one factor unduly predominates, the sense of the whole practice is easily lost.

One useful analogy to draw here is between writing practice and religious practice or athletic practice. When we speak of someone as practicing religion, for example, the idea of practice extends beyond mere membership in some religious group, financial contributions, or participation in ceremony and rituals. The term practice, as I am using it, suggests an extensive and intensive range of activities and states of mind that interpenetrate with the practitioner's sense of himself or herself. Any kind of serious practice is a day by day discipline which is maintained amid countless distractions. This sense of practice is indeed a secret held by many practicing writers, and as they know and my students know, productivity has an important, but not the only, part to play in it.

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Notes

[1]At the 1987 CCCC in Atlanta, Louise Wetherbee Phelps extended this critique in a new direction by suggesting that research also distorts the role time plays in composing. Many researchers make only short, timed episodes the object of study and ignore the fact that much writing gets done only after periods of days, weeks, months, or even years elapse.

[2]The dispute over quantity and quality is one I can't hope to resolve. It is a product of the tendency the western mind has to create dualisms and then mount arguments for and against each member. What this dispute ignores is the fact that neither quantity nor quality excludes the importance of the other—at least not in the practical world of the composition classroom. Consequently, when working with my students I often find myself uttering such bits of wisdom as "A cook must cook well and cook enough," or "You've got to lay a lot of bricks to be a lot of bricklayer."

[3]See, for example, George Hillock's *Research on Written Composition*, especially the sections on modes of instruction.

[4]I based this analysis on Kinneavy's understanding of the aims of discourse. For a practical rendering of the types of writing I assigned to each category consult the diagram on p. 61 of *A Theory of Discourse*.

THE KNACK FOR ART: THE WHY AND THE WHEREFORE OF COMBINING STRATEGIES OF INVENTION

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Perhaps nothing affects our attitudes and beliefs about what can and should be done in a writing classroom more than the way in which we characterize for ourselves the respective roles of reason and imagination in the process of writing. In fact, broaching the subject of my essay in these terms recalls ancient concepts of rhetoric still durable despite our suspicions about the limitations of dualistic thinking. Thus whenever we are sympathetic to Aristotle's point of view that rhetoric is an "art" whose principles are susceptible to analysis, we may emphasize to our students the power of systematic discovery procedures, heuristics not unlike Aristotelian *topoi*. On the other hand, whenever we recall Plato's characterization of rhetoric as a "knack," derived from talent and experience,[1] we may eschew systems and insist with William Coles that "the only way one learns to write is by writing" (112).

Howsoever our sympathies guide us—whether we align ourselves with those rhetoricians who are "new classicists" or those who are "new romantics," to borrow more contemporary terms from Frank D'Angelo and Richard Young (Young, "Concepts" 132, 134)—we usually maintain that these contrasting perspectives do not so much describe exclusive views but complementary ones, both of which legitimate within shifting and inexhaustible contextual domains. In short, contrasting perspectives suggest the possibility of *dialectical* rather than exclusive relationships, which on the surface offers an elegant vehicle for reconceiving a stale dualism. But in the ordinary way of things we cannot look in two directions at once, and having to gaze first in one direction forever colors alternative vistas – especially in this case: for the themes of this particular set of contrasts bring with them a residue, a history of pejorative usages that often leads us to marginalize one side of our provisional dialectic, sometimes for good reasons. Thus it is not surprising to find W. Ross Winterowd arguing in a recent essay that vitalism (the term through which he thematizes one side of these contrasting perspectives)[2]

> makes composition essentially unteachable, though not unlearnable, for "instructors" can give students "invitations" to use language, to embark, that is, on linguistic voyages of discovery, or, perhaps, more appropriately, to start combining elements in various ways to find out what will result. ("Purification" 269)

Winterowd makes these remarks in passing, and they form only part of a broadly based argument meant to show that composi-

tion and rhetoric have deep conceptual roots only partly understood by those few (or many?) influential literary critics who deign to take notice of the field. And, in fact, Winterowd is in good company, for he echoes Aristotle's claim that art is more truly knowledge than experience because art "implies the power to teach" (*Metaphysics* 1.a.1, 114). But whatever the validity of Winterowd's overall argument, part of its foundation consists of presenting the knack versus art distinction in exclusive terms, the unteachable and by extension the teachable. If considering the "vitalist" perspective leads us to translate rhetoric – more specifically rhetorical invention – into terms of the teachable and the unteachable, it doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out which of the alternative perspectives will invite more attention, which will not. Common sense and professional interest urge us to prefer the now teachable over the now unteachable. Similarly with other contrasts (really metaphors) traditionally inhabiting more or less the same territories, reason versus imagination, rational versus irrational, discovery versus creation, and so on.

