Personnel Review
Submitted to the University of Cincinnati
February 29, 2016
A. INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In the wake of the July 19, 2015 shooting death of Samuel DuBose, which occurred during a traffic stop by former University of Cincinnati Police Department (“UCPD” or the “Department”) Police Officer Raymond Tensing,¹ the University of Cincinnati (“UC” or the “University”) retained Exiger, LLC (“Exiger” or the “team”) to conduct a top-to-bottom review of UCPD’s policies and practices (the “Assignment”). This report represents Exiger’s findings relative to a critical issue that arose during our initial week of fact finding.

Specifically, on the first day of on-campus interviews with UC administrators and UCPD personnel, an apparently irreconcilable set of facts emerged regarding the pre-July 19th, 2015 knowledge by UCPD Chief Jason Goodrich (“Chief Goodrich” or the “Chief”) as to the extent of, and motivation for, the dramatic increase in traffic stops by UCPD officers after the Chief took over the Department in November 2014.² During that period, the number of traffic stops and traffic citations increased by almost 400 percent.

In our initial interview, Chief Goodrich indicated that he was unaware of both the extent of, and motivation for, this substantial upsurge in stops. As Exiger learned from other interviews, the Chief had made similar assertions to several senior UC administrators at various times following the shooting. These assertions—both to Exiger and the administrators—could not be reconciled with interviews that Exiger conducted of sworn UCPD members, or with documents that Exiger had received by request pursuant to the Assignment.

Exiger viewed this seemingly conflicting information as sufficiently troubling to bring the matter to the attention of the UC Administration, including the UC General Counsel. The University requested that Exiger undertake an immediate, confidential investigation to determine Chief Goodrich’s knowledge of these matters, and whether he had misled the Exiger team and UC senior administrators. Exiger promptly initiated this additional assignment (the “Personnel Review”), commencing a series of interviews on February 24, 2016. During one of these first interviews, Major Timothy Thornton, Chief Goodrich’s second-in-command, made statements mirroring those of the Chief—that is, denying knowledge regarding the extent of, and motivation for, the sharp rise in traffic stops during the Chief’s tenure. In light of Major Thornton’s statements, and again in consultation with

¹ Shortly after the incident, the University of Cincinnati retained Kroll to perform an administrative review of Tensing’s conduct during the events leading up to the shooting. Kroll concluded that, in fact, Tensing had violated UCPD policies and procedures, as well as police best practices. Review and Investigation of Officer Raymond M. Tensing’s Use of Deadly Force on July 19, 2015: University of Cincinnati Police Department, Summary of Key Findings, Aug. 31, 2015, http://www.uc.edu/content/dam/uc/safety-reform/documents/Kroll%20Report%20of%20Investigation%208.31.2015.pdf (“Kroll Report”). As a result of separate criminal proceedings, a Hamilton County grand jury charged Tensing with murder. He is set to be tried later in 2016.

² Not only was Tensing conducting an off-campus traffic stop during the encounter that led to the shooting of DuBose, but two additional UCPD patrol cars that first responded to the scene were—at the same time of the shooting—each performing their own separate off-campus traffic stops. Kroll Report at 31.
senior UC administrators and the General Counsel, Exiger broadened its review to investigate the Major’s knowledge regarding the traffic stop issue.

It bears emphasis that, through this supplemental review and report, Exiger is not passing judgment—good or bad—on the use of traffic stops as a method of proactive policing. That was neither the purpose nor within the scope of the Personnel Review. Our focus, simply, was to examine the potential misrepresentations by Chief Goodrich and Major Thornton about their knowledge of, and motivation for, the significant increased use of traffic stops by UCPD officers. Moreover, we set forth only our factual findings and conclusions. Exiger makes no recommendation concerning if, or how, the University should act on the basis of these findings and conclusions.

With these noted provisos, based on our findings, it is the Exiger team’s view that Chief Goodrich and Major Thornton were untruthful with both Exiger and the UC Administration, misrepresenting their knowledge as to significant increased use of off-campus traffic stops by UCPD officers during the Chief’s tenure. Indeed, as explained below, it was clear that Chief Goodrich embraced the aggressive use of such stops as part of his policing philosophy, that he communicated this philosophy in manifold ways to his officers (supervisors and rank-and-file alike), and that this precipitated the spike in traffic stops leading up to the shooting death of Samuel DuBose. As Exiger found, these misrepresentations, combined with other factors detailed in this report, resulted in the Chief and Major losing the confidence and support from many of their subordinate UCPD officers.

