exceptional” rating, the officer must
• Have an exceptional ability to detect problems;
• Demonstrate innovation in developing solutions;
• Consistently use data to analyze problems;
• Evaluate problem solving efforts; and
• Be “universally recognized” as someone to consult when addressing difficult problems.

At the opposite extreme, officers are rated unacceptable if:
• They fail to recognize community problems;
• Demonstrates no interest in identifying problems;
• Does not document problem solving efforts using the SARA process;
• Fails to take into account the results of actions;
• Fails to analyze problems; and,
• Demonstrates no attention to community “blight issues”.

5. Analytical Support

Since the signing of the Collaborative Agreement, the Cincinnati Police Department has dramatically improved its crime analysis capacity. There were very few people in the CPD in 2002 who could pass for crime analysts, and none were in the districts. Twelve years later each district has a crime analyst and there are several other analysts attached to various centralized police units. These analysts produce a variety of products, ranging from trend charts and maps, to detailed analyses of persistent problems. Given the importance of analysis to CPOP, this increased capacity cannot be overstated in its importance. The central analytical unit is called Crime Analysis and Problem-Solving Unit, indicating the importance of problem solving within the CPD.

Further increasing the capacity of the Cincinnati Police to address problems is the strong connection it has with the Institute for Crime Science at the University of Cincinnati. Faculty and graduate students assist operational units in detailed complex problem analysis, including CIRV (see Appendix C), and they also provide evaluation expertise. Though some of the assistance is directed at particular enduring tasks – such as CIRV or STARS – some of it involves informal consultation about problem solving projects.

6. Technical Support

Assistant City Solicitor. Though often overlooked, the assignment of an Assistant City Solicitor to the CPD to address nucience properties is,
nevertheless, a critical part of the infrascruture supporting a Community Problem Oriented Policing strategy. As one police official stated, “This might be unpopular, but I would rather have Mark Manning than 30 new police officers. That is how much work he provides.” Like all cities, a relatively few properties in Cincinnati generate a very large proportion of the calls for service and crimes. There are a number of reasons for this, but one of the most important causes is poor property management. These few locations consume more than their share of tax payer resources through their constant need for police attention. In the next section, Figure 2 shows that over half of the problems police address are at specific places, such as apartment buildings and small businesses. Having a dedicated legal expert in nussaince issues is critical to resolving these problems.

**Neighborhood Enhancement Program (NEP).** Over seven years old, the Neighborhood Enforcement Program is a joint public-private partnership that focuses on parts of neighborhoods for a 90 day period to clean up blight and improve the quality of life. The police have a large role, along with other city agencies. It shares with CPOP an interest in collaborative work and prevention. Importantly, NEP helps address problems arising from poor property management, including abandoned properties. CPOP projects can be a precuror to NEP involvement by idenfitying and analyzing problems that might be reduced by an NEP effort. During the NEP effort, problem solving is used to tackle problems. CPOP can also be used to help sustain NEP efforts after the end of 90 day period.

**University of Cincinnati, School of Criminal Justice.** Members of the Cincinnati Police Department, as well as a number of community activist, routinely discuss problem solving with faculty at the University of Cincinnati. In addition to getting an outside perspective these discussions sometimes lead to new ideas. Additionally, the ongoing informal relationship with the School of Criminal Justice has led to obtaining grant funding for special projects and research.

The U.S. Justice Department has been pushing police-academic partnerships for a number of years, and has had mixed success at creating enduring effective partnerships. Cincinnati has created such a partnership with no outside funding.

**7. Institutional Learning**

Interviews of police officials indicate a strong interest and knowledge in evidence-based solutions to crime and disorder problems. The CPD has
contributed to this evidence in supporting rigorous evaluations of their efforts. Police personnel routinely consult faculty at the School of Criminal Justice at UC about programs that have been tested elsewhere. A number of police officials keep up with the scientific literature on police operations. Importantly, police routinely consult the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing website when initiating a problem solving effort to determine what other agencies have do to address similar problems.

Though there appears to be a good deal of informal problem information exchange within the CPD, there does not seem to be a formal mechanism for collating lessons from problem solving efforts. Drawing lessons from earlier efforts to deal with a type of problem would be useful for police and community members beginning to tackle a similar problem. These lessons could also be used in training officers. And, in some cases the lessons might help city government develop new programs and ordinances.

### PROBLEM SOLVING EFFORTS

In 2007, the Cincinnati Police inaugurated its Problem-Solving Tracking System. Police working on problems register the problem in the system and add information as they progress. Data from the system can be used to get an overview of the nature of problem solving in Cincinnati. There are some limitations to these data, however. It took some months for police to become fully acclimated to the system, so the earliest efforts sometimes have missing information. Second, though fully computerized, the system is awkward to use and can be an impediment to full documentation if police leadership does not hold officials accountable for using it. This leads to the third limitation. With changes in police leadership, attention to documentation lapsed. Interviews with police officials indicate that they are aware of this and are now attending to it. Nevertheless, the data on past problem solving activities may under count the level of efforts, if officers were engaging in these efforts but did not document their work.