If, for the time being at least, a dialectical perspective seems unsatisfactory (if not impossible), what about a synthetic one? What about finding ways to gather the oppositions together within a single, broader perspective and in that ground our pedagogy? Richard Young suggests such a perspective in his essay "Concepts of Art and the Teaching of Writing," one of the best and most commonsensical treatments of the contrast between classic and romantic approaches to rhetoric that I know of, for Young seeks to avoid, indeed he condemns, the needless repudiation of one perspective at the expense of another:

> . . . behind art as glamour and art as grammar there may be a more adequate conception of rhetorical art that does not lead us to affirm the importance of certain psychological powers at the cost of denying the importance of others. If we choose this last course of action, we might begin with a scholarly investigation of the role of heuristic procedures in the rhetorical process, since they call into play both our reason and our imagination. ("Concepts" 139)

Young points out that the use of heuristic procedures implies certain assumptions about the inventive processes they are designed to facilitate, that their use implies a generic conception of the process and that some phases of the process are susceptible to deliberate and rational control. "If we cannot teach direct control of the imaginative act or the unanticipated outcome," writes Young, ". . . we can teach the heuristics themselves and the appropriate occasions for their use . . . for heuristic procedures can guide inquiry and stimulate memory and intuition" ("Concepts" 136).

In the examples cited above,[3] Young and Winterowd more or less share a pedagogical perspective derived from their respective analyses of the contrast of art and knack: that teachers can show students how to extend their control over rational – and generic – processes of inquiry and that irrational processes of inquiry will take care of themselves, since the human condition makes them inevitable and since they are beyond analysis. Through practical pedagogy, the rational subsumes the irrational, a conceptual dualism is overcome, and a balanced dialectical perspective becomes far less imperative – insofar as we accept the hypothesis that heuristics adequately stimulate imagination.

Such a perspective is obviously useful, especially insofar as research into the effectiveness of heuristics shows that they may indeed help writers to consider and reconsider their material more thoroughly (Hillocks 179), and especially insofar as heuristics may be more effective in some ways than less structured inventive strategies like freewriting (Hillocks 178, 216, 232). Nonetheless, the move to include the irrational within the scope of more accessible rational activities, though compelling, is not inevitable: an alternative point of view can be argued just as easily when approaching the problem from a different perspective.

Suspicious that inexperienced writers sometimes begin to arrange their material before they have done any "real exploring" (*Forming* 65), Ann Berthoff recommends that writers generate "chaos" as a way of getting things started. She advocates list-making as a good means of generation, noting that the process requires writers to give names to what they "see and read and hear and feel" (64), and thereby it encourages writers to begin to create meaning. Generating chaos for its own sake, of course, is of very little value to writers, and so Berthoff recommends that, among other things, writers use a sort of master question with which they might probe the chaos they generate: "How does who do what and why?" (HDWDWW?) helps writers name agent and action, manner and purpose, and helps writers to understand the limits of the chaos they have generated because, like any good heuristic, it reveals not only what is before them but also what is not (71).

Berthoff's approach, of course, is designed to be dialectical, but by virtue of awarding pride of place to creating a chaotic array, it significantly values the primarily imaginative activity of generating chaos over the primarily rational activity of exploiting a heuristic procedure, at least in the inaugural moments of the composing process. In this way Berthoff implicitly questions the primacy of the teachable over the unteachable because generating chaos is not by nature a "teachable" skill, a point Berthoff emphasizes: "Whatever you really learn," she writes, "you teach yourself" (9). In short, she offers a dialectical perspective useful because it explicitly seeks to honor all themes within the traditional art versus knack contrast, but ultimately a perspective which we too often undervalue, if nothing else because we have no adequate understanding of the human imagination and because we often harbor the strong suspicion that such matters are better left to poets than to rhetoricians.

