Pick Up This Cross and Follow: (Ir)responsibility and the Teaching of "Writing for Audience"

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"[T]he majority of people who write interesting things, write without knowing to whom they are speaking. That is part of the workings of this society, and it is very good. There is no need to cry about it.
—Jean-François Lyotard—Just Gaming

In a December, 1990 article in College Composition and Communication, Richard Fulkerson announces an "emerging rhetorical consensus" in the field of Composition Studies on what constitutes good writing (414). According to Fulkerson, schools of thought that value the "Platonic individualism" of the writer ("Expressivism"), the surface correctness of the text ("Formalism"), and the accuracy of information in the text ("Mimeticism"), are presently in decline. These divergent axiologies (conceptions of what is valued in writing) have been superseded by a "rhetorical approach in which readers and their responses are the final criteria" in determining the "effectiveness," and therefore the value, of writing (415).

This elevation of one constituent in the conventional rhetorical triangle reflects a significant movement away from what Wayne Booth once identified as "our main goal as teachers of rhetoric," teaching a proper balance among the three elements that are at work in any communicative effort; the available arguments about the subject itself, the interests and peculiarities of the audience, and the voice, the implied character, of the speaker. (141)

Support for Fulkerson’s contentions about consensus on the role of the reader is widely available. Many recent pedagogies actively privilege the reader in this traditional tripartite relationship. Russell Long, for example, suggests that "the reader plays an active role, and that the writer, when writing, must be consciously aware of the reader’s activity" (221). Linda Flower recommends that a good writer makes every effort to "meet the needs of a reader" (1). At the far end of the scale, Fulkerson
contends that “[g]ood writing... is contextually adapted to, perhaps even controlled by, its audience” (417). Implicit, at least, in all of the scholarship that supports a rhetorical axiology is the claim that the location of judgment about the “effectiveness” of any given text is with the reader. The growing “concern for audience” in composition textbooks, journal articles, and books about writing is, in fact, cited by Fulkerson as evidence of the consensus on a rhetorical axiology: regardless of any given rhetorical theorist’s conception of what an audience is, the necessary relationship between its consideration and good writing appears to be beyond question.

Fulkerson contends that because much recent debate in composition journals centers on conceptions of audience “[t]he importance of audience may now seem obvious to us” (his emphasis 416). Yet, at the very least, teachers who urge their students to “write for audience” risk devaluing the epistemological dimension of the writing activity itself. As teachers committed to the act of writing as the production of knowledge, we ought to seriously consider the way we limit students’ inventive strategies by suggesting that an understanding of who the audience may be recommends parameters regarding how a topic can be treated. As Jean-Loup Thebaud implies, “the existence of the reader is a cross for the author” (8). I propose here that writing textbooks and scholarly research that weigh writers down with models of “real audience” analysis based on Aristotelian character-typing stultify Invention, and in doing so directly compromise the epistemic dimension of the writing they influence.

I

Certainly a perusal of writing texts for undergraduate courses confirms an obvious concern with audience: “You can save yourself time and trouble by always deciding in advance just whom you are writing for” (Shaw 24) (his emphasis). Such concern can be traced to the recovery of classical rhetoric and its contemporary application to writing instruction in American universities. The historical antecedent for much of the work on audience is Aristotle’s Rhetoric (Ede 141; Ong 18; Park 480). In Book II, Aristotle contends that there is a corresponding relationship between “human character” and “various ages and fortunes.” A knowledge of the character of an audience can be understood, according to Aristotle, by analysis of its wealth, power, and relative youth; armed with such an “account of types of character,” a speaker can go about choosing proofs that will correspond with “emotions and moral qualities of each character type” to effect persuasion (121-22).²

Many contemporary textbook sections on audience analysis are built on Aristotle’s admonition to analyze audience based on supposedly verifiable attributes of an intended audience. In A Writer’s Rhetoric, for
example, Suzanne Britt reminds student writers that they will "need to keep in mind what sort of people" they are writing for, and then "write in a tone, language, and style adjusted to the[ir] values and tastes" (17). Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford have used the term "audience addressed" to refer to such positions that "emphasize the concrete reality of the writer's audience," and assume that "knowledge of this audience's attitudes, beliefs, and expectations is not only possible (via observations and analysis) but essential" (156). Britt, for example, includes an assignment that asks students to describe the "typical" audience of "a popular magazine" in order to develop a "composite picture of a subscriber" (19).