Two hundred sixty one problems were documented in the CPD Problem-Solving Tracking System from 2007 through early 2014. Figure 2 shows that CPD addressed a wide variety of problems. The top graph shows the scope of the problems addressed. The largest category dealt with problem places – typically addresses or street segments. Problems of a larger geographic scale – neighborhood or district – were less common. Problems defined by the nature of the people involved
were the relatively common. The second graph gives another view of the types of problems. Disorder problems – often dealing with so-called “quality of life” concerns – were the most common. This should not be surprising as it is often the case that the most pressing concerns to neighborhood residents are not serious crimes – even in high crime neighborhoods – but other issues that impact their lives. Serious crime problems – property, violence, and drugs – were also common.

**Figure 2: POLICE ADDRESS A VARIETY OF PROBLEM TYPES**

Unfortunately, the data from the tracking system indicate that problem solving activities have declined dramatically. This can be seen in Figure 3. We do not know the maximum caseload of problems the CPD can handle. These efforts take time and effort, so there is an upper limit. Explanations for the decline include leadership changes and the declining size of the CPD. It is worth noting that already in 2014 the number of problem solving efforts exceed all of 2013. So there is reason to be optimistic about police taking on more problems. Interviews with CPD officials also indicate there are reasons to be optimistic.
The duration of problem-solving projects is a rough indicator of the complexity of problems, and the level of effort required. The duration of the problem-solving projects was calculated by counting the number of days from the date the project was opened in the tracking system to the date it was closed. Seventy-seven projects had no closing date. Some of these were opened in the last year, so may still be in progress. However, 45 of the projects without closing dates had some record of the results of the effort, so these are probably no longer active. For those projects with closing dates, Figure 4 makes it clear that the CPD is probably tackling more complex problems than simple ones. Quick turn-around projects are relatively infrequent and longer projects are relatively common.
Police partnered with others in the majority of the problem-solving efforts. In 59.4 percent of the efforts the police had a non-CPD partner, and the average number of partners for projects was two. The most common partner for the police officers addressing problems was another element of the CPD (Figure 5). This might give the misleading impression that the CPD largely partnered with itself. However, in two thirds of the cases where there was a police partner, there was some partner outside the police. The most common partner outside the police department was a business or apartment owner, or community members. The least likely partner was another law enforcement agency. The conclusion one draws from this is that the CPD does look outside its ranks in problem-solving efforts.
Figure 6 shows the types of solutions implemented to reduce the problems. Most projects involved some sort of law enforcement as part or all of the solution. For close to a third of the projects, law enforcement was the only part of the response. Thus, two thirds of the projects involved solutions in addition to or other than law enforcement. Third-party interventions occur when someone other than the victims or offenders take action to resolve the problem. This can be a landlord, store owner, or other party who has control over at least some of the conditions leading to the problem. Importantly, third party interventions are more frequent than law enforcement only responses. Situational refers to “situational crime prevention”. This is an evidence-based approach to change the immediate conditions that facilitate crime, disorder, or other harms. These were not frequently recorded as part of the solutions, despite the fact that these are widely taught approaches for addressing problems. It is worth noting that police in general often neglect to record interesting, creative, and useful approaches to problem solving. Consequently, it is possible that there may have been more use of situational prevention than recorded in the tracking system.
Finally, the tracking system allows us to look at the effectiveness of the problem-solving efforts. Figure 7 shows that for those problems where an outcome was recorded, they were largely successful. Some of the 37 problems without outcomes recorded are still on going. But even if most of these 37 were not successes, successful problem solving efforts vastly outnumber unsuccessful ones. The most common indicator of success was a reduction in the number of crimes or calls for service stemming from the problem. In a little over a third of the problems with recorded outcomes, the officers involved felt the problem was eliminated. Harm reduction was also reasonably common. In these cases, the incidents that continued to occur were less harmful to victims or the community than before the effort began. Improved handling includes problems were people who were involved in the problem were treated better by agencies or private organizations than before (e.g., they received more or better counseling).
Figure 7: PROBLEM SOLVING APPEARS EFFECTIVE

Types of Outcomes – Multiple Types Allowed.

37 cases without dispositions are not counted. At least 12 of these are probably still open.
WHAT ARE THE OPPORTUNITIES FOR IMPROVEMENT AND PROGRESS?

The previous section showed that the CPD has developed a sound infrastructure for supporting problem solving with communities. It also showed that when police engage in problem solving they typically collaborate with non-law enforcement entities. The decline in problem solving, however, is troublesome. This section makes several recommendations for strengthening problem solving and increasing its quantity and quality.