The "new classicists" and the "new romantics" – here represented by Young and Winterowd on the one hand and Ann Berthoff on the other – certainly agree on at least one point: the advantage of a dual perspective on matters of rhetorical invention; in fact, Young and Berthoff strive to exploit the full range of alternatives suggested by traditional contrasts, helping their readers to appreciate the carefully qualified claims that they make for their particular pedagogical and research recommendations. Yet one feels despite their apparent success, they each finally demonstrate the difficulty of rethinking long-held, traditional conflicts, for each ultimately favors one approach over another as the key to successful invention. If we would refuse the choice between the classic and the romantic, between art and knack, and therefore regard suspiciously the distinction between the teachable and the unteachable, we must do more than find solace, as Richard Young has, in Niels Bohr's observation that the opposite of a deep truth may well be another deep truth (cited by Young, "Concepts" 139). We must also redefine traditional contrasts in terms that admit more easily a productive dialectic, and we must work to understand invention and inventive strategies within these terms.

One way to accomplish this goal is to reconceive the inventive strategies familiar to us according to explicitly axiological principles, according to what they deem or refuse to deem valauble for their users to know or to do. I can illustrate my idea by briefly redescribing two familiar inventive strategies which may stand

as representatives of alternative approaches to invention: the heuristic derived from Kenneth Burke's Pentad (an example of those sorts of strategies typically embraced by "new classicists"), and Peter Elbow's version of freewriting (an example of those sorts of strategies congenial to "new romantics"). Some differences between the two strategies are obvious and well-known; in fact, Janice Lauer, in a discussion of textbook treatments of invention, points to one difference by showing how texts often distinguish between those sorts of strategies designed to develop a thesis and those designed to develop evidence for a thesis already in hand (131). But reconceiving inventive strategies in axiological terms will allow another dimension to emerge, one frequently overlooked but nevertheless important, the temporal dimension.

Burke has written that he originally conceived the Pentad as an aid to help a critic understand more thoroughly what was going on in a text, not to help a writer produce one ("Questions" 332). Even so, the shift from hermeneutic device to heuristic strategy seems a natural one: "Any complete statement about motives will offer *some* kind of answers to these five questions," writes Burke: "what was done (act), when or where it was done (scene), who did it (agent), how he did it (agency), and why (purpose)" (*Grammar* xv). Winterowd points out that in retrospect Burke would also include "attitude" within his elegant semantic matrix (*Synthesis* 196, 202).

The power of the Pentad as a heuristic device is probably unassailable, but I wish to emphasize here that part of that power derives from a set of terms which individually and collectively tell users what to ask about their topics. Everyone would agree that within the domain of any appropriate topic attempting to find answers to all of the questions and ratios suggested by the Pentad is self-defeating – with practice users will discover that the Pentad generates an inexhaustible array. But everyone must also agree that the terms suggest, just as Burke designed them to do, what is more or less valuable to know about human motivation in a variety of contexts. This last point has several important implications.

First, users of the Pentad must see the situation they are analyzing as a variant of a kind of situation that they have seen before and that is susceptible to the type of analysis for which the Pentad is useful; this is a point made by Young about all heuristic procedures ("Concepts" 136). A second implication is that the Pentad has a built-in rhetorical dimension, since those users who have faith in the strategy may also expect that their eventual audience will also find value in having answers – howsoever they are eventually expressed – inspired by some or all of the five terms. A third implication is that the Pentad, like other heuristics, has a timeless quality, since the type of information that it defines as valuable to know is not dependent upon any single occasion of its use. In short, the Pentad defines a vocabulary that functions as a selection of reality (*Grammar* 59) and thereby the Pentad – like other heuristic procedures sharing the same family resemblance, for instance the Aristotelian *topoi* and the tagmemic grid – establishes a more or less permanent matrix of values independent of context. I hope to clarify the importance of this point by contrasting Burke's heuristic strategy to Elbow's description of freewriting.