Fred Pfister and Joanne Petrik's "A Heuristic Model for Creating a Writer's Audience" has the dubious distinction as the most often-cited article valorizing audience addressed. The authors contend that "successful written communication . . . depends a great deal on the writer's knowledge of his or her audience" (218). In order to attain such knowledge, Pfister and Petrik advise students to internalize a set of questions about "those many readers who actually exist in the world of reality and who will be reading the writer's words." Such questions might answer to the "physical, social, and economic status" of the audience, as well as their "educational and cultural experience," "ethical concerns and hierarchy of values," and "common myths and prejudices" (214).

More than one author has pointed to flaws in reasoning that develop from naive and literal application of classical precepts about "the art of speaking" to current text production (Kroll 173; Long 223-24). According to Long, such efforts assume

that observable physical or occupational characteristics are unvaryingly accurate guides to attitudes and perceptions, and that people sharing certain superficial qualities are alike in all other respects. (223)

Assignments that ask students to analyze "their audience" in terms of race, age, gender, occupation, sexual preference, religion, or political affiliation are progenitors of a simplistic and "noxious stereotyping" that teachers of composition "in any other context . . . fight diligently against" (223).

Such stereotyping is understandable, however, from textbook authors and theorists working within the classical rhetorical paradigm informed by Aristotle. While few of us would feel comfortable with a student draft that suggested "wealthy men are insolent and arrogant" or that "good birth . . . makes those who have it more ambitious," Aristotle's Rhetoric makes those very claims (126). While my interest is not in labeling Aristotle, I would suggest that a system of audience analysis that
generates such profoundly disturbing and logically flawed generalizations may not be the best to pass along to fledgling writers.

Pedagogies that reflect a theory best described as "audience addressed" invariably generate assignments that provide a particular audience for students to analyze. Booth suggests that when students are "given no purpose and no audience" in writing assignments, teachers are left with an inadequate basis for evaluation (142-43). Ironically, a better argument can be made for exactly the opposite case. Teachers can be left unable to evaluate writing for audience if they do not share the attributes that analysis like Pfister and Petrik's yields for a student. Following the logic of audience addressed, any given teacher, depending on age, academic or social experience, political orientation, etc., would be able to only roughly approximate an audience for one of the papers in the following assignment, but certainly not both.

Write a short speech to students about a controversial campus policy, whether academic or social. Now, write a speech on the same campus policy, but this time address your remarks to the president, dean, or chancellor of your university or college. (Britt 19)

In "Analyzing Audiences" Douglas Park recommends that teachers of writing focus on situations rather than audiences since "[t]o identify an audience means identifying a situation." Proposing that student writers need to see themselves as "social beings in a social situation," Park contends that teachers can help students best "when we help them define situations for their writing" (486). We can likely assume that a similar assumption drives Britt's assignment above. But one of those proposed by Park—"Imagine you are resident assistant writing a report for the Dean of Students" (487)—creates an evaluation problem for any teacher who has not experienced the complex system of restraints, prerogatives, and expectations relevant to a Dean of Students. More importantly, perhaps, it asks students to abandon their own ideological perspectives and adopt someone else's, or naively carry those perspectives into an unknown context. One might imagine that much teacher commentary on student drafts of such an assignment would be devoted to questioning (perhaps without foundation) how accurately students had created their personas. Teachers already troubled by problematic and unquestioned assumptions in student writing generated from the students' own perspectives may well see the adoption of personas as an additional way to mystify what is already for some students a confusing enterprise.

The problematics of stereotypical characterizations of "types" of readers as think-alike clones, whether they are identified by shared
superficial traits or as members of a given social community, are well documented. But equally important, perhaps, is the recognition that classical rhetoricians were concerned with relationships between speakers and listeners. The astonishing difference between a classical orator’s present, relatively homogeneous collective audience and a postmodern readership characterized by increasing diversity may make reliance on Aristotle’s view of audience a foundation built on water. As Barry Kroll suggests, “In a good deal of writing the potential audience is so broad that the writer can make only very general assumptions about the readers” (175). Although Ede and Lunsford claim that differentiating between a writer’s audience and a speaker’s is an oversimplification, their contention that an audience of oratory is “not a collectivity but a disparate, and possibly even divided, group of individuals” (161) only intensifies the simplistic nature of much contemporary instruction in audience analysis.