For his part, in our final interview, Chief Goodrich insisted that many of these issues could have been attributable to a series of miscommunications between himself, senior UC administrators, the Exiger team, and his own officers. For myriad reasons described below, we do not view this claim as either plausible or credible. And irrespective of whether some genuine misunderstanding occurred, such a sustained failure to communicate in so many contexts, to so many different stakeholders, calls into question Chief Goodrich’s ability to perform his job effectively. Additionally, Exiger’s findings implicate basic failures of both Chief Goodrich and Major Thornton to gather information, assess risk, and exercise managerial oversight. In short, even crediting the Chief’s unlikely version of events, the Exiger team’s findings still plainly implicate bedrock issues of competence.

B. METHODOLOGY

From February 24-26, 2016, as part of the Personnel Review, a four-person Exiger team visited UC and interviewed 14 UC employees of varying positions and ranks from both the UC Administration and UCPD, ranging from the President of the University to UCPD line officers and unsworn personnel.3 The team interviewed Major Thornton on February 24th (one of our first interviews during the Personnel Review), and Chief Goodrich on February 25th (our final interview). Exiger had previously interviewed the Chief on February 16th. The team also obtained and reviewed various documents including, but not limited to: internal UCPD memoranda; emails among UCPD officers and supervisors; minutes from the

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3 The Exiger team consisted of Jeff Schlanger, Roberto “Taz” Villaseñor, Beth Corriea, and Timothy C. Stone.
bimonthly meetings of the UC Crime Reduction Committee (meetings attended by, among others, senior officers from UCPD and the Cincinnati Police Department, as well as UC administrators); maps of UCPD patrol or “beat” zones; daily UCPD crime and statistical reports; and media stories (both in print and video form) relating to the shooting death of Samuel DuBose and its aftermath.

Although this targeted review was not intended to be a deep dive into UCPD’s policies regarding traffic and pedestrian stops, it was important for Exiger to accurately understand the relevant statistics for those stops relative to Chief Goodrich’s time with the Department. Consequently, the team examined data regarding the frequency of traffic stops, citations, and arrests from both before and after UC hired Chief Goodrich in November 2014, along with other pertinent information. That data reflected, among other things:

• Prior to Chief Goodrich’s arrival, stops were averaging 86.5 per month. Subsequent to his arrival, stops were averaging 271.5 per month, a more than threefold increase.4
• Prior to Chief Goodrich’s arrival, citations were averaging 64.5 per month. Subsequent to his arrival, citations jumped to a monthly average of 256, an almost fourfold increase.5
• During the two months prior to the shooting death of Samuel Dubose, stops and citations hit an all time high with an average of 412 stops per month in those two months, and an average of 392.5 citations.6

C. STATEMENTS AT ISSUE

1. Chief Goodrich

On February 16, 2016, as part of Exiger’s initial Assignment, the team first interviewed Chief Goodrich. The discussion covered various topics, from the Chief’s background and hiring by the University in November 2014, to problems he encountered with the UCPD and improvements he implemented. The team specifically questioned Chief Goodrich about UCPD’s use of off-campus traffic stops as a policing tool at the time of the shooting death of Samuel DuBose in July 2015, underscoring the nearly fourfold increase in the number of such stops that began shortly after he assumed command of the Department. In answering, Chief Goodrich said that Raymond Tensing, before joining UCPD, had worked at a local police department where it was part of the culture to generate traffic stops. The Chief stated that, prior to the shooting, he did not know that his own officers were performing traffic stops off-campus. He emphasized that UCPD had historically not produced end-of-shift reports. The Chief characterized the increase of such traffic stops under his watch as a “blind spot.”

That same week, the Exiger team also interviewed several senior UC administrators. Chief Goodrich’s statements to Exiger—denying knowledge of the routine practice of conducting off-campus traffic stops, and of the spike in such stops under his leadership—

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4 Covering the period of time from July 2013 through October 2014 versus November 2014 through June 2015.
5 Covering the period from July 2013 through October 2014 versus November 2014 through June 2015.
6 Covering the period of May and June 2015.
largely matched what the Chief had conveyed to those administrators on repeated occasions since the shooting. In particular, consistent statements were made to:

- **UC Vice President for Safety and Reform Dr. Robin Engel**

  Following the shooting and after assuming her new role as Vice President for Safety and Reform, when she learned that UCPD officers were conducting off-campus traffic stops, Dr. Engel asked Chief Goodrich about whether he knew of this practice; the Chief said that he had not known. After gathering statistical data and discovering that UCPD officers were not only routinely conducting such stops, but with markedly increased frequency during the Chief’s tenure, Dr. Engel once more addressed the issue with Chief Goodrich. Again, the Chief insisted that he was unaware of these off-campus stops. Dr. Engel then compiled the data relating to the race of those being stopped, which reflected notable disparities, especially in some officers, between black and white drivers. At that point, Dr. Engel spoke to the Chief for a third time. The Chief stated that he had been unaware of the racial data and observed, “They might be profiling.”