1. MAKE CPOP MORE VISIBLE

Every collaborative problem-solving project is an important example of how to address crime and disorder in Cincinnati. These examples need to have as much prominence with the public as individual crime stories.

a) Publicize problem solving. The Police Public Information Officer should work with the command staff district captains and community partners to identify problem solving efforts worthy of news coverage. These stories will illustrate to the general public how problem solving works better than any other method.

b) Create a CPOP annual report. Annually, the Cincinnati Police Department should produce, either in print or on its webpage, a report to the City Manager and community, on problem solving work in the community. This report should list, by district every problem-solving effort undertaken, the nature of the problem, who in the police department was involved, the community and government partners, and the evidence showing the degree to which the harm stemming from the problem was reduced.

2. MAKE CPOP MORE ACCOUNTABLE

The Cincinnati Police Department has a Problem Solving Tracking System to help manage problem solving and assure accountability. Efforts had been made, in the past, to incorporate reports on problem-solving in the districts in the STARS process. It appears that this excellent idea waned over the last few years. Efforts are underway to bring it back. Implementation of these recommendations may already be underway, at least in part.
a) **Reintegrate problem solving reporting and discussions within the STARS process.** Any police official reporting on crime within their unit should be prepared to discuss any problem solving efforts underway, and what problem solving efforts might be undertaken in the immediate future.

b) **Improve the Problem Solving Tracking System** to provide an accurate and timely accounting of what problem solving efforts are going on within the city. If necessary, update the software to make it more flexible and easier to use. Make it possible for someone to ask for a status report on one, several, or all problem solving efforts and to get an accurate report within 24 hours.

c) **Establish the following data elements for all problem solving efforts:**

   i. The measures that will be used to judge success should be developed by the end of the Scanning stage. These can be quantitative measures, such as calls for service of specific types and crime events, or qualitative measures such as photographs and systematic observations. The measures must be agreed upon by all partners in the problem-solving effort.

   ii. Measurable outcomes should be reported by the end of the Assessment stage. At minimum, for each problem there should be a comparison of the nature of the problem at the beginning, just before the problem-solving effort was undertaken, and at the end, once the response was implemented and operational for at least six months. The data should show how harms from the problem have changed, preferably by declining. If possible, changes in police costs for handling the problem should be documented – e.g., before the problem was addressed the CPD spent X hours of officer time addressing calls associated with the problem, and after implementation of the response, these hours have been reduced to Y, translating into $Z in reduced policing expenses. The total cost of the problem-solving effort was $W, and $Z - $W shows a cost savings.

   iii. A set of key words identifying the characteristics of the problem and the responses should be entered into the data base by the end of the Response stage. This will allow rapid analysis of problems to determine patterns and develop lessons for the police and communities.

d) **Have the Crime Analysis and Problem-Solving Unit conduct effectiveness audits** of a representative sample of problem solving
efforts. The point of the audit is to gain an accurate rigorous account of the average effectiveness of problem solving efforts. So the purpose of the audit is to promote better problem solving. Its purpose is not to uncover misconduct or poor work.

3. MAKE PARTNERSHIPS A CRITICAL ELEMENT

The Collaborative Agreement clearly calls for Community Problem-Oriented Policing. The Cincinnati Police have made great strides in community involvement, but the city cannot remain stagnant. These efforts to involve the community need to be improved. Where earlier efforts may have been unsatisfactory, the police and community need to engage in frank discussions on how to make improvements. It is quite likely that community engagement will vary considerably in form across the city. The central business district, for example, is highly organized with Downtown Cincinnati Incorporated providing a strong leadership role. On the other hand, outreach to the developing Latino community in Cincinnati is in its formative stages.

a) Improve community involvement in CPOP. Residents through neighborhood organizations and other civic institutions are a vital part of community problem solving. However, it is true in every city that in every neighborhood, a relatively few residents do most of the work for these organizations. There are many reasons for this, but probably the most important reason is that most residents have job and family obligations that hinder sustained community involvement. Nevertheless, many residents can help out in addressing short-term problem solving efforts that directly impact their lives, even if they cannot make sustained contributions to their larger community.

b) Engage non-resident stakeholders in neighborhoods. There are many important non-resident participants within neighborhoods, and some of these have a far greater connection to problems than do the residents. Clear examples of these non-resident participants are landlords and business owners. Considerable research shows that in every instance, most landlords and business owners are associated with little or no crime or disorder. At the same time, crime and disorder tends to concentrate on a few addresses, often rental properties or business locations. It is very clear that residents are not complete masters of their own fate in the most crime and disorderly neighborhoods.

Rather than expect local residents to report on who committed crimes, something that some residents find distasteful, police should focus on having residents describe the behavior of the owners and employees of
The objective is to remove conditions that facilitate crime and help offenders. The City of Cincinnati and its Police Department have considerable expertise in this, but it has received far less attention than it should. There is considerable strong evidence that place-based interventions are strong against crime. No city has made progress against crime by exhorting its poorest and most disaffected residents to do more to fight crime. However, placing the burden on the non-resident participants to do their job does play dividends.

c) *Coproduce solutions to problems;* do not present solutions to the community. A recurrent theme in discussions with community members was that while the Cincinnati Police have made extraordinary progress in working with community members, it appears that the police are more comfortable presenting fully formed solutions to the community, rather than developing solutions with the community. Presenting instead of coproducing solutions is quicker, but it is less sustainable and it is certainly not satisfactory.