Textbook authors and theorists recommending that students write for the needs of readers have worked in the face of serious challenges since Booth coined the phrase “rhetorical stance.” Otto Clevenger, writing within the discipline of speech communication and predating social construction theory in its contemporary sense by more than ten years, pointed out in 1966 that every audience is distinguished by plurality—“there is more than one listener who must be taken into account”:

each individual behaves as he does because of his prior experience coupled with the stimuli operating upon him at the moment, including the context as he perceives it... [E]xperiences, contexts, and stimuli... are infinitely variable. (9-10)

Walter Ong, contending that “the writer’s audience is always a fiction” (17), points to the obvious absence of a reader while writing is being done: “I am writing a book which will be read by thousands... So, please, get out of the room” (10). The present absence of readers and the plurality of an “audience” made up of readers who may share nothing in common but a familiarity with a given language cast severe doubt on the assumptions of those who promote audience addressed. Ong contends that a successful writer develops the ability to “fictionalize in his imagination an audience he has learned to know not from daily life but from earlier writers who were fictionalizing in their imagination audiences they had learned... and so on” (11). For Ong, a writer must first “construct in his imagination, clearly or vaguely, an audience cast in some sort of role—entertainment seekers, reflective sharers of experience, and so on” (12). As Kroll explains, such a conception of audience “is intimately connected with (and perhaps even indistinguishable from) a
sense of genre and convention... gained not from social interaction but from broad exposure to various forms of written discourse" (182). Theoretical positions that assume that the only audience the writer can consider when writing is an imagined one have been labeled “audience invoked” by Ede and Lunsford.

Claiming that both audience addressed and audience invoked fail by privileging one aspect of the rhetorical triangle rather than recognizing a necessary tension among the elements, Ede and Lunsford seek to bridge the two theories. They suggest that a weakness of research favoring “audience invoked” (or “audience created”) valorizes the writer over the reader by “failing to recognize the constraints placed on the writer, in certain situations, by the audience.” The writer who “does not consider the needs and interests of his audience risks losing that audience” (165). Paraphrasing Ann Berthoff, Ede and Lunsford contend that conceptions such as “audience addressed” and “audience invoked” fail by refusing to accept that meaning arises out of a synthesis of all elements of discourse, writer, text, and reader (159-60). Such claims lead Ede and Lunsford to suggest that the audience addressed—“actual or intended readers of a discourse”—must be accommodated through authorial adaptation for authors who “wish to be read” (166-67).

As examples of audience addressed for their own College Composition and Communication article, which later won the Braddock award for 1984, the authors cite each other as co-authors and themselves as readers of their own text, and “one particular colleague” who had extensive contact with the text during revision. The process of revising the text led them to “new audiences”: readers of CCC, attendees of CCCC, and the 30-odd authors cited in their text. Then-CCC editor Richard Lanham has the distinction of being specified as both invoked audience—an actual individual “whose questions and criticisms we imagined and tried to anticipate”—and addressed audience once he responded to the text with “questions, criticisms, and suggestions” (168).

Curiously, it is Lanham’s response to their text that signals his shift from audience invoked to audience addressed. Significantly, on examination, all of the individuals identified as audience addressed, including the authors themselves, engaged in direct response that initiated changes in the document before publication. The “particular colleague,” for example, “challenged” Ede and Lunsford “with harder and harder questions” that they contend influenced them during the composing process (168). With that admission, it is difficult to understand these members of an addressed audience as “outside the text.” They are bound up in the text through a process of collaboration with the credited authors.5 Those identified by Ede and Lunsford as audience addressed—themselves, Lanham, the colleague—caused the authors to modify their discourse on
the basis of response, a feature of Platonic dialectic. As Jean-Francois Lyotard contends, "a reader who starts to talk" is quite different from "an addressee of written messages" (6). The dialectic between collaborators—acknowledged or not—creates a series of permutations in which new messages seek to satisfy those involved. Those "audience" members that Ede and Lunsford implicitly identify as collaborators certainly differ from the audience of readers who had access only to the final product and no opportunity to change its shape before publication.