- **UC Director of Public Safety Jim Whalen**

  In early August 2015, the University hired Jim Whalen, formerly the CPD Assistant Police Chief, to serve as Director of Public Safety, a newly created position within the University; Chief Goodrich reported directly to Whalen. Soon after his arrival, Whalen asked Chief Goodrich specifically whether the Chief knew about the fourfold increase in traffic stops; the Chief responded unequivocally that he did not know.

- **Senior Vice President for Administration and Finance Bob Ambach**

  On at least two occasions, Chief Goodrich told Bob Ambach that he was unaware that his officers were performing traffic stops. Dr. Engel was present on one of those occasions. Chief Goodrich had never told Ambach that he used traffic stops as a method of crime control.

- **UC President Santa Ono**

  After the shooting, Chief Goodrich told President Ono that he had been unaware that his officers were conducting off-campus traffic stops.

2. **Major Thornton**

On February 24, 2016, the Exiger team interviewed Major Timothy Thornton, Chief Goodrich’s second-in-command; this was one of the first interviews for the Personnel Review. The Major had previously served as a lieutenant under Jason Goodrich when he was Chief of the Lamar University Police Department in Beaumont, Texas. Major Thornton volunteered that he was extremely loyal to Chief Goodrich.

As relevant here, when asked about the surge in traffic enforcement after Chief Goodrich arrived at UCPD, Major Thornton insisted that the Chief was not an aggressive proponent of traffic stops, but rather sought “balanced” policing. According to the Major, balance entailed a “small” amount of traffic enforcement coupled with community-oriented policing and foot patrols; traffic was “not essential.” He attributed the dramatic rise in traffic
stops to a clique of four or five aggressive “outlier” officers (including Raymond Tensing), compounded by, among other issues, a poor command structure and an insufficient Field Training Officer program. Before the shooting, UCPD did not have “systems” to track the metrics of its officers’ conduct. He acknowledged that UCPD produced officer-activity reports, that these reports reflected the number of traffic stops, and that he saw these reports. Nonetheless, he did not examine the relevant data. Like the Chief, and in remarkably similar terms, the Major characterized the issue of off-campus traffic stops as his “blind spot.”

In addition, Major Thornton said that no one had directed UCPD officers to conduct more traffic stops, and that little discussion of traffic enforcement occurred between himself and the captains (his immediate subordinates), or between himself and the Chief. In fact, he claimed that did not ever speak directly to the Chief about traffic enforcement. A member of the Exiger team noted that, given the Major’s admittedly close relationship with the Chief and the fact that the two men spoke frequently, it was odd that they did not discuss the issue of traffic stops. In response, Thornton said that he did not realize that traffic stops were an “issue,” reiterating that this was his “blind spot.”

D. KNOWLEDGE OF TRAFFIC STOPS

As the Exiger team learned, the statements described above—in which Chief Goodrich and Major Thornton disclaimed knowledge regarding the use of off-campus traffic stops during the Chief’s tenure—were belied by an array of evidence that, taken collectively, is overwhelming. Based on Exiger’s investigation, including interviewing more than a dozen UC employees and examining numerous documents, no question exists that Chief Goodrich embraced the use of traffic stops as a key part of his proactive policing philosophy, that he actively encouraged his officers to make more stops, and that both he and the Major knew about—or, at the very least, were manifestly on notice of, and indeed had engendered—the spike in traffic stops that began shortly after the Chief arrived at UCPD.

1. Chief Goodrich’s Email Response to Traffic Citation Statistics for March 2015

A UCPD officer provided Exiger with an email to Chief Goodrich and several other senior UCPD members (including Major Thornton), along with the email response that the Chief sent to these same individuals; both emails were dated April 7, 2015. The email that the Chief received contains the subject line “citations since 3/1/2015,” and consists of a list of citations—categorized by charge—that UCPD officers had issued from March 1 to April 7, 2015; the list is entitled “Criminal/Moving Citations by Charge.” Each charge indicates the number of corresponding citations issued, and the end of the document reflects the “Grand Total” charges for the noted period of time. Of the 46 types of charges, 40 are labeled “TRAFFIC TICKET,” with each containing further identifying information (e.g., speeding, failure to wear seat belt, no front license plate, driving without insurance, etc.). Of the 290 total citations, 263—i.e., approximately 91 percent—were for traffic charges.