4. EDUCATE WITH CPOP

The “community” in Community Problem-Oriented Policing is both a blessing and a curse. The blessings are obvious, and are noted throughout this report. The curse is the abilities of communities to deliver on substantive actions to reduce problems is often more aspirational than real, and this ability is highly variable across communities. This is often a major frustration for police who would dearly like to have community partners, but find that the partners cannot deliver. The consequences are varied. Sometimes the police soldier on with the communities bringing up the rear. Sometimes the police back off and focus on problems that they can address without community involvement. Sometimes the inabilities of communities results in conflict between police and community members.

This is not surprising. It is an obstruction in all cities that have attempted some form of police-community engagement. And despite decades of effort, no one has developed a sure-fire, rapid fix to this problem. Additionally, for decades police and elected officials have sold the idea that the public merely needs to report things to the police, that the public are the eyes and ears of the police, and the solution to crime and other public safety concerns is more police. Finally, the public, like the police is woefully misinformed about the causes of crime and disorder. Whether conservative, liberal or in between most people think that the solution to crime and disorder is exclusively through
actions on offenders. The only difference is what actions – more enforcement and sanctions for conservatives, and more public assistance for liberals. Both approaches are largely ineffective and expensive. CPOP charts a third path, but it is a path that is just becoming understood by police and is largely unheard of by most of the public.

So for these reasons, it is critical the citizens of Cincinnati become smarter about the causes of crime, just as many in the Cincinnati Police Department have. The two recommendations that follow address this.

a) **Educate the public.** One of the important results of the Collaborative Agreement was the establishment of the Community Policing Partnering Center. Originally, the Partnering Center was housed within the Urban League, but was a separate organization. It now has been brought within the Urban League. When it began, the Partnering Center assisted communities in developing problem solving efforts along with the police. Unfortunately, it no longer has the staff or resources to assist communities. This is extremely unfortunate.

It is important that a non-governmental organization with strong ties to Cincinnati communities assist residents and businesses. Efforts should be made to revitalize the Partnering Center, focus it on problem-solving related activities and on building a strong community capacity to address problems.

b) **Involve youth in problem solving.** Though Cincinnati is fortunate to have a strong public constituency for community problem-oriented policing, much of the public knows little about it. A number of the earlier recommendations to make CPOP more visible and to increase accountability will help educate the public. Here is another approach that focuses on youth.

For decades, police throughout the US have developed programs to bring police into positive contact with young people, particularly young people from communities where police-youth encounters are often troublesome. Examples of these efforts include School Resource Officers, DARE, and GREAT. The standard approach is for the youth to be passive recipients of police services in a school setting.

CPOP offers a unique opportunity to engage youth in active learning, put them in positive contact with police, and help reduce crime and disorder problems that impact these youth and their neighbors. The idea is to create youth teams that follow the SARA process from start to
finish within a school-based program, with police. Problem-solving efforts will require young people to conduct statistical analysis, interview people, read reports, learn about their community and local government, engage in project management, and advocate for their recommendations. In short, problem solving provides an exciting and relevant learning opportunity, while also giving youth the experience of serving their communities.

Though there are many details to be worked out, there is precedence for this sort of work, from Charlotte North Carolina in the mid-1990s. There are people in the community who already are engaging youth with SARA. Cincinnati has the Community Policing Partnering Center that could spearhead and house this effort. The Cincinnati Police Department has a solid and well managed School Resource Officer program that could adopt a youth problem solving program. Cincinnati also has the UC Schools of Education and Criminal Justice which have strong contacts with the school system and police, and that can provide technical assistance. The Cincinnati Public Schools and the Cincinnati Police Department are critical partners in this. With careful planning, a community-school-policing partnership could develop a youth problem solving program that will not only help educate tomorrow’s community leaders, but will make their communities safer. If done well, this could become a national model.

Critically, by engaging youth in meaningful problem solving with police, the lessons of CPOP will spread to parents, neighbors and others throughout Cincinnati. This will increase the likelihood that young people will assist in problem solving efforts outside an educational setting, and this will make it easier and more productive for police to work with communities resolve problems.