The purpose of freewriting is to disconnect the process of editing from the process of writing, to put down, as Elbow has it, ". . . whatever is in your mind. . . . The only requirement is that you never stop" (*Teachers* 3). Once again, the advice seems unassailable, conforming as it does to the intuitions of at least one successful writer, William Stafford, who feels, ". . . one should lower his standards until there is no felt threshold to go over in writing. It's *easy* to write. You just shouldn't have standards that inhibit you from writing" (qtd. in Murray 152).

With the "editor" off – or perhaps muted is a better term? – writers can expect that their freewriting will eventually yield a "focus or a theme," a center of gravity (*Teachers* 35). The claim is not that the freewriting itself will produce powerful writing, but that it will lead to powerful writing through a mysterious underground process: "When people talk about the Zen of this or that," writes Elbow, "I think they are referring to the peculiar increase in power and insight that comes from focusing your energy while at the same time putting aside your conscious controlling self" (*Power* 15-16). Of course that also means that freewriting need not be controlled by an explicit set of assumptions about what is valuable to know, that freewriting contrasts with heuristics like Burke's Pentad because it offers no direction for inquiry and no built-in rhetorical dimension. In short, I am arguing that freewriting is best understood as a strategy for inquiry making no specific axiological recommendations, and that as a result, the combination of elements – of values – that freewriting makes possible is always grounded within the temporal – that is to say, impermanent – occasions of its use.

The Pentad and its family members, of course, are not impervious to contextual constraints: for obvious reasons the Pentad may not be as readily useful for users walking around argumentative issues as for those walking around dramatistic ones. On the other hand, freewriting – and I would argue, other undirected inventive strategies such as clustering, or listmaking, or brainstorming – is never so limited because it is nearly pure process, no system of values need limit the contextual utility of the strategy: to the extent that freewriting helps particular users, it promises to always help, and failure, though frequent, is an unpredictable occasion, setting aside such variables as a user's predilections, abilities, and commitment to the process.

The term freewriting is probably a misnomer. At best, writers who exploit the strategy are free only insofar as the process manifests no particular set of values to guide inquiry. Which is not to say that users are not guided more subtly by values previously internalized, through practice with familiar heuristic procedures or through specialized knowledge of the topic. Nonetheless, freewriting offers the possibility that these subtle values may combine in unpredictable, novel ways, potentially leading users to appreciate those unique elements suggested by their topics and their writing contexts. The Pentad offers a different possibility, that its explicit matrix of values will lead users to discover predictable elements buried within their topics and their writing contexts. Thus the strategies contrast: one urges a stable set of values, the other combines elements into impermanent combinations. As a result, the Pentad directs attention from the outside in, to reveal overlap among topics and contextual domains; freewriting potentially pushes attention from the inside out, to reveal borders and test limits.

It seems to me that an axiological perspective – revealing, as it does, the relatively permanent and the relatively temporary sets of values urged by different inventive strategies – suggests a fruitful theoretical ground for teaching invention. As we have seen, the functional distinction Lauer notes in textbook treatments of invention draws a sharp contrast between strategies that seem best for searching for a thesis and those that seem best for generating evidence for a thesis already in hand. This distinction is obviously useful, but not exhaustive: writers may use any inventive strategy – whether it be the Pentad and its family members or freewriting and its family members – to generate evi-

dence or to generate a thesis. When texts categorize inventive strategies in this way, they allow us to overlook the potential utility of all inventive strategies and they ask us to keep the strategies themselves forever separate, discrete operations applied one after another. Thinking of inventive strategies from within an axiological perspective, however, takes us a step further by explaining how writers may fruitfully combine strategies according to their axiological dimensions.

