Political Science Professor's Editorial Appears in Canadian Newspaper

Brace yourself for a showdown with Saddam

The Globe and Mail Newspaper, Toronto, Canada

By Richard Harknett

Thursday, February 13, 2003 If UN diplomacy over Iraq eventually breaks down, rather than choose exile, Saddam Hussein will more likely elevate tension in a bid to survive in power. In that event, we are likely to witness the first weapons of mass destruction deterrence crisis and war of the 21st century. Governments in Europe and the United States need to prepare their publics for this dangerous moment.

Fifty years of cold war crises suggest that the best time to "use" weapons of mass destruction is before war begins -- as a deterrent threat. Many security-studies specialists credit the presence of nuclear weapons with keeping the Cold War cold. The Americans and Soviets became trapped in a condition of mutual assured destruction and neither pushed their numerous crises over the brink.

Why should we not expect Iraq as the weaker conventional military power to follow a similar strategy? If war becomes unavoidable and Saddam Hussein's core motivation is to remain in power, is the Iraqi leader likely to wait until he's losing the war before using his secret biological, chemical, and perhaps nuclear (radiological) weapons? Or would he brandish them before the fighting starts?

With time running out, Saddam Hussein faces two basic choices: Allow the United Nations to disarm him or openly retain his weapons of mass destruction.

The problem with the first choice is that the Iraqi leader must put his faith in the international community to constrain the United States from overthrowing his regime once he has lost his arsenal. Not very likely. Once disarmed, he would have to assume that Washington would be more, not less inclined to covertly or overtly seek regime change.

Mr. Hussein has to have been watching the tactics of Kim Jong-il of North Korea. Given the risky choice of relying on the unreliable United Nations to block U.S. force after disarmament or depending on one's own capacity to act, it is more likely that the Iraqi leader will, as he has done so consistently for 12 years, attempt to retain his weapons of mass destruction. This will create a crisis with a military power that, unlike in 1990-1991, he can have no illusions about defeating on the battlefield.

At some point, the effort to disarm Iraq will have run its course. Washington will declare the inspection regime a failure and Americans will brace for an Oval Office announcement that military operations will begin after all UN personnel have left Baghdad. This is when we may well experience the deterrence moment.

Volumes of security studies research suggest that a defiant, but calm Saddam Hussein will appear on television to admit that, indeed, Iraq possesses everything the Americans have been citing for years. He will indicate that Iraq will use its arsenal only if attacked. Placing his military on a hair-trigger, he will warn that any indication of U.S. (or Israeli) pre-emptive military action will lead him to disperse chemical, biological and radiological weapons levelling Israel and the northern oil fields of Saudi Arabia.

At this point, the world will face the brink of a war of mass destruction. Public opinion, particularly in Europe, is not ready for this shock. While leaders in Washington, London and Madrid will be vindicated, European citizens will be aghast. There will be calls for a last minute diplomatic intervention to avoid a war (Mr. Hussein's hope). Some will point to Cold War history and conclude that a state of mutual assured destruction is better than war. Washington and London will be pressured to accept a vigilant containment of Iraq. While Saddam Hussein will now have no backers in the world, taking a page out of the North Korean playbook, he will have some hope of living to see another day.

Ultimately, this gambit is unlikely to succeed. Iraq's delivery capacity can be contested and thus, while the Iraqi leader's will to use these weapons should not be questioned, the credibility of his deterrent may be undermined by counteractions. The U.S. military has certainly taken all this into account and the United States will not be deterred.

But, if this is ultimately the case, it is not only good coercive diplomacy to state that explicitly to Iraq now, but good public diplomacy to prepare American domestic and world opinion for a very dangerous moment. The next few weeks require not only intense diplomacy between governments, but intensified engagement with average citizens over the costs and risks of mass-destruction conflict, if one wants support before, during, and after war to hold.

Richard J. Harknett is Fulbright professor at the Diplomatic Academy in Vienna, and teaches at the University of Cincinnati.