5. LEARN FROM EXPERIENCE

The Cincinnati Police and their community partners have a wealth of experience in problem solving to reduce crime and disorder. A number of the members of the CPD are world class experts in the application of CPOP. Nevertheless, the CPD has not systematically built a learning process into the department, so that lessons from past problem solving efforts can be developed and disseminated within the department and community. Fortunately, the basic infrastructure is available to do this.

a) *Create lessons from problem-solving experience*. Periodic reviews of the Problem-Solving Tracking System should reveal classes of problems police and public frequently encounter. Based on these records, and
interviews of police, public and others involved the CPD should create 1) training for the police and public, 2) procedures for improving the quality of problem solving, and 3) written or web-based guides for handling these problems. The problem specific guides developed by the Center for Problem-Oriented Policing provide a useful framework for this. The Cincinnati guides can be made available to community members, and other police agencies, through the CPD website.

b) Create a problem place strategy. Research indicates that a small fraction of properties are connected to a very large proportion of crime, disorder, and police workload. This finding is so common that it has its own name: The Iron Law of Troublesome Places. Analysis of data from Cincinnati shows that our city is not different. Over half of the problems listed in the Problem-Solving Tracking System dealt with specific locations. City Council has recognized this when it passed its ordinance dealing with nuisance property. Community activists routinely complain about problem properties that create trouble in their neighborhoods. Problem places are so common that the CPD should develop, with community members, a strategy for addressing rental housing, businesses, and other specific addresses that facilitate crime and disorder.

6. SUSTAIN CPOP LEADERSHIP IN THE CPD

There are three things that can be done to assure that the leadership of the CPD has a strong enduring commitment to community problem-oriented policing. This is critical because in any police agency officials retire and are replaced by new officials. Police departments that do not attend to the commitment and knowledge of new leaders routinely lose the ground that they have gained. Of the three recommendations here, the first is relatively easy to accomplish, the second already has a very strong foundation, and the third should not be particularly difficult to address.

a) Strengthen the Chief’s Scholars Program. Given the important positive impact of the Chief’s Scholars Program it is critical that this be continued. It should be strengthened by guaranteeing a minimum of three CPD officials per year.

b) Assure new police understand and can undertake problem solving. The Cincinnati Police Department has built knowledge and experience in problem solving into its promotion process. This needs to be reviewed and updated continuously. All new police hired by the CPD need to be knowledgeable in the basics of problem solving, including any lateral
hires from other police agencies. New from the academy officers in the field training officer program should be partnered with training officers who can demonstrate how problem solving works and can provide the new officer with experience in problem solving. Advancement in rank should be accompanied by additional training and education in problem solving and evidence-based theories of crime and crime prevention.

\[c\) Assure new police leaders understand the value of problem solving.\]

Though problem-oriented policing has been successfully applied in numerous police agencies in the US, Canada, and Great Britain, its long term success depends critically on whether new leadership embraces the strategy. Typically, new chiefs are unfamiliar with community problem-oriented policing and have their own personal strategy. This is true of Cincinnati, but with a big difference. In Cincinnati, we have a public constituency for community problem-oriented policing, and a cadre of knowledgeable and supportive police officials. Thus, unlike most cities, Cincinnati’s gains have not been completely lost. Learning from the last five years, we must assure that any new chiefs of police know about the Collaborative Agreement, and can demonstrate experience and knowledge with a problem-oriented approach. Any future police chief selection processes must make it clear to applicants that community problem-oriented policing is the strategy of the Cincinnati Police Department, and their success in the selection process will depend in part on their ability to demonstrate how they will further this strategy.

Table 2 gives a summary of these recommendations and an indication of who should be primarily responsible – though seldom solely responsible – for carrying out the recommendation.
## Table 2: SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendations</th>
<th>Primary Responsibility for Acting</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Police</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1. Make CPOP more visible</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Publicize problem-solving efforts</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b) Create CPOP annual report</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2. Make CPOP more accountable</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Reintegrate problem solving within STARS®</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Improve Problem Solving Tracking System</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Update data elements within the Problem Solving Tracking System</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Conduct rigorous evaluations of a sample of problem-solving efforts</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>8. Make partnerships a critical element</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Improve community involvement</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>b) Engage non-resident stakeholders</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Co-produce solutions</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>4. Educate with CPOP</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Educate the public</td>
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<tr>
<td>b) Involve youth in problem solving</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>5. Learn from experience</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) Create lessons from problem-solving experience</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td>b) Create a problem place strategy</td>
<td>x</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>6. Sustain CPOP leadership in the CPD</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>a) Strengthen the Chief’s Scholars Program</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>b) Assure new police understand and can undertake problem solving*</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Assuring new leaders value problem solving</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
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* Efforts known to be underway
SOME FINAL THOUGHTS ON POLICING IN CINCINNATI

Policing is expensive and will become increasingly so. Most of the costs are personnel costs, but because we demand skillful handling of complex events, we cannot afford a police service of cheap, unskilled, poorly trained, and weakly led foot soldiers. This means that cities must find cost effective ways of addressing crime. Simply adding police is not a sustainable option. First, there is extremely little evidence that hiring more police has a substantial impact on crime. Second, adding police as primary response to crime does not address the more critical factor in police effectiveness; the strategy for fighting crime. The strongest evidence available supports the use of problem-oriented policing to address crime, disorder, and other problems. Third, when police can work with the public, particularly in those areas with the most crime, they are more likely to be effective and the costs of policing are less. Fourth, greater emphasis needs to be placed on pushing crime solutions back onto the shoulders of those who have created conditions that facilitate crime. When a business, for example, creates criminogenic conditions, that business is imposing a cost on neighboring businesses and residents, and on tax payers. If the police are expected to bear the full responsibility for addressing the resulting crime, tax payers are subsidizing this business. A better solution is for the police, with assistance from city government and local residents, to shift the responsibility, and costs, for reducing these crimes onto the business that created the situation. This not only reduces crime, but reduces the costs to tax payers.
APPENDIX A -- A BRIEF GUIDE TO COMMON POLICE STRATEGIES