Of course, Berthoff suggests something similar when she recommends applying a set of questions (very much like those suggested by the Pentad) to the "chaos" generated by listmaking; in effect, she shows how to match a more or less permanent set of values with a set generated independently for a particular occasion. Combining strategies in this way may be especially valuable, as Berthoff points out, when such applications reveal potentially important values that have not been generated. Students who use a strategy like freewriting, for example, to generate material for an essay on their writing processes might have no trouble naming stages – drafting, editing, and so on – and considering the heuristic role of typical arrangement schemata – the chronological order of a conventional narrative, say, or the point-by-point schema of a comparison. But many of these same students may neglect considering the effects of their immediate writing contexts (the value of "scene" named by the Pentad) or of the tools with which they write (the value of "agency"). Teaching students to combine the two strategies will help some of them to more comprehensive – and ultimately more focused – treatments of the topic because, as we can now see, they will learn to interpret what is valuable within the chaotic arrays they generate by means of a more or less permanent set of values and the rhetorical dimension that attaches to it: the writer's audience and its conventional expectations about dramatistic discourse.

An axiological perspective can also explain why invention can be approached the other way around. Strategies like freewriting and brainstorming can be used to push beyond the easy or obvious answers writers might settle for in response to Pentad prompts. In this case, writers may be guided by an overall topic suggested by one of the powerful Pentad terms but use a strategy like freewriting – which ignores explicit sets of values – to supplement conventional answers. For many students, the writing process has one agent, themselves. But freewriting or brainstorming on the topic may lead them to consider the contributions of other entities, for example social communities, teachers, peers, and so on, and each of these may suggest some adjustments within the domains of the other Pentad values. In this case, students are not simply searching longer – which in and of itself guarantees little creative success[4] – but they are using an inventive technique that urges no special axiological focus in order to challenge the contextual value of the questions and answers that – thanks to the Pentad – they have generated for a particular occasion.

The analysis is obviously incomplete, forming the barest recommendation for reconceiving rhetoric along axiological lines. But in order to end, let me pretend that it is complete and draw together some of the strings left dangling. There are broad distinctions between the sorts of inventive activities we urge our students to try, between activities like using the Pentad and activities like freewriting. Furthermore, appreciating these distinctions is difficult within familiar dialectical frameworks like art versus knack or teachable versus unteachable because one seems to marginalize one side of the dialectic and the other one recasts the dialectic in exclusive terms. The consequences are the same in either case: one sort of inventive strategy tends to dominate the other.

An axiological analysis underscores a different sort of dialectic – one organized about the question of value and the relative permanence or impermanence of the values urged or discovered by different sorts of inventive strategies. In this way, we can do justice to the interdependence of differing perspectives on invention without marginalizing one side of the dialectic or recasting it in exclusive terminology. Such an analysis asks us to reconsider the relationship on a conceptual level, which in turn will lead us to reconsider it in more pedagogical realms, if only by suggesting a good reason for teaching students to combine the different sorts of inventive strategies that we offer them, a reason not readily apparent whenever we approach invention from traditional and seemingly exclusive poles like art versus knack.

Notes

[1]Plato has Socrates say in *Gorgias*, "And I say [rhetoric] is not a craft, but a knack, because it has no rational account (*logos*) by which it applies the things it applies. . . ." (465a). The translation of "knack" is derived from *empeiria*, which, according to Terence Irwin, "often means 'experience,' and here refers to the result of experience, a 'knack' or 'technique' (which would be a good translation except for its derivation from *technē*, which Socrates sharply opposes to *empeiria*)" (Plato 130). The distinction is also clear in Aristotle, who uses the term *technē* – usually translated as "art" – to describe a theoretical activity reducible to "a system, for it is possible to examine the reason why some attain their end by familiarity and others by chance" (*Rhetoric* 354a).

[2]Ann Berthoff objects to Winterowd's characterization of vitalism, claiming ". . . the word as it is used in the spurious taxonomies that delight contemporary rhetoricians means 'creative' or non-algorithmic, personal, individualistic – and whatever else goes to make up a sterling example of what Vygotsky meant by a pseudo-concept" ("Comment" 95).

[3]I realize that the examples I cite in this essay do not do justice to the complex positions of rhetoricians Winterowd and Young; I have selected them because they seem to me emblematic of how the foundational art versus knack distinction can be translated into different terms requiring the concomitant recognition that changing the opposing terms may change the nature of the dialectic as well. See T. K. Seung for a discussion of how themes in dialectical "tension" are resolved (192-217).

[4]On this point, see D. N. Perkins who makes the argument that creative behavior depends more on high standards than the length of time spent searching, an argument, it seems to me, consistent with my overall analysis.