Chief Goodrich emailed a short response to these statistics: “Not bad, a little light for over a month but progress. Thanks for sharing.” In our second interview with the Chief, described more fully below, the Chief, himself, brought up this email, indicating that there was an email that had been sent to him and to which he replied, which might have given a
misimpression. Without referencing the exact wording of the reply, the Chief indicated that his reply—which he (mis)quoted as “A good start”—was meant to refer to the attempt to gather statistics, rather than to the quantity of stops themselves.

Notably, UCPD issued 619 total citations from January through March 2015. One year earlier, during January through March 2014, UCPD had issued 141 total citations, an increase of 439 percent.7

2. Frequency of Stops Raised in Command Staff Meeting

UCPD leadership, including Chief Goodrich and Major Thornton, participate in a daily Command Staff Meeting with senior members of UCPD (lieutenants and above). Three interviewees recounted one such meeting, approximately two or three months before the shooting death of Samuel DuBose, when the head of the UCPD communications center—which oversees the University’s 911 dispatch system—expressed concern over the dramatic increase in traffic stops and citations. The communications officer presented statistics at the meeting reflecting that UCPD had conducted more stops in one month than during the entire previous year. Chief Goodrich and Major Thornton responded to this information by stating that UCPD should “keep up the good work,” with one adding that UCPD should be “doing even more” and that it was a “good start.”

After voicing his concern over what might be viewed as dissension at the Command Staff Meeting, Major Thornton called the communications officer into a separate meeting to ensure that they were “on the same page”; he and the Major discussed the wisdom of UCPD performing so many traffic stops. Not long after that additional meeting, the Major expelled the communications officer from future Command Staff Meetings.8

The Exiger team interviewed the communications officer, who is an unsworn member of UCPD. He described his “alarm” at the increase in the frequency of traffic stops under Chief Goodrich—in his view, UCPD had gone from being a law enforcement agency to a “traffic department.” He noted that UCPD’s use of a license plate reader had contributed to this upsurge, and that the rise in stops had yielded a spike in potentially dangerous vehicle pursuits.

3. Chief Goodrich’s Communication of his Approach to Traffic Stops

Five interviewees said that, at the start of Chief Goodrich’s tenure, he held one-on-one meetings with each UCPD officer. During these meetings, the Chief described his approach to proactive policing—namely, the area around campus should be viewed as a “box,” and UCPD would use traffic enforcement to “stop” and root out anyone carrying drugs or guns, and individuals with warrants, in those zones. They were, according to the Chief, to be

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7 From January through March 2014, UCPD conducted 266 traffic stops. During that same three-month period in 2015, UCPD conducted 638 stops, embodying an increase of nearly 240 percent.

8 A lieutenant whom Exiger interviewed said that he, too, raised the issue during meetings that lieutenants and their supervisors attended, including the Chief and Major. He recalled complaining that, for example, UCPD lacked the training, resources, and equipment to handle vehicles that fled during traffic stops.
effectively “no fly zones” through which, via excessive traffic enforcement, criminals would not want to drive.

Shortly thereafter, Chief Goodrich promoted two officers to key supervisory roles, summoning them into his office. He showed them a video from Lamar University where, as noted, he had previously served as the Chief of the Lamar University Police Department. Like the University of Cincinnati, Lamar University is an urban campus surrounded by pockets of high-crime areas. The video, which was set to music, was described as evoking the opening scene of the television program *Cops*: Lamar University Police Department officers chasing down and arresting “bad guys.” Chief Goodrich told the two newly promoted officers that “this” was what he wanted for UCPD. As these supervisors understood it, the Chief was relating that officers should be going out and doing traffic stops. The Exiger team, notably, viewed a separate video concerning Lamar University: a local television news segment about the Lamar University Police Department during Chief Goodrich’s tenure there (Goodrich was interviewed on camera during parts of the video). At one point, a Lamar University police officer described his typical routine as, “Lots of traffic stops, lots of patrols.”