Since the 1980s police and researchers have put forward a number of strategies for improving the police. Few strategies are carefully defined and they often overlap. Consequently, there is considerable confusion over the strategies. With the proliferation of strategies since 2000, police agencies sometimes lurch from one to the other, depending on the publicity the newest strategy receives. The proliferation of strategies will probably continue.

The strategies are listed in alphabetical order. Following the general policing strategies are descriptions of approaches to crime that have been widely used within the context of CPOP.

GENERAL POLICING STRATEGIES

**Broken-Windows Policing** – This strategy is an outgrowth of community policing in the 1980s. Its central thesis is that if disorder is not addressed it leads to more disorder and crime in a community and a downward spiral. Police are to intervene early to restore order and allow citizens to take back their community. Evidence for broken-windows policing effectiveness is scarce, indirect, and controversial. It is often associated with a zero-tolerance approach, though this is not a necessary component.

**COMPSTAT** – The name comes from *Computer Statistics* and originated in the New York Police Department in the mid-1990s. It holds district commanders accountable for reducing crime, through the use of crime maps and other statistical information presented to command staff at regular meetings. Evidence for effectiveness at reducing crime is anecdotal, at best. It has greatest value as an internal management-accountability method.

**COP** – Community policing. This is a strategy to engage police more with community members. It is one of the earliest police reform strategies. Though it is vague, and hard to define, elements of it are widely used. There is some evidence that it can reduce fear of crime, and increase citizen perceptions of police legitimacy. It is best used as a foundation upon which to build a strong problem-solving capacity.
**CPOP** – Community Problem-oriented Policing. See the main body of this report for more details. This is the only strategy that started out with a clear set of core principles, has systematically developed over time, and is connected with a large scale scientific research program. The Center for Problem Oriented Policing maintains a comprehensive website with information on the strategy, training and educational materials, and scientific reports (www.popcenter.org). The website also contains an extensive series of guides to addressing common problems, as well as guides describing when common police tactics are useful and when they are not.

**Evidence-Based Policing** – A general approach that advocates selecting police programs and practices based on the scientific evidence for their effectiveness. It is highly complementary of CPOP as CPOP has strong evidence behind it, uses evidence in formulating solutions to problems, and uses evidence to determine if these solutions worked.

**Hot-Spots Policing** – A general term for any policing strategy that deploys officers to small (sub-neighborhood) concentrations of crime and disorder. It is used within a COMPSTAT approach and with other strategies. There is strong evidence that this strategy does reduce crime and disorder, but the impacts are short term, and variable. There is some evidence that crime is more likely to displace from a hot spots intervention than from CPOP interventions. In head-to-head comparisons, CPOP tends to outperform hot-spots policing in crime reduction and generates much less displacement.

**Intelligence-led Policing** – Developed in Great Britain in the late 1990s, it relies heavily on developing and using intelligence on criminal groups and individuals. It is not well defined, and some advocates describe it as a variant of problem-oriented policing. There is evidence for its use, though the experiments could equally be used to support hot-spots policing or CPOP.

**Predictive-Policing** – A very new approach that uses highly sophisticated software to forecast where crime will occur. It is a variant of hot spots policing. The evidence for its effectiveness (beyond the effectiveness of hot spots policing) is too limited to draw a conclusion. Much of the promotion for it comes from businesses selling software to local governments and police.
APPROACHES TO CRIME AND DISORDER

**Focused-Deterrence (e.g. CIRV)** – Unlike the above, focused deterrence is not a general policing strategy. It is a way of curbing the activities of highly active networked offenders that can be used under a number of different strategies, including Community Problem-Oriented Policing. It originated in Boston, in the mid-1990s as a problem-oriented policing project to reduce youth homicide. It has been widely used and tested, with generally good results. It is the operating principle behind the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV). Because focused-deterrence programs alter the immediate crime situation faced by a potential offender, these programs overlap with situational crime prevention.