In comparison with dialectic, in which the control of discourse is shared by speaker and listener in a process of clarification, writing distances the reader ipso facto, creating an absent space that can only be filled with the writer's presence. The audience that Ede and Lunsford identify as invoked—those who did not comment on the article before it was published—is never more than a product of the authors' inventive strategies, a series of creative interventions in their own text that places limitations and constraints on its possibilities. When the authors suggest that "it is the writer who, as writer and reader of his or her own text... establishes the range of potential roles an audience may play" (166), they seem to deny their earlier approval of Paul Kameen's claim that "discourse is not grounded in forms or experience or audience; it engages all of these elements simultaneously" (qtd. in Ede and Lunsford 159). Things get murkier yet. Immediately following, they seem to support the autonomy of the individual interpretive subject, ironically devalued in parentheses: "(Readers may, of course, accept or reject the role or roles the writer wishes them to adopt in responding to a text)" (166). The announced purpose of the article, to celebrate "the fluid, dynamic character of rhetorical situations" (156), is subverted by the apparently unrecognized simultaneous grant of autonomy to the authors and their collaborators on one hand and the invoked audience on the other: those who are absent from the text both physically and dialectically, who have no effect on the production of the text except as fictions created by the author, but who may do with it as they please.

In stressing a rhetorical epistemology, Ede and Lunsford suggest that formulations that privilege the author or the reader as separate locations of knowledge creation oversimplify. However, they fail to support the contention that knowledge creation depends on a relationship between writer and "real" reader unless that reader directly affects the production of the text. It appears that what their project implicitly supports is an argument for writer and non-collaborative reader as separate loci of knowledge creation simultaneously united and separated by the text.?
Central to the rhetorical paradigm that Fulkerson identifies as consensus today is the argument that to write is to create knowledge, not just to transmit it (Anson 33; Berlin 488-91). Such consensus can be seen in Patricia Bizzell and Bruce Herzberg’s influential collection, The Rhetorical Tradition, in which the editors explicitly “favor works with more relevance to the modern view of rhetoric as epistemic and ideological” (vi). The movement within rhetorical studies to reinvigorate the theoretical position of the Sophists, claiming them as progenitors of contemporary social-epistemic theory, supports the contention that meaning is created by writing, not simply transmitted.8

As the social constructionists suggest, a writer is a product of historical situationality, community, and language, and, with increasing critical and speculative literacy, the range of choices a writer can make becomes increasingly larger. Through synthesis, the writer refracts what the social milieu gives her with her unique interpretive amalgam of the social milieu, thereby functioning as a source of new knowledge. As a locus of interpretation, a set of “values . . . arranged in a specific way” (Lyotard 10), the social construct that is the writer must be the progenitor of that meaning making activity, a source of new knowledge; not new in the sense of previously absurd or impossible, but in the sense of uniquely synthesized.

Theoretical arguments that propose “writing for audience” as a way to avoid privileging either writer or reader necessitate a contradiction. To assume that one can shape a text to conform to an audience’s expectations implies that there is some shared interpretive criteria between the author and individual audience members. This is an argument supported by only the most naive formulations of social-epistemic theory, such as those that assume a clone-like uniformity among members of discourse communities. One of the fundamental assumptions of the academic enterprise holds that knowledge is advanced within discourse communities through a process of adversarial communication (at conferences and in academic journals, for example). The social constructionist maxim that truth is temporary and constantly in flux would seem to support the notion that readers and writers share some relative autonomy within a broad social milieu. We don’t all change our minds at once about what constitutes the truth: a reader too serves as a locus of refraction, a “place” where knowledge created by writers is filtered through a necessarily different matrix of vocabulary, ideology, and experience.

Reading, of course, is a meaning-making or knowledge-creating activity. As the act of writing ipso facto demands the absence of the reader, the act of reading demands the absence of the writer. Both are knowledge-making activities. We need not deny one as such to understand the other
as such. To suggest that knowledge is created through an interaction between writer and reader does not speak to the infinite range of possible interpretations of any given text, even by the same reader. It would seem more helpful to suggest that writer and reader have, at best, a commensal relationship with the text. Each uses the text to create knowledge, yet their relationship to each other is fragmented, tenuous, and when apparently most obvious, it is most obscure.