Chief Goodrich conveyed this same directive to newly hired UCPD officers. One of the officers that we interviewed, whom UCPD hired in February 2015, recounted how Chief Goodrich addressed the class of new officers during their first two or three weeks of training. This officer took notes when the Chief spoke: Chief Goodrich described the Department’s mission as to make proactive traffic stops to look for guns and drugs and to check for open warrants, balanced with community engagement. The goal was to push certain types of illegal activity out of the neighborhoods around campus. This was apparently well received among the new officers, as it accorded with what they had learned during the recruitment process—namely, that UCPD was a high-enforcement agency.

Major Thornton, likewise, clearly knew about and embraced this type of proactive policing. After the shooting death of Samuel DuBose, the Mayor of Cincinnati issued an emergency ordinance restricting traffic enforcement by UCPD to the University’s geographic boundaries pending further review. Two interviewees noted that, at a subsequent meeting of UCPD leadership, Major Thornton said, in apparent exasperation, “How the hell are we going to get guns and drugs off the street?”—referring to the restrictive effect of the new ordinance.

4. **Additional Evidence**

Other evidence only further confirmed that Chief Goodrich and Major Thornton promoted, and certainly knew of, UCPD’s significant use of off-campus traffic stops. These included:

- Chief Goodrich has his assistant prepare for him a “Daily Management Report,” which contains a brief narrative of every incident involving his officers from the prior day. The Exiger team reviewed a copy of one such Daily Management Report.

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10 According to one interviewee, there had, in fact, been some guns recovered during traffic stops in the relevant period.
The top of the document includes a “Daily Activity Summary” that identifies the statistics for various categories of police activity. These categories include, among others, “Traffic Stops, Warning” and “Traffic Stops, Citation.” These statistics clearly showed the dramatic increase of stops and citations. The Chief nonetheless indicated that he was not aware of this increase due to the absence of any prior year data from the report.

- UCPD issued “beat” maps showing patrol zones for UCPD patrol cars on- and off-campus. These maps were laminated and distributed to supervisors in a spiral binder, posted in the stationhouse, and placed in the patrol cars. In one of the maps that the team examined—titled “2nd Shift Overlap Beats,” denoting the patrol zones during the period of overlap between the second and third beats—two boxed-in geographic areas are marked “Traffic Safety Vehicle.” Within the Traffic Safety Vehicle zones, according to a senior member of UCPD, officers were encouraged to write every ticket possible to deter criminals from entering. Chief Goodrich reportedly wanted to expand traffic enforcement to its own dedicated, non-overlap shift.

- Multiple interviewees noted that Chief Goodrich had ordered two new motorcycles for the Department, which were intended for traffic enforcement purposes and to form part of a dedicated Traffic Safety Unit. Although purchasing the motorcycles, UCPD abandoned the plan to use them for traffic stops after the shooting death of Samuel DuBose.

- The Exiger team encountered a nearly uniform perception among those interviewed in the UCPD rank and file that Chief Goodrich—based on his comments to the media in the wake of the shooting along with additional factors—was attempting to disclaim ownership of the aggressive traffic stop culture that the Chief had personally nurtured. In other words, that Chief Goodrich was now distancing himself from his explicit promotion of traffic stops as a key policing tool.

E. FINAL INTERVIEW OF CHIEF GOODRICH

On February 26, 2016, the Exiger team interviewed Chief Goodrich for the second time; it was the final interview that Exiger conducted as part of the Personnel Review. At the outset, a member of the Exiger team advised the Chief of the interview’s purpose: to clarify his remarks from the previous interview—and remarks he had reportedly made to members of the UC Administration—that he had been unaware of the use of traffic stops under his watch, a practice that the Chief had described as a “blind spot” in his managerial oversight.11

For his part, Chief Goodrich now maintained that, during the earlier interview, he had not been referencing traffic stops, but rather: (1) the racial data underpinning those stops; and (2) the fact that Tensing, and a “clique” of outlier UCPD officers, were conducting a disproportionate number of those stops. The Chief said that he of course knew that his

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11 There were clear signs that, before this interview, Chief Goodrich had spoken with several of the earlier interviewees and that, by now, he knew the focus of the Exiger team’s investigation.
officers were performing off-campus traffic stops. He had been speaking about the subset of officers who were “clearly off mission” and “fishing for stuff,” as being that which he did not know. He also claimed that he did not know the exact statistics for traffic stops and citations either overall or by officer—notwithstanding that, as the Chief acknowledged, UCPD had the relevant data and it would not have been difficult to prepare such statistical information. He had planned to do so in the fall of 2015.