**Situational Crime Prevention** – This is an approach to preventing crime that focuses on changing the immediate physical and social environments of crime. It originated in Great Britain in the early 1980s and has been used world-wide to address a wide variety of crimes, from minor youth disorders, to terrorism and maritime piracy. Situational crime prevention focuses on crime events, not criminality, though it has been expanded to use to control disorder and traffic problems. It is the principle tool of officers engaged in CPOP and is widely taught to police involved in problem solving. It relies only to a very limited extent on law enforcement so it reduces crime by keeping people from behaving like offenders. There is strong scientific evidence that Situational Crime Prevention is effective, and it has the least tendency to displace crime (typically crime is not displaced with this approach and more often prevention spread outward from the point of the intervention).
APPENDIX B -- SIMON AND SABEL LETTER

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Dear Chief Blackwell,

As promised, we're writing to report our impressions from our visit last month.

It is clear to us that Cincinnati's reputation as a leader in Problem-Oriented Policing is well-deserved, and we are grateful for the opportunity to observe the department at close hand. The STARS meeting illustrates that the capacity for the identification and analysis of underlying problems is well developed among the department's leadership. In addition, our conversations with Captains Gerard, Lee, and Neville, Lts. Herold and Hammer, Officers Saye, Lorenz, and Epstein suggested that problem-solving methodologies and practices are diffused throughout the department. Many of the people we spoke to were collaborating enthusiastically and productively with academics at the University of Cincinnati, especially Professors John Eck and Robin Engel. This relationship seems unusually deep and highly valuable.

We are not experts on policing, and even if we were, we would hesitate to offer advice on the basis of such a short visit. No doubt the assessment Professor Eck is currently working on will be of more value to you. Nevertheless, it's possible that our work in other areas of public administration might provide a relevant perspective, and sometimes it is helpful to have an outside view. With that qualification, we point to four areas that strike us as involving important open questions or opportunities for growth.

1. Formal problem-solving process. You, Colonel Humphries, and several others we talked to mentioned that the formal problem-solving process is not being fully implemented. As we understand it, the Form 560 designed to initiate the process is not commonly used, and the Problem-Solving Tracking Process has fallen into disuse, in part because of the inadequacy of its
software. Since your current intention to improve documentation of problem-solving is likely to require new software, this might be a good time to review the entire formal process. Ideally, the process serves three functions. It enables the department and collaborating stakeholders to identify and locate efforts and solutions that have relevance to problems that they are working on. It enables the department to explain its efforts to the public. And it imposes intellectual discipline on analysis in the problem-solving process. The SARA process that you have adopted presumes that people think and communicate most clearly when they are documenting what they are doing. The Tracking Process appears to be most important for the first and third purpose. With respect to the purpose of public explanation, it might be useful to consider resuming something like the Annual Reports on Problem-Solving that were done for 2004-06. We are not sure what the ideal form of public communication of problem-solving is, but we found these reports to be exceptionally valuable.

2. Central Support for Line Problem-Solving Efforts. On our visit, we heard about many sophisticated problem-solving efforts in the divisions. We wonder if there might be a stronger role for the center in supporting these efforts. We assume that efforts to improve documentation and data collection will be managed from the center. We also assume—the we were not able to discuss it specifically on our visit—that efforts by the analysts in the intelligence division support problem-solving efforts. But problem-solving processes can benefit from the exchange of specific types of information, such as best practices and lessons learned, that may not fall within the traditional sphere of intelligence. In addition, they benefit from technical assistance on activities specific to problem-solving, such as the SARA process, and from quality assurance review. We are not sure what the proper allocation of these activities between center and line is. We heard many interesting thoughts on these issues during our visit. It might be useful to try to coordinate the discussions that are now going on with a study group charged with reporting on these matters.

3. Innovative Quality Assurance or Peer Review Processes. An element that we have found important in problem-solving systems in other fields— including health care, education, and child protective services—is quality assurance processes in which a sample of projects are periodically assessed intensively by reviewers not directly involved in the projects. The reviewers may come from outside the agency or from other divisions of it, and they may be hierarchical superiors of the teams being reviewed or peers of co-equal rank. The reviews are sometimes attached to promotional or compensation decisions, but their most important function is usually improvement and professional development. Such processes provide a valuable supplement to the use of outcome indicators such as crime rates or calls for service as measures of success. Since outcomes are influenced by forces other than agency efforts, exclusive reliance on such indicators can be misleading. It appears that quality assurance processes of this kind are less developed in policing than in other fields (although we have heard of interesting efforts of this kind in connection with problem-oriented policing in the United Kingdom.) Innovation along these lines might be a natural step for your department.

4. Self-Presentation on the Web-Site. In view of Cincinnati's national reputation as a leader in problem-oriented policing, we were surprised at the low-profile of problem-solving activities on the department's generally excellent website. The main discussion of problem-solving occurs in documents several years old that appear under a link entitled "Collaborative
Agreement.” One could get the misleading idea that this is all history. It might be useful to feature more prominently the general approach and specific current efforts.

Please forgive us if some of these views reflect ignorance of relevant facts or considerations. We only hope that they are interesting or useful enough to interest the CPD in further conversation.