To suggest that a writer can “consider audience” and make “appropriate choices” in response to “the constraints imposed by the requirements of real audiences” (Park 486) assumes some type of universalism among readers that denies their complexity as conflicted yet separate loci of interpretation. Readers rarely operate as a collectivity. As Lyotard maintains, a text “takes off in networks of distribution that are not at all networks of reception. . . . And as to what may happen to the [text], what its actual reception may be, no one knows” (9). We can likely assume that Plato had no way of anticipating an audience for the Phaedrus that would precipitate Jasper Neel’s attack on that work 2,500 years later. Likewise, Jim Corder reminds us that it took Wordsworth and Coleridge nearly ten year to sell the first 750 copies of the Romantic icon Lyrical Ballads.

III

In “Closing My Eyes As I Speak: An Argument for Ignoring Audience,” Peter Elbow identifies the clash between stressing Invention and “writing for audience”: “[i]t’s often difficult to work out new meaning while thinking about readers” (53). Perhaps in an attempt to avoid a poor reception with his own intended audience, however, Elbow cautions that “we must nevertheless revise with conscious awareness of audience in order to figure out which pieces of writer-based prose are good as they are—and how to discard or revise the rest” (53). Presumably, once a student has worked through an act of knowledge creation in a way that clarifies a problem for herself, she should then struggle to find a different set of words, or arrangement, or style to convey the same idea. For their part, teachers should simply help students defer the impossibility of audience analysis until later in the writing process. Presumably, it is the writer who will “figure out which pieces of writer-based prose are good” through the heuristics that Elbow offers. Yet each of these seems to treat the audience as a monolith: “Is the text oriented toward the writer’s frame of reference or point of view, or oriented toward that of readers? Are the readers’ needs being met?” These questions, by their very nature, cannot be answered by a writer; they are the province of absent readers.

As Russell C. Long explains, considering audience, then, belongs more properly under the purview of what is traditionally called inven-
tion: "a writer's choice of alternatives determines his audience; that is, his
decisions create a very specific reader who exists only for the duration of
the reading experience" (his emphasis). Such a theory of "audience
invoked," or "audience created," begins with a new set of questions to
replace the old:

Rather than beginning with the traditional question, "who is
my audience?", we now begin with, "who do I want my audience
to be?" Rather than encouraging a superficial, stereotyped view
of reader, we are asking the student to begin with a statement
about the audience she wants to create. What attitudes, ideas,
actions are to be encouraged? (225)

None of this is to suggest that "teaching audience" is grounded in
other than the best intent to help students to write better, however that is
conceived. As Elbow points out, "Young people often need more practice
in taking into account points of view different from their own" (51), and
just this argument has driven many arguments in favor of audience
analysis. Composition theorists, working on Piaget's assumptions that a
sign of maturity is the ability to cast off an egocentric orientation, have
suggested that student writers—even those at the college level—are in
need of "decentering," an escape from a self-centered orientation that
does not reflect anticipation of diversity of opinion and points of view (see
Lunsford; Perl; Maimon; Shaughnessy).

However, the very idea of classical audience analysis assumes a
kind of determinism that the separation of reader and writer, by the
indeterminacy of the text, denies. If any particular attitude typifies
student writers it is a lack of confidence in the suitability of their rhetorical
choices. Experienced writers are often acutely aware that they cannot
control or anticipate the possible interpretive responses generated within
the complex matrix of historical, temporal, and situational determinants
that define individual readers. To offer students a problem that the most
sophisticated writers can only imagine to solve by something as mysteri-
ous as invocation can only be described as debilitating. As Kroll argues,
to say that a writer must hear the "voice" or see an "image" of an
imaginary audience is to shroud the concept of audience in
mystery. Without clearer definition, the notion that a writer
"senses" an audience might suggest to students—many of whom
already believe they lack "talent" or "inspiration"—that good
writing relies on a special kind of "awareness" that some people
have and others simply lack. (181)
Curiously, arguments for the necessity of considering audience as a method of casting off egocentrism usually emerge within contexts that stress the social nature of reading and writing (Kroll 179-83). Within the social perspective are a number of other pedagogical approaches capable of helping students “decenter” that do not demand an ability to conjure a vision of what cannot be seen or verified. Collaborative writing groups, or peer-editing groups, can provide students with a concrete audience that will provide immediate feedback and the opportunity to compare their own thoughts with those of others (Armstrong 87; Kroll 180). Likewise, teachers who take “process teaching” seriously by engaging student drafts and providing ungraded commentary can provide response that will allow inexperienced writers to see the consequences of their rhetorical choices on a more sophisticated reader. Finally, by demonstrating the long range aspect of collaboration—the way each student’s “unique” ideas are the refracted images of dialogue and text he or she has already encountered—teachers can stress the appearance of “research” (broadly construed) in any written text and thereby lead students into the consideration of alternate perspectives by way of focused research.