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WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT / WOMEN'S ENSLAVEMENT: STORIES FROM THE HISTORY OF LITERACY

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> Now, what I want is, Facts. . . . You can only form the minds of reasoning animals upon Facts: nothing else will ever be of any service to them. (Dickens 47)

So Thomas Gradgrind presents himself to his students – those "little pitchers" before him who were to be filled full of facts. When we read *Hard Times*, most of us laugh at the schoolmaster, a Facts peddler who never realizes that learning – literacy itself – is more than the consumption and undigested "pour-back" (48) of Facts. E. D. Hirsch might not laugh, for he opens *Cultural Literacy* by declaring that "literacy is far more than a skill . . . it requires large amounts of specific information" (2). A "new insight," writes Hirsch, central to his book. But Gradgrind shows us that the "new" insight of fellow Benthamite Hirsch is not so new. In fact, Hirsch's "new insight" has a long history. The traditional mainstay of both educational *praxis* and measurement has been that "literacy" requires specific knowledge imbricated on reading and writing skills – until recently, an untested assumption.

We lack consensus on how best to define literacy because we have differing views on its social purposes and values. The concept of literacy that I'll be using is necessarily reductive for my purposes today. Literacy can comprise only the process of learning "what to know": "what to know" is whatever knowledge of oral and written forms the literati of any sociohistorical context consider culturally significant information. "What to know" is the usual goal and benefit of education – what Gradgrind and Hirsch would call "facts" and others, "functional" literacy.

But literacy can also comprise "what to know" together with "how to think," another component in the process of becoming literate. How far that process goes is determined by how well a student learns to extract, abstract, synthesize, conceptualize, and criticize the (a) "what to know" of literacy, (b) the assumptions that underpin that knowledge, and (c) his or her own assumptions that preexist that academic knowledge.

Calling the "what to know" functional literacy and the "how to think" critical literacy is a necessarily artificial method for examining the process of learning. Ideally of course, critical literacy incorporates functional literacy in its process, a process that I like to think of as active: *to literacy* (a verb), and not static, which is implied by calling *literacy* a noun. If we give people a verb instead of a noun, we give them power and consequences of that power, which include both the ability to realize a critical consciousness of language and the ability to recognize language as a force in human affairs, as a code for our values, and as a force for change.

Historically, most women fortunate enough to be educated have been willing to *accommodate* (Chase passim) the conventions of their education without questioning how those conventions privilege some forms of knowledge at the expense of others. They have learned to read or to write (a little) and to memorize their "facts," whether they be the *Pater Noster*, a few French phrases, the definition of "horse," or as Hirsch would have it, the difference between Irving Berlin and the Berlin Wall. They knew they would be rewarded for absorbing and regurgitating facts. Questioning, arguing, conjecturing on alternative possibilities have been at best uncultivated – at worst, discouraged and even punished. Hence, most women have received an education to become among the literate of their time; only a few of them "claimed an education" (Rich passim), *opposing* or *resisting* (Chase passim) the dominant ideology propounded in their course of study. Even fewer envisioned a critical literacy and realized the potential for power and change that lay beyond their functional literacy.

My discussion, limited to Western women from Antiquity through the Renaissance, focuses on the literacy experiences of those who belonged to the dominant class. As a whole, these women were not marginalized in the way that slaves, blacks, or other groups have been marginalized; rather, these women played an integral role in the dominant class – that's just my point. For most of these women, literacy was a means of acculturation, a potent tool for maintaining the hegemony of their class, of the men of their class. In fact, their course and measure of literacy was most often a derivative of the firmly entrenched male model, a model dispensed by their male teachers. Although the male model has evolved, its constant has been a canon of sanctified knowledge; the critical component was a variable – sometimes available to men, almost certainly withheld from women.

I'd like to tell you some stories about literate women, beginning in Classical Greece. In the transitional society of Asia Minor (600 B.C.), women of rank were freed from the rigidity of traditional marriage and from the identity that arose from that fixed role. Unlike Athenian women, who were kept in rigid seclusion, the Greek women of Lesbos met in literary societies to write and study music, poetry, epics, and drama – becoming literate by the standards of their time and class. At the center of