Sincerely,

William H. Simon
Arthur Levitt Professor of Law

Charles F. Sabel
Maurice T. Moore Professor of Law

Cc: Alphonse Gerhardstein
APPENDIX C – SOME NOTES ON CIRV

CIRV, the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence, is a form of focused deterrence (see Appendix A). The purpose of CIRV is to reduce group related killings. There is strong evidence it was achieving this objective when it was fully operational. Unfortunately, like CPOP, changes in leadership resulted in an erosion of CIRV with the possible result that more young African-American males were killed in Cincinnati than would have been if CIRV had continued at full operational status. Very recently, efforts have been made to renew CIRV.

Unlike many violence reduction initiatives police across the U.S. have tried, CIRV uses a highly focused approach to law enforcement. Rather than take a zero-tolerance approach to minor offenses that are statistically correlated with violence, CIRV targets those criminal groups directly involved in the most serious violence. Rather than arresting many small time offenders, which seldom reduces violence, CIRV reserves major sanctions for the very few individuals involved in serious violence.

CIRV was designed around three principles. First, offender groups need to receive a direct credible threat that engagement in killing will result in a strong immediate action that will break up the group. Second, offender groups need to know that the community does not support their behavior, but it will welcome back former offenders who leave the criminal groups. Third, offenders will be more likely to leave criminal groups if they are offered services leading to rehabilitation, jobs, or education. The evidence, unfortunately, suggests that third principle is incorrect: service provision is ineffective. The evidence is unclear how useful the second principle is to reducing killings. The evidence clearly supports the focused deterrence message imbedded in the first message.

Despite the demonstrated success of the focused-deterrence aspects of CIRV, this strategy is difficult to maintain. It requires considerable coordination and cooperation among organizations who may not often share the priority of the Cincinnati Police to reduce killings. Further, debates over how street workers should be used to direct offenders to services has dominated much of the public discussion over CIRV, and diverted attention from the fact that the priority is murder reduction.

A third issue is that CIRV must continuously adapt to the offender groups. Tactics that were useful earlier loose effectiveness as
offenders adapt. This is particularly true of the methods for delivering credible messages to offenders.

As noted in Appendix A, the roots of CIRV like programs are in problem solving. Further, CIRV and CPOP share a commitment to analysis and evidence. The need for continued adaptation and building effective interagency collaboration suggests that CIRV could use a more prominent problem solving approach to the category of problems it was designed to address.
HOW THIS REPORT WAS DEVELOPED

This report was funded by the Greater Cincinnati Foundation, through the Community Policing Partnering Center of the Cincinnati Urban League. The author, John E. Eck interviewed a wide variety of Cincinnati Police officials knowledgeable about problem solving, and members of the community who have been involved in problem solving and in the creation and implementation of the Collaborative Agreement. William Simon and Charles Sabel, of Columbia University, shared a very helpful letter to Chief Blackwell (Appendix B). Eck was assisted in this effort by a graduate student, Shamma Hickling, who reviewed the Cincinnati Police records of problem solving efforts. Iris Roley facilitated a number of the community meetings. John Eck combined the information about the status of problem solving in Cincinnati with his extensive experience with problem oriented policing, problem solving, and crime prevention to develop the recommendations.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author thanks the Greater Cincinnati Foundation for funding this report. Without the foundation’s support, the research would not have been possible. Al Gerhardstein also must be thanked for his championing a review of CPOP and the need for this report. Iris Roley provided considerable advice and insight throughout this project. Shamma Hickling, a graduate student at the University of Cincinnati, diligently examined police records of problem solving and developed an analyzable data base from which the figures in this report were derived. Finally, and most significantly, the author thanks the citizens of Cincinnati who gave their time for interviews and discussions of CPOP, and the police officials in Cincinnati who were forthright in their discussions of the past, present and future of CPOP.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR

John E. Eck is professor of criminal justice at the University of Cincinnati. He joined the faculty at UC in 1998 after spending 20 years working with police agencies to improve their operations. He has a doctorate in Criminology from the University of Maryland, and a Masters in Public Policy from the University of Michigan. From 1984 through 1987, he headed the research team that examined the first full-scale implementation of a problem-oriented strategy in a police agency. His research teams have been responsible for developing a number of the standard techniques, now used world-wide, to solve policing problems, including the SARA process and problem triangle.

He has worked with numerous police agencies across the United States, Canada, and Great Britain. These include manuals for police on crime and intelligence analysis, and problem-specific guides on robbery and crowd violence. Dr. Eck is the author of many reports for police on how to improve problem solving and has published papers for academics on crime patterns, crime mapping, and high crime locations. He served on the National Academy of Sciences panel on police policy and research, and co-directed the writing of the chapter on police effectiveness in the panel’s final report.

In 2001, he was asked to work with the litigants and the Fraternal Order Police to help develop what would become the Collaborative Agreement. Dr. Eck serves on the Downtown Cincinnati Incorporated Safe and Clean Committee, is a member of the City Manager’s Advisory Group, and the Police Chief’s Advisory Board. He lives, with his wife of 37 years, in Cincinnati.