Likewise, the Chief maintained that Dr. Engel and the other administrators must have misunderstood him as well—that he had spoken to them only about the racial disparity in the traffic stops. A member of the team read aloud notes from our interview with Dr. Engel in which she described how, on two occasions unrelated to racial data, Chief Goodrich had denied knowing about off-campus traffic stops. The Chief, in response, said that he did not remember saying such things and did not “really recall the conversation.” He urged that Dr. Engel and others knew about the traffic stops because the issue was purportedly discussed at biweekly meetings attended by UCPD leadership, UC administrators, and senior members of the Cincinnati Police Department, and because the UCPD Daily Management Report was disseminated to the UC Administration. In short, Chief Goodrich insisted that “people” knew that UCPD was conducting off-campus traffic stops. The Exiger team pointed out that Major Thornton, his own second-in-command, had claimed one day earlier—that he did now know his officers were making off-campus traffic stops. The Chief reasoned that Major Thornton was not a “traffic guy” and not involved in operations until very recently.

The Exiger team also inquired, more generally, about whether Chief Goodrich promoted traffic stops by his officers. The Chief said that he could “take or leave” stops: when such stops related to the mission, they were permissible, with some stops having prevented robberies and led to the recovery of guns. But he “never” told his officers to “go out and do stops” or that it was an “expectation”; it was just a “tool” that was “part of the job,” and not his “agenda.” He ultimately acknowledged that stops were a “common theme” in his conversations with supervising officers who reported to him, and that it was “probably” a fair assessment that he promoted traffic stops as part of a balanced approach to policing. Asked about the Chief’s “no fly zone” approach to off-campus policing, he replied that this was basic “crime displacement” theory: by maintaining “visibility” around the perimeter of the campus, criminals would move somewhere else. The Chief ultimately admitted, upon questioning, that part of this strategy was more than just visibility—namely, that it included proactive policing and stops. When the Exiger team described the almost universal perception within UCPD that the Chief instigated a policy of aggressive off-campus traffic stops, and that he expected his

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12 The Exiger team reviewed the minutes of those meetings by the UC Crime Reduction Committee, which were held to discuss crime trends and specific strategies for crime reduction. The minutes do not reflect any discussion by Chief Goodrich or UCPD regarding the University’s use of traffic stops as a strategy, nor did Dr. Engel, who attended many of these meetings in her role as a consultant to the Cincinnati Police Department, recall any such discussion. The only clear references to the increased use of traffic stops involved its use by a particular district of the Cincinnati Police Department.
officers to engage in such stops, Chief Goodrich concluded that he must have failed in communicating his message of “balance”—that it got “lost in translation.”

F. CONCLUSIONS

Based on the Personnel Review and the findings set forth above, the Exiger team draws the following conclusions:

• In statements to senior UC administrators after the shooting death of Samuel DuBose, and during his initial interview with the Exiger team, Chief Goodrich misrepresented his knowledge about the extent of, and motivation for, UCPD’s historical use of off-campus traffic stops as a key policing method.
• Major Thornton was less than truthful in his interview with Exiger, concealing his own knowledge regarding UCPD’s use of off-campus traffic stops.
• Chief Goodrich, assisted by Major Thornton, openly and actively encouraged UCPD officers to conduct off-campus traffic stops as part of their proactive policing strategy, which was motivated by, and intended to address, crime concerns in neighborhoods surrounding the University.
• The failure to take ownership of this proactive policing strategy following the shooting death of Samuel DuBose eroded the trust and confidence of, at least many, UCPD officers in Chief Goodrich.
• Despite promoting the use of traffic stops, Chief Goodrich, as leader of the Department, failed to take basic steps to gather available data and formulate management information by which UCPD could have assessed risk and better understood the conduct of its officers in the field, both individually and collectively. Compiling such statistical information was not an onerous task—indeed, members of the UC Administration and press did so within only weeks of the DuBose shooting. Chief Goodrich’s stated embrace of a “balanced” policing philosophy was negated by not taking such fundamental steps, calling into question the Chief’s ability to carry out his duties effectively and competently.

13 The Exiger team questioned Chief Goodrich about his conversation with the communications officer during a management meeting. The Chief indicated that he had dismissed the officer’s voicing of concern about the rise in traffic stops, concluding that it probably stemmed from the the 911 dispatchers having expressed displeasure to the communications officer about the additional workload. As to the Chief’s statement at a meeting that it was “good” that UCPD had conducted more stops in one month than in the past year, the Chief suggested that he was “probably poking” fun at the communications officer, not speaking seriously.