We need to help student writers see themselves as products of a historical, social moment. We also need to help them understand readers in this same way, and we need to highlight the refractory processes of writing and reading a text that necessarily separate the two knowledge-making activities. Students should be free from a confusing responsibility to “their audience” that can leave them in a state of paralysis, hindering their ability to function as sources of new knowledge. Trying to imagine what might be effective allows only the displacement, modification, or ignorance of the range of inventive possibilities that an unfettered concept of process would allow.

In addition, we could do worse than to pass on Lyotard’s contention that writing is “irresponsible, in the strict sense of the term” (8). It is inventive, disinvolved with dialectic response to others and response from others at the moment of its production. This need not lead back to “romantic” notions of the self, as long as we continue to conceptualize the self as a locus of refraction. In this way, a teacher cannot privilege “self” in its traditional sense but can support the student writer as an undeniable source of new knowledge through research, synthesis, and experimentation.

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Notes

1 Fulkerson appropriates the term *axiology* from philosophy, contending that it means "simply value theory conceived generally." As such, in relation to teaching composition, an axiology can be "a commitment about what constitutes good writing . . . some analysis of what we want student writers to achieve as a result of effective teaching" (410-11).

2 As Douglas B. Park has shown, such conceptions of audience can be seen wherever Aristotle is privileged (480-81). George Campbell, for example, contends that different habits and occupations "make one incline to one passion, another to another." Following the precepts of Common Sense Realism, it is not inconsistent for Campbell to suggest that "there are certain principles in our nature, which, when properly addressed and managed, give no inconsiderable aid to reason in promoting belief" (71). A speaker, according to Campbell, in addition to an awareness of the general qualities of human nature, ought to regard "the special character of the audience, as composed of . . . individuals; that he may suit himself to them, both in his style and his arguments" (95).

3 It is not unimportant that Aristotelian rhetoric proceeds on a very narrow conception of what constitutes humanity. The job of fully considering the implications of adopting Aristotelian conceptions of audience as writing instruction for twentieth-century women students remains undone.

4 In addition, as Walter Ong reminds us, because Aristotle's works (as we know them) consist primarily of "school logia or sayings" later compiled by others in written form, they "were addressed to specific individuals whom he knew, rather than simply to the wide world" (18). As such, their application to contemporary writing instruction is at best tenuous.

5 Edwin Black ("The Second Persona." *Quarterly Journal Of Speech* 56 [1970]: 109-19), suggests that an Aristotelian examination of a discourse, in which it is assumed that the text is an object created by an instrument (rhetoric), can never comment on a "real" audience, only an implied one.

6 As James A. Reither and Douglas Vipond suggest ("Writing as Collaboration," *College English* 51 [1989]: 855-67), the kinds of collaborative efforts that Ede and Lunsford describe, whereby comments and criticisms function as "feedback to guide revisions," bind those respondents up within the text. Additionally, they argue that the suppression of collaborators—"assessors, surrogate editors"—may be peculiar to this field: "In other disciplines with other conventions governing these matters—chemistry or biology, for example—trusted assessors might well [be] listed as authors" (859).
In *The Idea of the Renaissance* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1989) William Kerrigan and Gordon Braden explain that “the skill of writing traffics at both ends in absent presences. A simulacrum of speech, it diverts language from literal to fictive others whose existence depends on the operations of a solitary’s fantasy” (163).


### Works Cited


Conference

The Mid-Atlantic Writing Centers Association Conference will be held March 13, 1993 at Villanova University in Villanova, Pa. This year's theme is "Conversations about Writing: Faculty, Peer Tutors, and Students." Elaine Maimon will deliver the keynote address. One-page proposals for papers, workshops, or panel discussions should be sent by February 1, 1993 to Karyn Hollis, English Dept., Villanova University, Villanova, PA 19085 (215-645-7872).